Rooted in realist international relations theory—particularly the balance-of-power tradition associated with thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer—this framework rests on a sober assumption: major powers do not necessarily seek comprehensive or definitive resolutions to conflict. More often, they aim to contain instability within manageable bounds, preserving long-term strategic interests related to energy security, maritime trade, regional balance, and global commerce.
Throughout 2025, this logic was clearly reflected in the foreign policy posture of the second US administration of President Donald Trump, which reasserted “peace through strength” as its guiding doctrine. A sequence of interconnected developments defined the year: the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 following a rapid offensive by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; a short but intense Israeli-Iranian war in June 2025 that lasted twelve days; a Gaza ceasefire brokered at the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Conference in October and anchored in Trump’s 20-point plan; the formal inauguration of Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam in September; Israel’s recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland in Somalia in December; and a relative decline in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
These developments were not isolated or coincidental. They reflected a broader, multidimensional struggle for influence in which the United States and Israel sought to weaken Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and consolidate Russia’s retreat from the region, while reinforcing Sunni-Israeli-Gulf alignments and safeguarding the stability of critical maritime corridors through which a significant share of global trade and energy flows.
Within this evolving strategic environment, the growing interdependence between Middle Eastern and East African theatres became unmistakable. Red Sea security proved inseparable from Gaza and Yemen; Nile water disputes intersected directly with the balance of power in the Horn of Africa; and the fall of the Assad regime opened space for expanded Israeli influence that required careful containment to prevent the spillover of instability and extremism into Africa. It is within this dense web of linkages that Egypt has reasserted itself as a pivotal power—geographically positioned as a bridge between two continents and strategically indispensable to any sustainable regional equilibrium.
Egypt’s approach rests on a calibrated blend of soft power—mediation, diplomacy and multilateral coordination—and hard power, including maritime security presence and military cooperation agreements. This posture has positioned Cairo as a key strategic partner of the United States in managing controlled disorder, while preserving its decision-making autonomy and its historically anchored positions on Arab and African issues. Egypt does not seek military dominance; it seeks balance. By filling the vacuum created by declining Russian and Iranian influence and confronting Ethiopian strategic challenges, Egypt has increasingly emerged as the center of gravity shaping regional trajectories heading into 2026.
Syria: Regime collapse and a fraught transitional phase
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 marked one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the past decade. A half-century of rule collapsed following a swift, coordinated offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under Ahmad al-Sharaa. While the regime’s downfall ended one of the bloodiest civil wars of the modern era, it ushered in a deeply complex transitional phase marked by sectarian tensions, acute security challenges, and intense competition over influence.
A transitional government was formed with representation from Alawite, Druze, Christian, and Kurdish communities. Elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces were partially integrated into a newly constituted national army. U.S. and European sanctions were lifted in stages, more than four million refugees returned, and large-scale reconstruction projects—financed primarily by Gulf states under direct American oversight—began to take shape. Turkey emerged as a central mediator in northern and eastern Syria, while Sharaa’s expanding international engagement, including a landmark meeting with President Trump, conferred growing international legitimacy on the new authorities.
Yet the challenges remain formidable. Sectarian violence persists, particularly against Alawite and Christian communities in former regime strongholds. Israeli influence has expanded in the Golan Heights and southern Syria under the banner of security imperatives. ISIS cells continue to pose intermittent threats, and rebuilding state institutions after decades of corruption and authoritarianism remains an immense task. Strategically, Assad’s fall constituted a major victory for the United States and Israel, decisively weakening Russia’s regional footprint and severing Iran’s land corridor to Hezbollah and the Mediterranean, thereby reshaping the regional balance of power.
Gaza and the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict
Gaza remained the most sensitive and politically charged file of 2025. In October, a ceasefire was achieved under Trump’s 20-point plan, encompassing a comprehensive cessation of hostilities, phased prisoner and hostage exchanges, partial Israeli withdrawal, large-scale humanitarian assistance under international supervision, and a gradual reconstruction framework financed by Gulf states and the United States.
The truce held through the end of the year, though under fragile conditions. Israel maintained security control over parts of Gaza through a buffer zone known as the “Yellow Line.” Hamas rejected full disarmament as a prerequisite for the second phase, while efforts to establish a transitional governance mechanism under an international “Peace Council” stalled. Within the broader strategic context, the ceasefire formed a central pillar of Trump’s effort to weaken Hamas as a key Iranian proxy, link Gaza’s stability to wider Arab-Israeli normalization, and prevent regional escalation that could threaten Red Sea navigation.
For Egypt, Gaza remains inseparable from national security. Cairo’s role as an indispensable mediator—managing the Rafah crossing, ensuring the flow of aid and fuel, pressing Hamas to uphold commitments, and coordinating with Israel to prevent violations—has reinforced Egypt’s strategic relevance. Any collapse of the ceasefire would pose direct risks to Sinai, Red Sea stability, and regional security. Egypt has thus succeeded in maintaining its Arab credibility in defending Palestinian rights while partnering with Washington to prevent the liquidation of the Palestinian cause under the guise of conflict management.
