These transformations touch upon one of the deep foundations upon which Israel has based its relationship with the Western world for decades. Israel has presented itself not only as a military power and a strategic ally, but also as a special moral case, born of a major historical trauma. Because of this trauma, it deserves an exceptional degree of political and security understanding at the Western and global levels (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).
Following the shifts within Jewish consciousness after the Gaza war, particularly among security, diplomatic, intellectual, and civil society elites, provides insight into whether the legitimacy that surrounded Israel in the West still functions as effectively, or whether it has entered a phase of slow erosion. The effects of this erosion are not necessarily visible in the immediate decisions of governments, but they are reshaping the political and moral environment in which Western governments operate (Allin & Simon, 2016).
The end of Israeli exceptionalism
For decades, major Jewish institutions in the United States and Britain, along with broad segments of the Israeli elite, helped to solidify the seemingly stable and unquestionable equation: that Israel is a state that survived historical persecution, is threatened in a hostile environment, and is therefore entitled to a wide margin of support or understanding, even when its policies in Gaza are questionable.
Or the West Bank is subject to criticism. This consensus did not mean the absence of dissent. There have always been Jewish voices critical of Zionism, the occupation, or Israeli wars. What is new is that criticism is no longer confined to the ideological or academic fringes, but is now emerging from within circles that were previously part of the very structure protecting the consensus.
Recent examples include statements by former Mossad chief Tamir Pardo, former Israeli negotiator Daniel Levy, and the American Jewish intellectual Peter Beinart, who emerged from the heart of Zionist liberalism, as well as American Jewish movements that have become capable of occupying the public sphere with slogans calling for an end to the war and refusing to speak on behalf of Jews in support of Israeli policies (Associated Press, 2023; Beinart, 2025; Levy, 2024).
This shift does not mean that Jews in the West or Israel are moving in one direction. Quite the opposite. The current landscape is rife with division and conflict, not with a consensus on supporting the Israeli state in its brutal practices against civilians. Some institutions remain deeply committed to defending Israel, such as AIPAC. In the American political sphere, organizations like AIPAC, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), focus much of their work on combating antisemitism (Anti-Defamation League, 2024) and are highly critical of left-wing Jewish organizations like Jewish Voice for Peace.
Conversely, younger generations and more liberal or progressive segments of society no longer readily accept the automatic link between Jewish identity and the unconditional defense of Israeli state policies. Therefore, the essence of the phenomenon is not a fleeting "awakening" or a unified moral shift, but rather a transition from a disciplined consensus to an open space of struggle over meaning among Jews worldwide: the meaning of Judaism, the meaning of Zionism, the meaning of security, and the meaning of responsibility towards the Palestinians (Jewish Voice for Peace, n.d.; Pew Research Center, 2024).
The old structure of this consensus rested on three interconnected pillars.
The first pillar was memory, particularly the memory of the Holocaust and the long history of antisemitism in Europe that preceded and accompanied it. This memory granted Israel a special place in the Western imagination, not only as a state, but indeed as a historical necessity.
The second pillar is security, that is, the perception of Israel as a small, threatened entity that needs exceptional means to ensure its survival.
The third pillar is diplomacy, that is, the promise that control over the Palestinians is not a permanent situation, and that the Oslo process and the two-state solution will ultimately lead to a settlement that restores the balance between Israeli security and Palestinian rights.
These three pillars have allowed Jewish liberals, especially in the United States and Britain, to maintain a position that can be described as "composite," consisting of core principles: criticism of settlements, concern about the Israeli right wing, and humanitarian sympathy for the Palestinians, but without abandoning or leaving the general framework of support for Israel (Beinart, 2012; Thrall, 2017; Telhami, 2024).
Levy: The conscience of a vigilant diplomat
However, the diplomatic pillar collapsed before its collapse was officially acknowledged. The language of the two-state solution remained present in statements, speeches, and reports, but the facts on the ground moved in a different direction.
The last three decades have witnessed a fierce expansion of settlements in the West Bank, a complex system of checkpoints, roads, and security zones, and a political and geographical separation between Gaza and the West Bank, along with the erosion of the Palestinian Authority's legitimacy and the rise of increasingly right-wing Israeli governments that do not treat a Palestinian state as a serious prospect to be achieved.
Hence, the importance of the critique offered by Daniel Levy, because he speaks from within the experience of negotiation. Levy was part of the Israeli negotiating team during the Oslo process and the Taba talks, and he became one of the most prominent voices arguing that what was called the "peace process" had become a mechanism for managing the conflict rather than working to find a solution to it.
