I regarded the Gaza ceasefire agreement as a necessary step, one that all parties—especially Hamas and Israel—accepted reluctantly for their own internal reasons. The United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, described metaphorically as the “guarantor states,” adopted it out of an increasing inability to justify the continuation of Israel’s mass killing of Palestinians in Gaza and the famine that threatened the population. These dynamics were eroding their regional and international standing.
There is no doubt that the agreement was concluded with considerable reluctance. While I fully endorsed the sound political vision Egypt presented at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit, attended by a broad array of regional and international leaders, I was aware from the outset that steering the agreement safely to shore—through the faithful and comprehensive implementation of its twenty provisions—would face multiple risks. It would require intensive negotiations, measured positions, and unwavering adherence to the principles of international legitimacy when translating numerous elements of the accord into practice. These include the formation and mandate of a temporary international administrative body for Gaza, the parallel Palestinian administrative structure, security arrangements, the mandate of the international force, the provision and protection of humanitarian assistance, and the mechanisms governing reconstruction. All of this is tied to the withdrawal of Israeli forces and situated within a broader framework: establishing an independent, sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel—a framework that demands a clear Palestinian character and ownership of all steps.
For these reasons, and given the anticipated difficulties, I described the Gaza agreement as akin to a framework drafted in pencil—an agreement requiring reinforcement and protection. I argued, and continue to argue, for shielding it with an appropriately worded Security Council resolution that grants it the legitimacy it needs and aligns it with international law. After all, the United Nations has issued numerous resolutions affirming the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and is the body that adopted the Partition Plan, the foundational source of Israel’s international legitimacy—one inherently linked to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
With these considerations in mind, I was neither alarmed nor prematurely optimistic when the United States submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council, followed by Russia. I was not troubled by the American initiative; logically, Washington must be a partner in or responsive to any Council action, especially when the agreement is attributed primarily to President Trump and his administration.
Yet I could not be optimistic either: the draft was initially presented without adequate consultation with the concerned Arab parties, and the administration prematurely declared that its provisions were “non-negotiable”—a posture that was both posturing and unrealistic.
Everyone knew that the draft could not pass without negotiations to ensure its full alignment with the Gaza agreement, and that other permanent Council members would resist allowing an Israel-aligned American administration to monopolize the Council’s direction.
Although I favored adopting a Security Council resolution on this matter as soon as possible—indeed, I may have been the first to propose it—I had several reservations about the style and substance of the initial U.S. draft. The most important was its failure to link its provisions adequately to the final settlement and the two-state solution.
Nor did it contain safeguards against Israel’s habitual avoidance of its obligations while invoking alleged violations by others in order to freeze the status quo—effectively legitimizing occupation. I was equally concerned by Washington’s long-standing unwillingness to hold Israel accountable for any failures, and by the draft’s neglect of the Council’s core responsibility: maintaining international peace and security.
Consistent with my long-held belief in peaceful dispute resolution, I maintained that the best way to confront difficulties is through objective engagement—supporting, amending, or rejecting proposals, while offering alternatives and pursuing extensive diplomatic outreach to capitalize on the international momentum generated by Egypt’s initiative at Sharm El-Sheikh.
Ultimately, the goal was to make decisions consistent with international legality. The fact that the United States circulated multiple revised drafts—each containing partial amendments requested by Arab and Islamic states before the final text was adopted—confirmed the validity of this approach. The inclusion of references to self-determination and a Palestinian state was particularly significant and deeply unsettling for Israel.
With the Security Council adopting Resolution 2803 on Monday, 17 November, by a vote of 13 in favor and two abstentions (Russia and China), rigorous follow-up is essential. The aim must be to ensure that all provisions are implemented in full, consistent with the Sharm El-Sheikh interpretations, and to guard against Israel’s predictable delays and evasions.
Upholding the core pillars of international legitimacy must remain non-negotiable, particularly the objective of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel—at a moment when senior Israeli officials openly reject such a prospect.
Several pathways exist to ensure the necessary oversight, and multiple points require precise monitoring to preserve what has been achieved and prevent any misuse of the Security Council resolution as a pretext for obstructing progress rather than advancing it.
First, Arab and Islamic diplomacy must intensify to reaffirm the comprehensive goal of ending Israel’s occupation and to strictly monitor Israel’s continued withdrawal from Gaza.
Second, forming technical committees composed of Arab and Islamic states—and other partners—to track implementation would allow for timely, high-level political engagement with the United States in response to any violations.
Third, humanitarian support and reconstruction efforts must accelerate. Egypt’s initiative to convene an international humanitarian relief conference is a step in the right direction.
Fourth, although I am convinced that the core challenge lies in Israeli policy rather than Palestinian conditions, the Palestinian Authority would benefit from expediting its internal reform process, in line with the Saudi-French–backed UN conference.
Doing so denies Israel and the United States any pretext to stall progress, facilitates the re-establishment of Palestinian administrative authority in Gaza, and ensures the preservation of Gaza’s institutional link to the West Bank. Reports of proposals to divide Gaza into an Israel-secured zone and an isolated Palestinian area are particularly concerning.
Fifth, it is essential to capitalize on the overwhelming international commitment to the comprehensive interpretation of the Gaza agreement, as articulated at Sharm El-Sheikh. The goal must be to prevent the agreement from devolving into a partial, transitional arrangement that entrenches the status quo—without any genuine Israeli intent to fully withdraw or move toward resolving the Palestinian question by establishing an independent Palestinian state.
* The writer is former Egyptian Foreign Minister
Short link: