It is too early to conclude that the shift in the balance of power is a result of Saudi King Salman’s policies, but it is also difficult not to link changes in the criteria of conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Iraq to this balance adjustment. Also, the ability of Riyadh and its allies to retake control from Tehran — in this round at least.

Yemen was a crucial test for the Sunni Arab camp in the first semi-direct confrontation with Tehran since the end of the Iraq-Iran war. It was not only a test of military readiness, managing combat beyond borders, and other traditional military assessments, but more importantly it was a test of the political and strategic ability of the Saudi regime itself, in terms of taking the initiative, crisis management and carefully transforming one phase to another, as well as not becoming too embroiled in the Yemen trap.

Several times, Tehran wagered that Riyadh would not be able to counter quick and simultaneous Iranian movement on several fronts. But every time, Tehran has lost miserably. In Yemen, it tried to manage the situation in its usual manner. It tried to bend in the face of Operation Decisive Storm and use it to reorganise the ranks of its mercenaries, to lure Saudi Arabia into an endless on-the-ground militia war that would deplete Riyadh's resources without leading to any real victory. Leaders in Tehran lost this wager after anxiously waiting for Saudi Arabia’s ground invasion, day by day. It never came.

Tehran also wagered on utilising Arab and world preoccupation with the southernmost part of the Arabian Peninsula in order to make gains on the Syrian front. Once again, Iran was stumped by a sudden advance of four Syrian revolutionary resistance factions that turned the tables on the Bashar Al-Assad regime, at a time when it is the most vulnerable since the start of the revolution. The factions did not close ranks and advance by themselves. Riyadh and its allies helped, no doubt.

Another blow to renowned Iranian cunning was a decision by the US Congress to arm Sunni and Kurdish provinces in Iraq to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This was the public reason, but it was also to stop Iran’s sectarian advance under the pretense of fighting ISIL. Here, too, you should look for Riyadh behind the scenes.

The writer is co-founder of Egypt’s Nour Party and serves as the party chairman’s assistant for media affairs.