In an article in The Guardian in August 2024, Daniel Levy wrote that the US diplomatic strategy toward Israel and Gaza was failing, and that US policies were strengthening Benjamin Netanyahu's position instead of imposing a clear political price for ending the war or changing course (Levy, 2024).
It is worth noting that Daniel Levy's analysis is important because it shatters what might be called the "comfortable illusion" within which a segment of Western liberalism has lived, an illusion that has consistently criticized the occupation while simultaneously continuing to reiterate the necessity of a two-state solution as if it were achievable using the same old tools. In this logic, diplomacy becomes a convenient way to postpone the pressing moral question of how Israel treats the Palestinians.
The rights-based approach, which Levy and other scholars are developing to challenge the status quo, shifts the question from "Where will the borders be drawn in the future?" to "What rights do people currently possess under the existing system?" This shift from geography to rights cannot be considered marginal. It facilitates the transition from dealing with a postponed settlement to explicitly addressing the present situation, and from a map that no longer serves the purpose to seeking a standard of equality that cannot be indefinitely postponed.
Levi argues that the time has come to move from trying to keep a dead peace process alive to an approach focused on rights, the rules-based international order, and human security for both Palestinians and Israelis (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021).
Pardo: A rebellion from the heart of the security establishment
Within the Israeli security establishment, Tamir Pardo represents a different point in this shift. Pardo is not a left-wing activist or an American intellectual writing from New York or London, but rather a former head of the Mossad, one of the very figures most closely associated with the concept of Israeli national security.
When he stated in an interview with the Associated Press that Israel is implementing an apartheid system in the West Bank because of the existence of two different legal systems for Palestinians and Israelis in the same territory, the significance of the statement lay not only in the terminology but also in the speaker's position. Such a stark characterization from the former head of the security establishment cannot be entirely reduced to mere rhetoric of solidarity or morality. Rather, it represents a shift that points to an internal rift in the understanding of the nature of the existing system (Associated Press, 2026).
The essence of Pardo's position is that it contributes to transforming the occupation from an external moral issue into an internal strategic dilemma. A system that governs two peoples with two different legal frameworks not only produces suffering for the Palestinians but also imposes on Israel a structural contradiction between the Jewishness of the state, its democracy, and its long-term control over a people to whom it does not grant equal rights.
This is not a new dilemma, but it has become more acute because the idea of a "temporary" situation is no longer convincing to either domestic or international audiences. The West Bank no longer appears as a land suspended in limbo awaiting a near-term settlement, but rather as a cumulative system of daily, violent control. Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip has transformed from an isolated arena against which Israel conducts intermittent military operations into a violent manifestation of a broader logic based on managing Palestinians through force, siege, and political disenfranchisement, instead of addressing their national and human rights (Freilich, 2018; Scheindlin, 2023).
The limits of power have become clearly evident in Gaza. Israel has managed to destroy part of Hamas' military infrastructure, eliminate prominent leaders and thousands of fighters, and redraw some maps of territorial control. However, it has not been able to generate new legitimacy through force alone, nor to transform a besieged and devastated society into a stable space, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had hoped.
This is the gap between the operational victory Netanyahu boasts of and the strategic failure of his government. A state may win a battle but lose its ability to explain to the world the meaning of the unequal war it is waging relentlessly. This state may impose calm for a time, but it deepens the conditions that make the next explosion more likely. In this sense, Israel’s crisis, as understood by critics of its government’s performance within the Jewish community itself, revolves around its ability to use force and brutality against the Palestinians over years of a brutal military campaign, but this same force is incapable of providing a clear political horizon (International Crisis Group, 2024).
Within Israel, this criticism remains hampered by powerful resistance factors: the shock of the 7 October attacks, the fear of Hamas, and the decline in trust in any Palestinian partner. Therefore, the influence of voices like Tamir Pardo on day-to-day political decision-making should not be overstated. However, it remains significant because it reveals a deep rift that has reached the security establishment itself. Former security leaders can no longer justify prolonged control with the logic of “temporary necessity.” There is a growing awareness among some former officials that this necessity has become entrenched, and that entrenched structures generate their own risks. This awareness, even if it does not translate into policy, remains a significant indicator.
The Israeli society's shift to the right
Understanding the transformations within Jewish consciousness in Israel, Britain, and the United States is incomplete without considering a parallel and equally important trend: the unprecedented shift to the right within Israeli society itself. This trend is not merely an electoral shift or the rise of a particular government, but rather reflects a profound reshaping of the psychological and political structure that governs Israelis' views on security, the Palestinians, and the possibility of a settlement. While segments of the Jewish diaspora are increasingly engaged in a moral reassessment of the events in Gaza and the West Bank, Israeli society is moving in the opposite direction, toward greater rigidity, intransigence, and skepticism regarding any political horizon.
