The most notable development occurred in January 2024, when Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Ethiopia joined, significantly enhancing the group's influence in the global economic system. This expansion is evident in BRICS' growing share of global GDP and its increasing footprint in international economic activities, particularly trade, investment, and tourism.

From its inception, BRICS has emphasized its economic nature, focusing on a financial and economic agenda – a characteristic it shares with other major international economic groups formed over the past three decades. Examples include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), established in 1989, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), founded in 1997, and the G20, created in 1999. These forums were initially designed to manage economic issues.

APEC sought to facilitate voluntary economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region, which later necessitated the establishment of a formal structure to sustain and deepen integration. Similarly, IORA aimed to manage economic cooperation among nations bordering the Indian Ocean, while the G20 was initially conceived as a bridge between the industrialized G7 economies and emerging markets in the wake of the 1990s Asian financial crisis.

The economic rationale has thus been a central driving force in forming these groups, remaining prominent since their establishment. However, the rise of their political weight and their engagement with political and security-related issues have also grown, albeit to varying degrees. For APEC, IORA, and the G20, this shift has been relatively modest. In contrast, BRICS appears poised for a different trajectory for several reasons that distinguish it from other international economic forums.

BRICS stands apart because it represents a specific global trend – encompassing emerging and middle powers within the international system. This differentiates it from APEC, IORA, and the G20, which, although they include significant emerging economies, do not uniformly reflect the interests of these countries. These groups, integrating advanced industrial economies and emerging markets, often find their agendas and discussions skewed by the presence of established economic powers. This affects their output and limits their ability to advocate policies that genuinely represent the interests of rising economies.

BRICS' exclusive focus on emerging and rising economies enhances internal cohesion, increasing the likelihood of unified policies that reflect the group's shared interests. This distinct identity creates a clear division between the bloc of emerging markets and advanced industrial economies. In this regard, BRICS draws a parallel to the G7, established in 1975. G7 has long represented the advanced nations’ economic, political, and security interests, playing a crucial role in managing various global and regional crises.

This distinct character of BRICS gains importance amid a critical moment in the global order, marked by a power struggle at the top – between the United States and its allies on one side and China and Russia on the other. This rivalry extends beyond politics, military, and security into the economic and financial realms, where China and Russia seek to establish alternative economic architectures that align with their interests.

This trend has gained momentum as US opposition hampers reforms within the International Monetary Fund, leading these powers to pursue economic institutions that serve their agendas, even if a complete alternative to the existing global financial system is not yet in place.

In this context, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, where China holds significant sway, and the New Development Bank, the financial arm of BRICS, are crucial steps in this direction. Evaluating this shift requires acknowledging the necessary time for its realization and recognizing the political implications hidden behind its ostensibly economic nature.

However, this does not imply an inevitable clash – military or otherwise – between BRICS and the industrialized nations or the Bretton Woods institutions led by the United States. The confrontation will likely be primarily economic and financial, targeting the structures and underlying philosophies that define the current global economic and financial order.

This conflict is no longer hypothetical; it is a reality as Western economies continue to dominate key international interests – foremost among them, the right to development, access to finance without political strings attached, unimpeded entry into global markets, and participation in crucial decision-making processes that impact emerging and developing economies. Historically, advanced industrial nations have achieved economic and social development without political, economic, or social preconditions, often at the expense of most of the world's economies.

The increasing economic influence of BRICS and its impact on global economic flows, particularly as new economic and financial structures solidify and expand, will undoubtedly accelerate a shift in the global balance of power. This will necessitate BRICS' engagement with political and security matters. Despite the group's current insistence on maintaining an economic and financial focus, the evolution of its role demands adequate time.

Such a transformation does not diminish BRICS' importance; rather, it underscores the interconnectedness of economic and financial roles with political and security dimensions. Restoring balance to international relations requires achieving a corresponding equilibrium in the economic and financial spheres – an endeavour that cannot succeed without the leading role of emerging and middle powers in today's global system.