So, how does the United States manage potential conflict scenarios between Israel and Hamas, and what do analysts and experts in Washington expect the outcome of this conflict to be?
Deterring Hezbollah
The Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, officially declared war on Palestinian armed factions in Gaza, with Hamas at the forefront, after their surprise attack on southern Israel.
The United States announced the deployment of its strike force to support Israel, yet Washington aimed to limit the expected fighting in the coming days and weeks between Israel and Palestinian armed factions in Gaza and ensure it does not spread to other areas.
Hence, the American military display served as a deterrent to Hezbollah, which began shelling the Shebaa Farms as a form of a threat to indicate its readiness to enter the conflict and support Hamas.
Hezbollah possesses 150,000 missiles that can be launched at major cities in Israel, potentially leading to a broader war not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon, drawing everyone into this conflict.
Because Hezbollah and its patron Iran pose the greatest direct threat to turning the war between Israel and Hamas into a broader and more damaging regional fire, the United States sent its warships to the eastern Mediterranean.
This move was not only to enhance surveillance, intercept communications, and prevent Hamas from acquiring more weapons but also to send a message that Washington is prepared for military intervention if necessary.
Any war between Israel and Hezbollah would escalate quickly and result in significant casualties on both sides.
Two Problems in Gaza
While some observers and American media interpreted Israel's declaration of war in Gaza (which did not occur during the five previous rounds of conflict with Hamas) as an attempt to gain full control over the Gaza Strip and topple the rule of Hamas, President Biden's administration does not seem confident about the consequences of this challenging mission.
This is due to two problems that could hinder achieving this goal, according to the veteran diplomat Martin Indyk, former US Ambassador to Israel.
The first problem is that Israel would be fighting in densely populated areas (2.1 million people at an average of 5,500 people per square kilometer). International protests against civilian casualties caused by Israel's advanced American weaponry could lead to condemnation of both the United States and Israel.
Israel is unlikely to comply with such demands unless it believes it has achieved at least some of its goals, as suggested by Jonathan Schanzer, Director of the "Squawkroft" Initiative for the Atlantic Council.
The second problem is that if Israel succeeds in a large-scale war, it will control the Gaza Strip, and it must then answer difficult questions such as how its forces will exit the territory, and when and for whose benefit they will withdraw.
Israelis are reluctant to return to Gaza, from which they already withdrew in 2005.
An Impossible Mission
Researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Daniel Byman and Alexander Balmer, argue that controlling the Gaza Strip would be nearly impossible due to the deep economic, religious, and social roots that Hamas has there.
They suggest that, at the very least, Israel's leaders, feeling the pressure to demonstrate success, will target the killing or capture of senior Hamas leaders. This, along with other clear and deep signs indicating Israel's response, means that Hamas will ultimately receive a severe blow, and Gaza's ordinary residents will undoubtedly pay a heavy price.
Furthermore, both Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are looking for ways to prevent what they describe as "enemies of Israel" from gaining a strategic advantage through their surprise attack on Israeli towns and settlements in the Gaza Strip and the holding of dozens of hostages.
This differs from previous routine rounds of conflict, which were followed by expected Israeli retaliatory actions and outside mediators facilitating negotiations for a temporary ceasefire.
This routine no longer exists, as Hamas has demonstrated greater ambition and operational efficiency than expected, while the losses suffered by Israel are more significant than those the United States experienced on 11 September 2001.
Therefore, the Biden administration expects that Israel's military response will reflect this reality. Ground operations will accompany airstrikes, resulting in a potentially significant deterioration of Hamas in Gaza with some Israeli losses, according to William Wechsler, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Counterterrorism.
As it has been proven that the events of 11 September were a long-term strategic mistake for Al-Qaeda, Americans, and Israelis aim to demonstrate that the events of 7 October were a similar strategic error for Hamas.
Preventing a Third Uprising
The only means by which Hamas could achieve victory in the upcoming war is if other Palestinian groups and organizations in the West Bank make decisions that advance Hamas's strategic goals. The US State Department, through intensive communications with Arab and international parties, seeks to influence the leadership of the Palestinian Authority to see if it can walk a fine line as it has done before.
This involves providing rhetorical support to the people of Gaza while preventing the outbreak of parallel acts of violence in the West Bank. However, if US efforts fail, or if Palestinian Authority’s leaders choose a different path this time, Israel will face a two-front war, with Palestinians there serving as a source of inspiration for less restrained attacks, especially as the conditions for a third uprising are already in place, according to former US diplomat Richard LeBaron.
In this scenario, Hamas will make significant progress toward its primary goal, which is to complete its battle in Gaza, which began in 2007. It could potentially become the appropriate and perhaps the sole alternative upon the death of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who is now 87 years old.
Furthermore, the US administration fears that Hamas may encourage Arab Israelis to rise, similar to the acts of violence that occurred in 2021, which surprised many observers. If this were to happen, the damage to the long-term viability of Israeli society would be severe. It is only natural to prevent such an outcome by seeking to improve the living conditions of Arab Israelis and making it a top strategic priority for any Israeli government.
Encouraging Intervention
The United States hopes that when the dust settles, it can once again request intervention from Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the countries that signed the Abraham Accords with Israel, such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, to calm the situation and reach a ceasefire.
The longer this takes in the future, the harder it will be for the United States to maintain its relationship with Israel. According to Martin Indyk, former US Assistant Secretary of State and former Special Envoy for Middle East Peace under President Barack Obama, Israelis also need to come to terms with the new reality.
Arrogance led Israelis to believe in 1973 that they were invincible and the dominant power in the Middle East. This arrogance resurfaced in recent years, even when many Israelis were told that the situation with the Palestinians was unsustainable.
They believed that the problem was under control, and now all their assumptions have been shattered, just as in 1973. That's why the Biden administration ultimately aims to persuade Israelis that they must embark on a serious peaceful approach with the Palestinians and learn from this harsh lesson.
*Tarek Al-Shami is a journalist specializing in foreign affairs, based in Washington.
**This article is published with special permission from the Independent Arabia website. The Arabic version of the article can be seen here.
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