The targeting by Israel of Hamas’s negotiating delegation in Doha on 9 September has added a new dimension to this tension, which Ankara views as a serious escalation.
Although not directly involved, Turkey’s mistrust of Israeli manoeuvres in the region has deepened. This article examines the indicators of tension in Turkish–Israeli relations, the potential limits of escalation, and the countermeasures that Turkey is adopting to confront the perceived Israeli threat.
Indicators of tension
Israeli support for Syrian minorities. Israel portrays itself as the protector and advocate of Syrian minorities, particularly the Druze, and has signalled its willingness to open official channels of communication with the Kurds.
It has succeeded in swaying the American position. Through its envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barrack, Washington proposed a quasi-federal or decentralised solution as the optimal framework for the Syrian state—one that guarantees the rights of all ethnic and religious groups.
This, in turn, has encouraged separatist tendencies, prompting the Druze and Alawites to form entities with secessionist aims, such as the Political Council of West and Central Syria and the Druze National Guard.
Such moves anger Ankara, as they undermine the 10 March agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and al-Sharaa to integrate the SDF into Damascus’s political and military structures.
Israeli–American actions have also emboldened the SDF’s procrastination, threatening to slow the “Terrorism-Free Turkey” process and thus disrupt one of Ankara’s top domestic political priorities.
President Erdoğan links the success of Kurdish reconciliation to building a coalition capable of supporting constitutional amendments that would allow him to run for a fourth presidential term—offered in exchange for broadening Kurdish cultural, social, and political rights.
Israel’s targeting of Turkish military interests in Syria. Following Israeli air strikes on Syrian facilities that Turkey had planned to use to establish permanent bases in Damascus and Homs—such as the T-4 Airbase in April—operations expanded to Turkish assets.
In August, an airborne raid near al-Kiswah dismantled surveillance systems that Turkey had installed a decade earlier. In September, Israel struck targets around Latakia and Homs, reportedly including Turkish-made missile warehouses and air-defence equipment.
The strikes occurred just hours after the Syrian Air Force commander visited Ankara, where he met the Turkish Chief of General Staff to deepen military cooperation.
The message was unmistakable: Israel rejects any attempt to rebuild the Syrian army as a unified force, arm it with strategic weapons such as air defences, missiles, and combat aircraft, or employ it as an instrument of Ankara’s regional security ambitions.
Turkey’s suspension of trade with Israel. On 29 August 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced before an extraordinary parliamentary session that Ankara had severed all economic and trade ties with Israel, barred Israeli ships from Turkish ports, closed Turkish airspace to Israeli aircraft, and prohibited Turkish vessels from docking in Israel.
Israel’s targeting of Hamas leaders in Doha. Although separated by hundreds of miles, Ankara does not view Israel’s strikes on Hamas leaders in Doha as detached from its regional concerns.
It considers them a dangerous escalation with broader strategic implications: signalling Israel’s growing reliance on coercive diplomacy, increasing the risk of military friction in Syria, and demonstrating Israel’s willingness to expand operations across the Middle East without restraint.
Such developments raise the risk of attacks on Turkey’s allies and reshape deterrence dynamics in ways that erode Ankara’s control over its security environment, imposing additional costs. They also send a clear warning to Turkey, which hosts Hamas officials and previously uncovered Mossad networks tracking Palestinian and Hamas operatives on its soil.
Even if Israel refrains from acting on such threats, Ankara regards this behaviour as hostile—especially given calls by Israeli and pro-Israel commentators that Turkey could be the next target.
Among them was Hebrew University professor Meir Masri, who posted on X: “Whoever attacks Doha, let him attack Ankara as well,” and US analyst Michael Rubin, who argued in the Middle East Forum that Turkey acts on behalf of terrorists and has already “fired the first shot,” thus granting Israel the right to retaliate. Rubin added that NATO would not invoke Article 5, predicting a US veto and discontent from Sweden and Finland.
Netanyahu’s reference to the Armenian genocide. Departing from Israel’s longstanding policy of avoiding the term “genocide” to describe the Armenian tragedy, Prime Minister Netanyahu casually acknowledged it during a podcast with American businessman Patrick Bet-David. While largely symbolic and not an official institutional position, the remark added yet another layer of strain to relations with Ankara.
Limits of escalation
Despite rising tensions, the prospect of direct war remains remote under current regional and international circumstances. Any escalation is likely to be limited and calculated, falling short of full-scale confrontation. Several factors explain this:
-
Turkey’s NATO membership. Whatever ideological clashes exist between Ankara’s ruling party and Israel, pragmatism shapes relations. Ankara understands the risks of antagonising Israel within the Western security framework, which could expose it to crippling US sanctions and derail its regional ambitions.
-
Collective defence dilemmas. NATO’s Article 5 obliges members to defend any member under attack. Although Israel is not a NATO member, it is Washington’s strategic ally. The idea of the US confronting Israel militarily is inconceivable. Washington, therefore, works to keep Turkish–Israeli tensions below dangerous thresholds, as both Ankara and Tel Aviv are pillars of its “new Middle East” vision.
Consequently, Turkish–Israeli friction—facilitated by US mediation—is kept within safe bounds. Indicators of this include:
-
Economic focus. Turkey escalated in trade and transport rather than diplomacy. Although both countries withdrew ambassadors in 2024, Ankara stopped short of a complete rupture. Economic measures serve as tools for signalling without burning strategic bridges.
-
Incomplete implementation. Despite announcing an airspace ban on 29 August, flights continued as usual, revealing a lack of full enforcement. Similarly, when Ankara declared trade cuts in 2024, goods still reached Israel indirectly via intermediaries. The moves were largely symbolic.
-
Avoiding Hamas targeting on Turkish soil. Reports indicate that Ankara quietly asked Hamas leaders to leave to pre-empt Israeli operations inside Turkey. Israeli officials, too, avoided striking Hamas offices on Turkish territory to prevent a potential NATO crisis. While some commentators floated Ankara as a possible target, such a move remains improbable given Turkey’s regional clout and overlapping interests with Israel in Syria.
Turkish counter-steps
Turkey has nonetheless taken steps to counter what it perceives as Israeli threats:
-
Rebalancing militarily. Ankara is accelerating its defence programmes—unveiling the “Steel Dome” air-defence system, testing the fifth-generation Kaan fighter jet, launching production of the stealth drone Kizilelma, preparing the Altay tank, and building the MUGEM aircraft carrier. It has also signed a deal for 40 Eurofighter Typhoons.
-
Seeking re-entry into the F-35 programme. Erdoğan hopes his relationship with President Trump can pave the way for Turkey’s reinstatement. Congress, however, remains resistant, tying access to conditions such as cutting ties with Hamas, refraining from threatening Israel, halting cooperation with Russia, China, and Iran, and ceasing violations against Greece and Cyprus. Many of these demands clash with Ankara’s current policy. Turkey may offer concessions—such as shelving the S-400 system—to gain approval.
-
Indirect control of the Syrian army. Denied permanent bases in Syria and barred from arming Damascus with strategic weapons, Ankara shifted its strategy to indirect influence—providing training and advisory support to factions integrated into the restructured Syrian army. The aim is to shape Syrian military doctrine to align with Turkey’s national security priorities.
Conclusion
Turkish–Israeli tensions are likely to persist but will remain carefully managed. Despite multiple arenas of rivalry and deep-seated mistrust, both sides recognise the prohibitive costs of an uncontrolled clash. The result is a relationship defined by persistent competition, selective escalation, and reciprocal signalling—a rivalry unlikely to disappear but constrained from escalating into full-blown conflict.
*The writer is a senior researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS).
Short link: