According to the joint statement carried by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), the agreement seeks to “strengthen common security and promote security, peace and stability in the region and the world.” It provides for stronger collective deterrence against aggression and establishes that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all of them. It also calls for an expansion of defence and military cooperation across a broad range of fields.
The agreement comes at a moment of profound uncertainty in the regional security order. Its significance therefore extends beyond the immediate military commitments contained in its text. It reflects Saudi Arabia’s growing concern over the reliability of existing security guarantees, the changing character of regional warfare, and the possibility that the current conflict may ultimately produce an entirely different strategic architecture in the Middle East.
Why Security Has Come to Dominate Saudi Arabia’s Regional Strategy
A review of Saudi agreements and diplomatic initiatives over recent years reveals the extent to which security has become the dominant consideration in the Kingdom’s external relations, particularly with major Arab and Muslim states. Even a limited survey of communiqués, agreements and summit declarations involving Saudi Arabia points to an increasingly systematic effort to insulate the Kingdom against mounting regional and international threats, especially against the backdrop of the US war with Iran and the network of forces aligned with Tehran.
One of the defining features of the Saudi conception of national security is its connection to a wider Arab and Islamic security environment, a connection rooted partly in the Kingdom’s religious and historical position. Saudi Arabia’s longstanding security relationship with the United States never entirely displaced the political, strategic and cultural ties binding the Kingdom to its Arab and Islamic surroundings. What has changed is the practical significance attached to these relationships. For decades, the American security guarantee occupied the central position in Saudi defence calculations. That guarantee has now become less predictable as its assumptions grow more ambiguous and its established conventions weaken under a US administration that has demonstrated little inclination to regard previous commitments as permanently binding.
The result is a growing Saudi interest in activating an Arab-Islamic security framework that previously served primarily as a source of political legitimacy and diplomatic support. Riyadh increasingly appears to regard this wider environment as a potential structure for operational security cooperation.
The timing of the Mecca agreement is particularly revealing. Only four days before it was concluded, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a multinational maritime defence coalition. Like the Mecca agreement, the new coalition remains open to additional members. Chiefs of staff or their representatives from 43 countries participated in the meeting establishing the initiative, alongside the European Union delegation to Saudi Arabia. Fourteen countries — all Arab or Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye — announced their accession, while several others expressed support and indicated that they were completing the domestic procedures required to join the joint declaration.
This sequence suggests that the commitments undertaken by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in Mecca extend well beyond maritime defence or the security of the Red Sea, Bab Al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, which constitute the principal operational concerns of the maritime coalition.
The same security preoccupation has become increasingly visible in Saudi public debate. Prominent Saudi commentators have displayed a growing awareness of the erosion of the traditional American security guarantee and of Washington’s apparent desire to reduce its exposure in the region. These concerns intensified after the Trump administration proved unable to compel Iran to alter the arrangements it had imposed around the Strait of Hormuz, and after Washington concluded a 14-point agreement whose provisions were widely perceived as delivering substantial gains to Tehran.
Writing in Asharq Al-Awsat on 4 August 2026 under the headline “On the Anniversary of the Invasion of Kuwait… The Risk of Invasion Remains,” prominent Saudi commentator Abdulrahman Al-Rashed concluded that the principal lesson of August 1990 was that Gulf security could no longer rest on assumptions or external guarantees alone. It required stronger indigenous military capabilities and deeper defence integration. His final warning was even starker: “After this war, the Gulf will be on its own.”
The Gulf states’ conduct during the war has reinforced such anxieties. National approaches repeatedly prevailed over collective action, exposing some of the deepest uncertainties surrounding Gulf security. Although individual Gulf states successfully intercepted Iranian missiles and drones, they failed to demonstrate an effective collective deterrence capability through the Gulf Cooperation Council. At the regional level, their actions rarely went beyond securing their respective national borders. Each government concentrated overwhelmingly on its own survival and national security, raising uncomfortable questions about the practical value of the collective-security arrangements developed since the GCC was established.
The proliferation of unilateral security initiatives has become particularly striking. At times, one GCC member may have little knowledge of what its neighbour is doing to protect itself from Iranian attacks, what understandings it has reached with Tehran, or what arrangements it has negotiated with third countries to secure its territory.
Mutual suspicions have been compounded by the uneven distribution of Iranian attacks during the war. Some Gulf states sustained heavy strikes during the opening days only to disappear almost entirely from Iran’s targeting map later in the conflict. Various reports have referred to financial arrangements and private visits intended to avert further Iranian attacks through bilateral understandings. Other Gulf countries experienced fluctuating levels of attack, with the intensity of strikes changing substantially as the war progressed.
Against this background, the Mecca agreement represents more than another defence accord. It reflects a search for additional layers of strategic insurance at a moment when neither American protection nor intra-GCC collective defence appears sufficient on its own.
The Questions Raised by the Mecca Agreement
One of the most consequential questions raised by the agreement concerns the actual scope of its obligations, the conditions governing their activation, and the behaviour expected from each signatory during a crisis or war. Would the three countries act automatically when one member comes under attack, or would military assistance require a formal request from the threatened state? What would Pakistan and Türkiye be expected to do if Saudi Arabia faced Houthi drone or missile attacks — a level of threat below full-scale war with Iran or Israel? Conversely, what would Saudi Arabia and Türkiye do if Pakistan faced a major confrontation with India? And how would Pakistan and Saudi Arabia respond if Türkiye came under Israeli military attack?
Another question concerns the relationship between the Mecca commitments and the pre-existing security and defence obligations of the three signatories. How will defensive operations be distinguished from offensive ones? Can the alliance deter attacks by non-state actors such as the Houthis? More fundamentally, what could Türkiye and Pakistan do against Houthi attacks that the United States itself proved unable to halt through Operation Prosperity Guardian, the multinational maritime coalition Washington announced and began leading on 19 December 2023?
The agreement has also generated questions about countries outside the new framework. Egypt participated in meetings of the quadrilateral mechanism with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye, yet did not join the Mecca agreement. The position of the United Arab Emirates is similarly important, particularly given the simultaneous signs of convergence and divergence that have characterised Abu Dhabi’s recent relations with Riyadh.
There are broader geopolitical questions as well. How might the trilateral alliance affect the future of the Abraham Accords, particularly given the Trump administration’s decision to link a civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia to the Kingdom’s accession to the accords? And how does the new defence arrangement interact with the much wider India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023 as an ambitious network connecting Asia, the Gulf, Israel and Europe through trade and infrastructure?
These questions were almost certainly present in the calculations of the three governments. One important consideration is that all three countries maintain strong strategic relations with the United States. The Mecca alliance should therefore not automatically be interpreted as a rebellion against the Saudi-American relationship or as an attempt to construct an explicitly anti-American security architecture. It may instead represent an effort to broaden Saudi strategic options while remaining within a wider system in which Washington continues to play an important role.
Three Scenarios: What Can the Mecca Alliance Deliver for Saudi Security?
Given the complex circumstances surrounding the formation of the trilateral alliance, the uncertain scope of its activities and the practical difficulties involved in activating its commitments, three principal scenarios appear to have shaped Saudi calculations.
Deterrence Through the Weight of Trilateral Defence
The first scenario views the alliance primarily as an instrument of deterrence through political and military signalling. Its immediate purpose would be to create the perception of collective strength and thereby reduce the likelihood of aggression without necessarily requiring the three countries to undertake major joint military operations.
Such a rationale would be particularly relevant at the present moment. Saudi Arabia faces growing pressure after the Houthis announced what they called a strategy of “blockade for blockade” and threatened the Kingdom’s East-West crude-oil pipeline, or Petroline. The pipeline has acquired even greater strategic importance as an alternative artery carrying crude from the Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu following Iran’s disruption of oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Recent Houthi attacks against Yanbu, Najran and Jizan have further heightened Saudi concerns.
At least during the alliance’s formative stage, deterrent signalling may therefore constitute its principal function while the three governments develop operational plans, command mechanisms and rules governing collective action.
Such an arrangement could be activated initially at a relatively low level, allowing each party to fulfil its obligations without becoming trapped in conflicts it did not choose. This consideration is especially important in asymmetric warfare of the kind that confronted the United States in the Red Sea, and in potential confrontations with regional actors willing to accept levels of military risk that conventional states often avoid — whether Israel, whose recent conduct has repeatedly exceeded conventional assumptions of strategic restraint, or Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose calculations do not always correspond to those of a traditional state military.
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly resorted to coalition-building in response to urgent threats. In March 2015, it established the Saudi-led coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognised government against the Houthis under Operation Decisive Storm. On 15 December of the same year, Riyadh announced the creation of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, eventually bringing together 43 countries.
Both organisations, headquartered in Saudi Arabia, provided political umbrellas for Saudi policy and, to varying degrees, Saudi military action. The new alliance may similarly derive much of its initial value from deterrence, prestige, intelligence-sharing and enhanced military coordination rather than from automatic collective warfare.
Yet this raises an obvious question. If Saudi Arabia already established a 43-member Islamic military coalition to combat terrorism, and if it classifies the Houthis as a terrorist organisation, why was that coalition not mobilised against them? Why was a separate maritime defence coalition required? And why create an additional trilateral framework with Türkiye and Pakistan when both countries already belong to the Islamic coalition?
Part of the answer may lie in Riyadh’s desire to modernise the missions and functions of its security partnerships and revive the strategic value of its relationships with Ankara and Islamabad. The central question nevertheless remains: what can Pakistan and Türkiye contribute operationally against the highly specialised threats posed by modern and asymmetric warfare?
A further possibility cannot be excluded. As with the Arab coalition in Yemen, the trilateral framework could eventually provide political and strategic cover for a renewed Saudi military campaign inside Yemen.
A Pre-emptive Alliance Against a Dramatic Escalation of the Iran War
The second scenario sees the Mecca agreement as an anticipatory response to the possibility of a dramatic new phase in the confrontation with Iran.
