The Middle East: What now?

Nabil Fahmy
Tuesday 10 Jun 2025

May 2025 redrew Middle East power lines with diplomacy, arms deals, and Gaza’s devastation shaping a volatile future where law risks being eclipsed by brute force.

May 2025 culminated a series of pivotal events for the Middle East and the Arab world, simultaneously raising expectations and deepening anxieties.

Egypt, my country, welcomed numerous distinguished guests, including President Macron of France, who toured the Egyptian border with Gaza. He gained a firsthand perspective on Palestinian casualties and widespread destruction, along with the seemingly endless convoys of humanitarian assistance blocked by Israel. Macron hinted that France might soon recognize the Palestinian state under occupation, and later with several other leaders indicated that sanctions against Israel could be considered if the crisis continued.

President El-Sisi visited Russia during its Victory Day commemoration of World War II, and held consultations with Russian President Putin, who appeared reinvigorated following the American elections. An American-brokered Houthi ceasefire in Yemen was announced, along with the reinstatement of the USA/Iran nuclear negotiations and pursuit of talks with Hamas, ultimately resulting in the unilateral release of American-Israeli hostage Edan Alexander.

United States President Trump embarked on a tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, accompanied by a large delegation of businessmen. The tour generated extensive, well-packaged multi-year binding and non-binding investments and arms sales exceeding several trillion dollars.

Not much was publicly announced on political issues that were undoubtedly sensitive, but the meeting with Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the new Syrian head of state, and the removal of American sanctions stood out.

Notably, commenting on the visit the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud publicly announced that the two countries had agreed on how to stop the Gaza war, though he did not elaborate on the specifics.

All directly participating parties seemed comfortable with the results of the American Gulf summit, despite some concerns raised in America about sharing AI technology with Arab Gulf states. These concerns fail to acknowledge that such cooperation would serve American interests by substantially reducing apprehensions about China potentially taking the technology lead in the Gulf.

The magnitude of financial commitments raised some eyebrows in the Gulf and elsewhere. However, I personally think that a closer examination reveals that much of this is consistent with the immediate and long-term plans of the three donor countries over the next decade.

Those most seriously concerned with these visits were the regional parties not participating in these talks.

Israel was formally silent throughout Trump’s visit, not wanting to upset the guest, but it was clearly unhappy with being left out. It was also uncomfortable with the Al-Sharaa meeting and increasingly upset with America’s engagement with both Hamas and Iran. As an expression of discomfort and a warning not to be marginalized by the American President, they intensified military operations in Gaza during the trip itself, causing about 100 deaths daily in the enclave.

Palestinians, of all creeds and affiliations, watched closely with high expectations, but could not find solace in the public statements about their case. Expectations that a ceasefire agreement could be announced during the visit did not pan out and were in fact unrealistic-  given Israel's historic insistence that no one can negotiate on its behalf.

However, some, including myself, hopefully concluded that the Saudi Foreign Minister’s statement was indication that more remained unannounced for now. If true and the visit leads to a stronger push for a ceasefire, this will and should be welcomed.

However, if Trump does not leverage his political influence to push Israel towards ending the Gaza war and halting expansion of settlements in the West Bank, this visit will be evaluated less favorably in the eyes of Arab Public opinion. The generosity will be deemed unappreciated.  This will be particularly true if Israel is emboldened to pursue its objectives more aggressively through force, thereby intensifying frustration, anxiety, and desperation among many Arabs in particular.

Iran is assessing the visit from several lenses, particularly the openings in American-Iranian relations. Tactically, it will be alarmed at the scale of arms purchases by its Arab neighbors, which could potentially shift the sub-regional balance of power. Conversely, Iran will favorably appreciate that such extensive weaponry procurement clearly indicates its neighbors’ desire to reduce security dependence on American and Western Allies. This perspective aligns with Iran’s longstanding call for the withdrawal of non-regional parties from the Gulf area’s security paradigm. Thus, I expect Iran to be more receptive-at least tactically-to reaching understandings with the USA on its nuclear file and enhancing dialogue with its regional neighbors.

Almost immediately after the Trump Gulf visit, Arab countries met collectively for their 40th Arab Summit in Baghdad, with considerable justifiable doubt as to the efficacy and credibility of Arab solidarity, especially in dealing with political issues.

A first preliminary reaction was that despite Iraq’s best efforts and keen interest in having a successful summit after years since its last hosting, attendance at head of state or government level was quite low, not exceeding a handful. The host Iraq did constructively put forth a substantial list of cooperative projects and initiatives as building blocks towards the future-a gesture well appreciated. However, these will not quell anxiety about the future of the region in light of Israeli ruthlessness.

Regrettably, I am anxious and share the sense of concern.

The suffering of Palestinian people and the absence of any sense of humanity, as well as the disregard for law in international relations, has reached a critical stage in our region. These circumstances will have potentially monumental consequences, generating intolerance and demonization with dangerous regional security implications if we allow the Rule of Force to supersede the Force of Law.

Among numerous other things, this will lead to intransigence and regional expansionism through the acquisition of territory by force, legitimization of civilian targets in times of conflict, and encourage hostile actions by state and non-state parties. Consequently, this will generate an endless arms race as states and factions attempt to gain advantage in the expression of power, to the detriment of all our security as well as peace and stability in the region.

In essence, all these factors and our reaction to them will determine the configuration and identity of the Middle East in the future.
 

*Nabil Fahmy is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt.

**This article is published in collaboration with the Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS), UAE.

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