This shift has opened space for new external actors, most notably Turkey, which has moved swiftly to establish itself as a central military and security partner in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad. Ankara’s growing presence reflects a clear transition from the role of arms supplier to that of an active security actor, operating through integrated partnerships that combine weapons sales, training, intelligence support, and logistical infrastructure.
Military coups since 2020 created an enabling environment for this expansion. The withdrawal of French forces and the cooling of U.S. military cooperation produced a tangible security vacuum, particularly in counterterrorism operations and border surveillance. Turkey moved decisively to fill this gap, benefiting from a reputation as a “reliable partner” capable of rapid delivery, flexible contractual arrangements, and lower costs than Western suppliers. Turkish defense systems have also gained appeal by offering operational effectiveness comparable to Russian and Chinese alternatives, while avoiding the political sensitivities associated with both Western conditionality and Russian quasi-military models.
This strategic shift was clearly on display at the Bamako International Defense and Security Exhibition (BAMEX 2025), hosted by Mali from 11 to 14 November 2025 under the supervision of Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries. For the first time, the exhibition witnessed an extensive and largely exclusive Turkish presence. Around 30 Turkish companies—including Baykar, Aselsan, and Otokar—presented integrated defense solutions encompassing armed drones (TB2 and Akinci), armored vehicles, command-and-control systems, electronic warfare tools, and smart munitions. Crucially, the exhibition went beyond static displays, incorporating live field-testing within the Sahelian operational environment itself, underscoring Ankara’s intent to market not individual platforms but a comprehensive, long-term security partnership grounded in effectiveness and trust.
Turkey’s influence in the Sahel is built on a composite model that blends advanced defense technology with training, advisory services, and the gradual embedding of Turkish systems within local military institutions—without the need for large-scale deployment of Turkish combat forces. At the heart of this model lies drone technology. Armed unmanned aerial vehicles have become the backbone of Turkey’s military engagement, reshaping battlefield dynamics by offering persistent surveillance and precision strike capabilities at a fraction of the cost of Western platforms and without the political or bureaucratic constraints typically imposed by European or American suppliers.
Turkish drones, particularly the Akinci, feature payload capacities reaching 1,500 kilograms and endurance exceeding 25 hours, making them well suited for reconnaissance and strike missions across the Sahel’s vast and difficult terrain. Integrated smart munitions and sensor systems further enhance their appeal, binding local militaries to Turkish supply chains, training programs, and maintenance networks over the long term. These capabilities have produced direct operational effects. In Mali, Turkish drones supported the army’s recapture of Kidal and enabled precision strikes against rebel groups. In Niger, they strengthened surveillance along the borders with Libya and Mali. In Burkina Faso, they provided operational support to government forces in the north and east, while in Chad they replaced French aircraft at forward bases following the suspension of cooperation with Paris, with Turkish technicians remaining to provide ongoing operational and maintenance support.
Alongside drones, Ankara has supplied a range of armored vehicles and ground systems tailored to the Sahel’s security challenges. Platforms such as Kirpi, Ejder Yalçın, and Hızır have altered the nature of patrols and convoy operations, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, where they replaced heavy, maintenance-intensive Western equipment. These vehicles offer improved protection against improvised explosive devices and greater mobility between isolated military positions. In Niger, lighter tactical vehicles have enabled rapid deployment along porous borders and facilitated pursuit of cross-border armed groups in areas poorly suited to heavy Western platforms. In Chad, cooperation is increasingly focused on supplying low-cost, high-endurance vehicles to enhance the readiness of ground forces operating across vast desert spaces.
Turkey’s engagement also places strong emphasis on training and advisory programs. Rather than focusing solely on senior officers, Ankara has prioritized non-commissioned officers and elite units, delivering specialized courses in counterterrorism, guerrilla warfare, crisis management, and intelligence integration. In Mali, Turkish teams trained special forces and rapid intervention units in asymmetric warfare adapted to forest and savannah terrain. In Burkina Faso, efforts focused on improving counter-ambush tactics and enhancing the readiness of counterterrorism and gendarmerie units. In Niger, Turkish trainers concentrated on border guard units and rapid-response teams, emphasizing combat intelligence collection and its integration into command-and-control systems. In Chad, cooperation is oriented toward building desert surveillance units capable of operating new systems across open and hostile terrain.
Crucially, Ankara’s role does not end with equipment delivery or training. Turkey has invested in establishing maintenance, logistics, and supply networks that ensure the continuous operation of Turkish systems and embed a permanent institutional presence within local defense structures. Joint drone maintenance centers in Mali allow sustained operations through direct supply lines from Ankara. In Niger, Turkey has established operational support points in the north, enhancing Niamey’s ability to conduct long-duration aerial patrols over the Libya–Mali border triangle. In Burkina Faso, field maintenance infrastructure has ensured the continuous deployment of armored vehicles along critical routes, while cooperation with Chad is moving toward laying the foundations of a logistical network to support new systems incrementally.
These trends are reflected in arms transfer data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which shows a steady increase in Turkish defense exports to Sahel countries over recent years.
Selected Turkish Arms Exports to Sahel Countries (2018–2024)
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Beyond official state-to-state cooperation, Turkey has also relied on private military actors to expand its footprint with limited political exposure. Companies such as SADAT have reportedly operated in Mali and Niger, providing training to selected units, including security formations linked to transitional authorities. Reports also point to the presence of Syrian fighters in Niger since 2023, tasked with protecting oil facilities, mining sites, and military bases, with limited involvement in operations. This model allows Ankara to expand influence at relatively low cost while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability.
Turkey’s objectives in the Sahel extend well beyond immediate security cooperation. Ankara is working to build long-term defense partnerships that position it as a security partner rather than a supplier, transforming the region into a sustainable market for Turkish defense industries. At the same time, the Sahel offers Turkey strategic depth, linking its growing presence in West Africa to its established foothold in Libya and its broader ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Access to critical minerals adds a further layer to this engagement. Lithium and gold in Mali, uranium in Niger, and gold in Burkina Faso are increasingly important for advanced manufacturing, defense industries, and clean energy technologies. From this perspective, security engagement functions as a tool for protecting future investments and ensuring access to strategic resources in a region marked by intense international competition.
At the strategic level, Turkey’s expanding presence in the Sahel is reshaping regional power balances. It reduces local dependence on Western military intervention, increases Ankara’s influence over national security decision-making, and deepens competition with France, while offering an alternative to Russian security models. As a NATO member operating independently in Africa, Turkey has positioned the Sahel as a key pillar in its broader foreign and security strategy.
Taken together, Turkey’s approach to the Sahel marks a clear turning point. By combining advanced technology, training, intelligence presence, and logistical networks, Ankara has moved decisively from arms supplier to influential security actor. As French and American roles continue to recede, Turkey has succeeded in filling part of the security vacuum, embedding itself within local defense structures and extending its influence beyond military cooperation into the core of regional security governance—potentially reshaping the competitive landscape of the Sahel in the years ahead.
*The writer is a Senior Researcher, African Studies Unit at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS)
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