This rightward drift is the product of a long accumulation, not a single moment. It began with the collapse of confidence in the Oslo process, the erosion of the Zionist left, the escalation of settlement activity, and the growing power of religious and nationalist parties. However, it became decisively entrenched with successive rounds of violence, reaching a new peak after the 7 October attacks and the Gaza War.
In this context, the idea of "peace" no longer constitutes a central horizon within Israeli society. For large segments of the population, the concept of peace has become associated with failure or danger. The dominant question has become not how to end the conflict, but how to prevent a recurrence of the catastrophe. This shift in priorities has already redefined all of Israeli domestic politics, from managing negotiations to managing threats, and from seeking a settlement to establishing deterrence, according to the perceptions and control of the religious and nationalist right wing.
The outlines of this shift are clearly visible in attitudes toward Gaza. Even with the decline in enthusiasm for the idea of direct administration of the strip, there is no real trust within Israeli society in any independent Palestinian alternative, whether represented by the Palestinian Authority or international arrangements. This lack of trust does not create a neutral political vacuum, but rather reinforces the logic of indirect or long-term control, even if it is not explicitly stated as such. In other words, there may not be a consensus on how to govern Gaza, but there is broad agreement on refusing to hand it over to a Palestinian actor perceived as incapable or unreliable.
In the West Bank, the shift has been even deeper and more persistent. Settlement expansion, the increasing complexity of the security apparatus, and the decline in talk of a Palestinian state have all entrenched a reality that is no longer seen by large segments of the Israeli population as a temporary situation, but as a stable arrangement with which they can live. At this juncture, the right wing has transformed from a political stance into a comprehensive cognitive framework, a way of understanding the land, the population, the borders, and the threat. The Israeli right wing is no longer merely advocating for a hardline approach; it has become, to varying degrees, the language through which society speaks about itself and its surroundings.
It can be argued that this trend is fueled by an undeniable psychological factor: the fear that has been exacerbated by extreme right-wing policies. The shock of 7 October was not simply a security event, but a collective experience that redefined the sense of vulnerability and threat. In the wake of this shock, calls for caution and a hardline stance become more palatable, while calls for compromise or concessions appear risky. Right-wing policies gain emotional legitimacy because they present themselves as a natural response to an existential threat, rather than as an ideological choice open to calm debate. This transformation has not eliminated internal divisions.
Israeli society is witnessing widespread protests against the government, sharp criticism of the way the war has been conducted, and conflicts over domestic issues such as the role of the religious community and the nature of the political system. However, these divisions, important as they are, do not necessarily signify a return of the left or the rise of a political alternative that reinstates the Palestinian issue as the core of the crisis.
Often, these protests remain directed against the government's performance, corruption, or failures, not against the structure of control itself. This makes the drift to the right more profound than mere partisan alignment, as it persists even within the opposition. Tamir Pardo's remarks can be seen as a warning to Israeli society that it has become more accepting of the new reality, to the point where it no longer perceives it as a stark contradiction to its self-definition. This adaptation to a long-term situation is what transforms the temporary into the permanent, and security measures into a political structure.
In the same vein, the shift in Western Jewish consciousness is not occurring in parallel with internal Israeli moderation, but rather in the face of increasing Israeli intransigence. A liberal Jew in New York or London might see Gaza as a test of conscience and values, while an Israeli in Tel Aviv or a West Bank settlement sees it as a test of the state's ability to survive and prevent a recurrence of the tragedy. The logic of the former stems from the language of rights, while the latter is based on the language of security. The wider the gap between these two languages, the more difficult it becomes to maintain a unified Jewish framework for interpreting the conflict.
It should be noted that this divergence between the two sides will not remain merely intellectual; it could transform into political and cultural tension. The more Israeli society shifts to the right, the more difficult it becomes for liberal Jewish elites to defend it unconditionally. And the more criticism from abroad intensifies, the more sectors within Israel feel that this criticism ignores their security reality or downplays the magnitude of the threat they face.
In this way, the disagreement is not limited to policies but extends to the very definition of reality: what constitutes danger, what constitutes justice, and what are the acceptable limits for the use of force.
The drift of Israeli society to the right is not simply a crisis of public image or distorted political discourse, but rather a crisis of increasing divergence between two paths: an internal path that tends toward consolidating control and strengthening security, and an external path within the Jewish diaspora that tends toward questioning this control and redefining it ethically. Between these two paths is forming a chasm that may be one of the most significant features of the coming period, because it reflects not only a difference in positions but also a difference in understanding the meaning of the conflict itself.