Lebanon and Yemen: Fragile ceasefire and the retreat of Iranian influence
Lebanon and Yemen in 2025 offered clear illustrations of controlled disorder in practice. In both cases, fragile ceasefires reflected a measurable retreat of Iranian influence through its principal regional proxies—Hezbollah and the Houthis—following limited but consequential Israeli and American military actions and sustained diplomatic pressure under the Trump administration.
In Lebanon, a ceasefire brokered in November 2024 ended more than a year of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. The agreement stipulated a phased Israeli withdrawal in exchange for the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River and the disarmament of Hezbollah in the area. By late 2025, progress had been reported, including the destruction of older weapons stockpiles. However, the December 31 deadline passed without full implementation, amid Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm while Israeli forces remained at contested points and continued near-daily airstrikes that resulted in significant civilian casualties.
In Yemen, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping declined sharply by late 2025 after peaking in 2024. The reduction followed Gaza-related ceasefires, sustained US–British strikes, and a U.S.–Houthi understanding brokered by Oman in May 2025 that halted attacks on American vessels in exchange for a cessation of U.S. strikes. Iranian logistical constraints following the June war further reduced the Houthis’ regional operational capacity, forcing them to refocus inward while retaining limited missile capabilities.
Egypt’s role across both theatres was marked by balance and restraint. In Lebanon, Cairo supported the government diplomatically and economically while coordinating with the Lebanese army to reinforce state authority. In Yemen, Egypt prioritized Red Sea maritime security through participation in international coalitions and regional initiatives, while consistently insisting that Red Sea security remains primarily the responsibility of its littoral states.
The Red Sea: A Global artery under pressure
By 2025, the Red Sea had become a focal point of global strategic concern. Accounting for between 12 and 15 percent of global trade, roughly 30 percent of container traffic, and substantial energy flows, disruptions carried far-reaching consequences. While Houthi attacks declined after Gaza ceasefires and the Iranian confrontation, lingering threats prompted major shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks per journey and sharply increasing fuel and insurance costs.
Traffic through the Suez Canal fell dramatically compared to pre-crisis levels, with trade losses measured in hundreds of billions of dollars. The Red Sea, long treated as a commercial artery, has become an arena of geopolitical contestation with direct implications for global supply chains, energy prices, and economic stability.
The Horn of Africa: Escalating Tensions
The Horn of Africa experienced a sharp escalation in 2025. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December marked a watershed moment, triggering firm opposition from Somalia’s federal government and condemnation from the African Union and key regional actors, including Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, Sudan, and China.
This development intersected with persistent instability in Somalia, where Al-Shabaab intensified operations and attempted to assassinate President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in March 2025. Simultaneously, tensions flared between Ethiopia and Eritrea over port access, driven by Addis Ababa’s declared view of Red Sea access as an existential necessity.
Against this backdrop, Egypt expanded its diplomatic and security footprint through agreements to develop ports in Eritrea and Djibouti, reinforcing its Red Sea presence and counterbalancing Ethiopian ambitions—particularly following the inauguration of the Renaissance Dam, which Cairo views as a direct threat to its water and food security.
Scenarios for 2026: Cold Stability, strategic opportunity, or escalation
As 2026 begins, the region stands at a decisive juncture. Three scenarios loom: the continuation of “cold stability,” a rare but achievable positive breakthrough, or a descent into renewed escalation.
The most likely outcome remains cold stability—fragile ceasefires, contained conflicts, and managed disorder without definitive resolutions. A more optimistic scenario depends on successful diplomacy: sustained Gaza stabilization, renewed nuclear talks with Iran, expanded Arab-Israeli normalization, and gradual Syrian reconstruction. The negative scenario remains equally plausible: the collapse of Gaza’s ceasefire, renewed confrontation with Iran, escalation over the Nile, and intensified instability in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Across all scenarios, Egypt remains the decisive variable—whether stabilizing a fragile balance, capitalizing on strategic openings, or confronting escalation with calibrated force.
Conclusion
Regional stability will not emerge from idealistic visions or sweeping settlements, but from disciplined management of strategic transitions through flexible, multilateral arrangements that combine diplomacy, security presence, and economic coordination. Egypt’s role is not merely regional; it is structural. With its unique geostrategic position and accumulated diplomatic capital, Egypt stands as the hinge upon which the future trajectory of the Middle East and East Africa will turn—toward relative stability or renewed disorder.
*The writer is the editor-in-chief of Alsiyassa Aldawlya and Al-Democratia magazines, published by Al-Ahram Foundation.
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