President Trump has repeatedly announced ceasefires, agreements and diplomatic breakthroughs during the conflict, only for some of those announcements subsequently to be contradicted, qualified or denied. His statements regarding the future of both the war and the negotiations have often pointed in different directions, making Washington’s ultimate intentions difficult to discern. The result has been considerable uncertainty about the war’s trajectory and final objectives.
A growing school of thought holds that if the conflict ends with an arrangement resembling the 14-point agreement, the consequences could extend far beyond Iran itself and potentially mark a historic contraction of American power. Such strategic anxieties remain present within Washington. Some scenarios compare the possible geopolitical consequences of the Iran war to the 1956 Suez Crisis, which accelerated the decline of British and French imperial power. In this reading, the United States could emerge from the conflict considerably weaker than it entered it.
Yet a decisive American withdrawal from the Gulf cannot be assumed, particularly while military deployments continue and Israeli pressure for further action against Iran remains intense.
The Mecca agreement may therefore constitute Saudi preparation for a far more dramatic scenario that Riyadh believes could unfold if Washington and Israel resume or expand military operations against Tehran. Should the United States move towards regime-change operations in Iran, the threats confronting Saudi Arabia would multiply — from Iran itself, from the Houthis, and from Tehran-aligned Shia militias in Iraq.
A renewed war would probably intensify Houthi operations in the Red Sea and increase Revolutionary Guard activity across the region. The resulting escalation could exceed anything witnessed during previous phases of the confrontation, potentially producing a comprehensive regional war with wider international consequences. Under the most extreme scenario, the Iranian and Ukrainian theatres could become increasingly interconnected as Israeli attacks on Iran resume and major powers find themselves drawn more deeply into overlapping conflicts.
It is under precisely these circumstances that the strategic logic of the trilateral alliance becomes most apparent. The mere possibility that Pakistan and Türkiye might participate in Saudi Arabia’s defence could complicate Iranian military planning and reduce the Revolutionary Guard’s willingness to strike Saudi territory. It could also diminish the credibility of threats involving a ground attack against the Kingdom.
Under this scenario, the trilateral arrangement would evolve from a symbolic deterrent into something closer to a mission-oriented coalition, capable of operational activation should the conflict widen. In essence, it would constitute Saudi strategic insurance against what the United States and Israel might do to Iran — and against what Iran and its regional allies might subsequently do to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
The Foundation of a Broader Post-War Regional Order
The third scenario places the Mecca agreement within an even wider strategic framework. It begins from the assumption that the Middle East is moving through a period in which the signals of continuing war coexist with indications of stabilisation, accommodation and possible normalisation. The final shape of the regional order remains unsettled.
Saudi Arabia is strengthening its military and defensive capabilities against the possibility of further escalation. It is simultaneously developing Arab and Islamic security coalitions and increasing its capacity for autonomous defence as a hedge against a potential reduction in American engagement. Some observers interpret both the maritime defence coalition and the Mecca agreement as evidence of an emerging Saudi strategic path distinct from the Emirati-Indian-Israeli axis.
Yet Saudi Arabia has simultaneously maintained deep engagement with Washington. On 22 July 2026, the Kingdom concluded a 30-year agreement with the United States on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Riyadh therefore appears to be preparing for several possible futures at once, preserving strategic flexibility and adopting a pragmatic approach towards competing scenarios.
Seen from this perspective, the trilateral alliance has several overlapping purposes. Its ultimate function could eventually converge with the wider objective of regional stabilisation and with the American vision of an expanded normalisation framework. The agreement could thus provide Saudi Arabia with a form of strategic landing gear: a mechanism allowing the Kingdom to move safely from an environment dominated by war into a different regional security order.
The Mecca framework should consequently not be understood solely as a military alliance. It may also represent a strategic coalition with a political horizon extending beyond the present conflict.
Several considerations reinforce this interpretation, although it rests more on an assessment of emerging balances than on definitive information. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan all maintain important strategic relationships with the United States. None has an obvious interest in becoming embroiled in a major war against Iran, a large Muslim country with which each maintains distinct strategic interests. All three governments also understand the constraints imposed by the relationship between Washington and Israel and the limits within which they can manoeuvre.
They may therefore have little objection to a regional settlement that ultimately produces broader normalisation with Israel and brings the present cycle of war to an end. The participation of all three countries in the Gaza Peace Council adds another dimension to this potential convergence.
The Mecca agreement can therefore be understood as the embryo of a wider regional strategic framework. Under present conditions, it provides a military deterrence umbrella. Over the longer term, however, it may help prepare the ground for a regional order that transcends the current war.
Such an order could eventually extend beyond Arab-Israeli normalisation to include Iran itself, replacing the present architecture of confrontation and proxy warfare with a different balance based on recognised states, formal security arrangements and negotiated regional interests. If that occurs, the lasting importance of the Mecca agreement will lie not simply in whether its mutual-defence clause is ever activated, but in whether it becomes one of the mechanisms through which the Middle East moves from an era of overlapping wars and proxy networks towards a new, if still uncertain, regional security architecture.
The writer is the Editor-in-Chief of the Arab Strategic Report published by Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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