Beinart: The harvest of consciousness revisions
On the American domestic front, Peter Beinart is a prime example of a deeper transformation, one of identity and conscience. For years, Beinart was a prominent voice within American Zionist liberalism, advocating for Israel as a viable Jewish and democratic state, provided the occupation ended. However, he gradually shifted to a more radical critique, particularly in his book, Being Jewish After the Destruction of Gaza: A Reckoning. The significance of this shift lies not only in his political stance but also in the reformulation of the question itself: What does it mean to be Jewish after Gaza? Can Jewish memory remain a moral force while the suffering of other people living under occupation is ignored? (Beinart, 2025).
This debate reopens the relationship between memory and politics. Memory, which for decades formed the basis of Israel's defense, is transformed here into a tool of accountability. It is no longer merely a source of legitimacy but also a source of tension, as the memory that calls on the world never to forget the suffering of the Jewish people is increasingly confronted with images of Palestinian suffering that cannot be easily ignored. In this new reality, the question of the crisis deepens: Is memory used to justify exceptions, or to broaden the scope of moral responsibility? (Butler, 2012). This intellectual crisis also resonates in Britain.
In April 2016, The Guardian published a report on warnings from leaders of progressive Judaism in Britain that Israel’s current political direction could pose an existential threat to Judaism itself, not in the sense of an external security threat, but because the state’s policies may become increasingly at odds with the values these rabbis wish to attribute to Judaism. Rabbis Charlie Baginsky and Josh Levy emphasized that criticizing the Israeli government is not treason, but may even be a religious and moral duty, and they called for a broader Jewish space that allows for pluralism and recognizes the Palestinians’ right to self-determination (The Guardian, 2016).
This development in Britain represents a significant turning point because it reveals a different dimension. The debate there is not only political or academic, but extends into the religious sphere itself. When criticism transforms into a religious and ethical discourse, it acquires a different depth, because it challenges not only politics but also the very principle of linking religion to it. This development opens the door to a more profound question: not what Israel is doing, but what Israel means to the Jewish faith itself.
In the United States, these shifts are taking a more dynamic form through organizations like Jewish Voice for Peace and IfNotNow. These movements do not represent all Jews, but they have succeeded in creating a visible presence for what might be called "Jewish critique of the war." These organizations speak not only as allies of the Palestinians but also as Jews who refuse to have their identity used to justify war. This shift is significant because it breaks the monopoly on representing the Jewish voice, the notion that only traditional institutions speak for Jews.
Despite the Anti-Defamation League's attacks on these movements, accusing them of adopting a discourse that undermines consensus and serves pressure campaigns against Israel, this conflict within the US reflects a deep division not only regarding Israel but also regarding the very meaning of solidarity. It raises deeper questions about the nature of solidarity: does it mean unconditional defense, or does it also include criticism when some perceive policies as deviating from values?
Conversely, institutions like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) remain powerful, organized, and influential. In its discourse on the Gaza war, AIPAC asserts that Israel's objectives are to remove Hamas from power, destroy its military infrastructure, free the hostages, and prevent a recurrence of the 7 October attacks. This discourse reflects the persistence of a traditional security logic that views war as a necessity and focuses on operational results as the measure of success (AIPAC, 2024). However, the problem is that this logic, despite its strength within institutions, is no longer sufficient on its own to convince broader segments of public opinion, especially among young people.
The importance of the younger generation becomes evident precisely at this point. Younger generations of Jews in the United States and Britain no longer receive news about Gaza and the West Bank solely through traditional media outlets. They are more exposed to non-traditional sources such as social media platforms, videos, human rights reports, and academic and cultural discussions addressing racism, colonialism, and Israel's excessive violence. This environment no longer produces a single stance but rather a variety of reactions.
The term "security" alone is no longer sufficient to explain everything; other terms have entered the equation, including siege, displacement, international law, collective punishment, inequality, and rights (Pew Research Center, 2024). Pew Research Centre data underscores this complexity. In March 2024, the study showed that 58 percent of Americans believed Israel had legitimate reasons to fight Hamas, but they were divided on the methods used, with 38 percent considering them acceptable and 34 percent unacceptable.
This divergence reflects a divide between acknowledging the security threat and rejecting or questioning the means employed. In another analysis, the centre noted that American Jews themselves express a wide range of emotions, from sadness and anger to fear and exhaustion, and that nine out of 10 believe antisemitism has increased since the beginning of the war. This means the debate is not taking place in a calm moral vacuum, but rather within an environment charged with genuine fear, which explains the sharp division.
In February 2026, Gallup revealed a clear shift in American sympathy for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the historically strong advantage for Israel narrowing and sympathy for the Palestinians reaching relatively unprecedented levels. The data also showed that support for a two-state solution remained high, despite declining confidence in its feasibility (Gallup, 2026). These figures do not signify an immediate political upheaval, but they do indicate a gradual change in public sentiment. It is noteworthy that this shift in public opinion coincides with a persistent and genuine Jewish fear of antisemitism.
Therefore, the debate cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy between moral conscience and political deviation. There is a real tension between two needs: the need for security and the need for moral consistency. This tension is what makes the debate within the Jewish community more complex, because it is not just about Israel, but about what it means to be Jewish in a world experiencing this conflict.
What does this mean strategically?
First, it means that Israel's legitimacy in the West is no longer tested solely in international institutions, but also within Jewish communities themselves. When Jews say that what is happening in Gaza does not represent them, Israel loses some of its ability to present itself as a unified voice for Jews worldwide. This does not eliminate significant support, but it makes it less spontaneous and more open to debate (Allin & Simon, 2016).
Second, this does not mean that American policy will change rapidly. The American-Israeli alliance is too deep to be affected by a single shift in thinking. However, it could become more complex, with increasing pressure within the Democratic Party and the emergence of critical Jewish voices that are difficult to ignore or easily categorize (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).
Third, this shift reinforces the move from a discourse of compromise to a discourse of rights. If the two-state solution remains present in rhetoric but absent in practice, the debate will gradually shift to the question of rights and equality. This does not offer an immediate solution, but it alters the nature of the debate on Palestinian rights and makes it difficult to revert to the old rhetoric without modification (Telhami, 2024).
Fourth, this shift presents both opportunities and challenges for Palestinians. On the one hand, internal Jewish criticism provides important moral cover. On the other hand, this critique should not become a substitute for the Palestinian voice itself. The Palestinian cause needs no moral mediator as much as it needs direct recognition of its rights (Thrall, 2017).
Ultimately, what is happening is not the end of one phase, but the beginning of another, a phase in which consensus is waning and conflict is widening. There is no longer a single voice defining what it means to be Jewish in this conflict, and institutions can no longer monopolize interpretation. This does not mean a collapse of support for Israel, but it does mean that this support is no longer immune from scrutiny.
The Gaza Strip and the West Bank will certainly remain the arenas of direct conflict, but another arena has become no less important: the arena of Jewish consciousness itself. Through intellectual, political, and religious debates, the relationship between identity and state, between security and morality, between memory and responsibility is being redefined. This transformation, despite its slowness and the obstacles it faces, may be one of the most influential factors in the future of the conflict, because it is not only changing the behavior of the actors but also how they understand what they are doing.
Conclusion: Are ideas leading to a Western “Awakening”?
What these shifts within the Jewish elites in Israel, Britain, and the United States reveal is that the new turning point is not merely a difference of opinion, but a fracturing of the equation that has governed Israel's relationship with the West for decades. This equation was based on a delicate balance between a historical memory that legitimizes hardline behavior, a security apparatus that justifies excessive and brutal force, and a diplomacy that promises future compromises.
Today, these elements no longer operate in the same harmonious way. In this context, voices like Pardo, Levy, and Beinart represent a significant new milestone that transcends their own proponents. They reflect a shift in the debate from the margins to the centre, from moral objection to a re-examination of the very structure that produced the consensus.
When this coincides with the rise of critical Jewish movements, a shift in the mood of younger generations, and a division in American public opinion, we are not witnessing an isolated phenomenon, but rather a gradual reshaping of the sphere in which Israel has operated with greater confidence.
This shift may not immediately translate into a change in policies. The balance of power, strategic alliances, and the structure of the political system in the United States all maintain support for Israel. What is changing, however, is the nature of that support. Support is no longer based on a tacit, unquestionable consensus. At the same time, defending policies has become more costly, and claiming to represent a unified Jewish position is less convincing to a public whose convictions have shifted considerably.
Ultimately, the paper clearly indicates that the pro-Israel consensus in the West no longer functions as it once did. This consensus has entered a phase characterized by open conflict of ideas, where multiple narratives coexist within the Jewish community itself.
While Israel continues to rely on force to control reality, it simultaneously faces a different challenge: maintaining the ability to explain this reality to an audience no longer willing to accept old explanations unquestioningly.
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