Understanding why Iran remains the focus of sustained international scrutiny requires examining both the legal obligations it accepted and the broader strategic context in which its nuclear program has evolved.
The Cold War taught us that nuclear weapons created a terrifying paradox: the knowledge that war could destroy civilization itself, coupled with the perceived need to demonstrate a willingness to risk that horror to prevent ruthless powers from dominating the world, as Harry S. Truman believed. Deterrence held because only two superpowers existed, each calculating the risks in broadly similar ways—the United States and the Soviet Union.
As more countries acquire nuclear weapons, that balance becomes far more complex. With multiple nuclear powers, it becomes increasingly difficult to predict how deterrence will function. What worked between two rivals may not prove as reliable when many actors, each with different worldviews and strategic calculations, are involved.
This reality shapes much of the international concern surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. The central issue is one of stability and predictability. Why do the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, and Israel possess nuclear weapons while Iran remains the primary focus of international pressure?
First, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and ratified it in 1970 as a non-nuclear-weapon state, thereby accepting the treaty’s obligations. Second, since 2006, the international community—including China and Russia—has repeatedly called on Iran, through six UN Security Council resolutions and the broader diplomatic process involving Germany, to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.
Iran’s nuclear program nevertheless advanced steadily despite these calls. From approximately 130 centrifuges in 2003, the country expanded its enrichment capacity to tens of thousands of centrifuges by mid-2025, while also accumulating a substantial stockpile of enriched uranium. As of June 2025, just before the major military strikes, this stockpile included roughly 9,000 kilograms of enriched uranium, of which approximately 441 kilograms had been enriched to 60 percent—close to weapons-grade levels.
This raised international concerns about Iran’s potential breakout timeline. However, during the June 2025 “12-Day War,” U.S. and Israeli strikes significantly damaged key enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. As of 2026, the IAEA reports only limited visibility into Iran’s nuclear activities because of restricted access, with enrichment operations appearing to have been largely disrupted or halted. Questions nevertheless remain regarding the status and security of the existing enriched uranium stockpile, which Iran maintains is retained exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Iran’s revolutionary ideology adds another layer of complexity. Ayatollah Khomeini described nuclear weapons as a “Western disease” and maintained that Iran did not seek to acquire them. At the same time, his broader vision regarded many existing governments as illegitimate and envisaged the spread of Islamic principles throughout the region through revolution and Islamic awakening. This ideological dimension inevitably raises questions about Iran’s long-term intentions among those who view its nuclear program with concern.
Some analysts argue that broader nuclear proliferation could ultimately strengthen global deterrence, reasoning that a greater number of nuclear-armed states would make any conflict prohibitively dangerous. Others contend that placing more fingers on nuclear triggers—particularly in states driven by strong ideological commitments—could make the international system less stable rather than more secure.
The question of why Iran faces greater pressure than other nuclear-armed states is a legitimate one. Part of the answer lies in the legal commitments Iran voluntarily accepted under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Another part stems from the secrecy that has surrounded aspects of its nuclear program and its history of non-compliance with international monitoring requests. Together, these factors have led many countries to view Iran’s nuclear activities with greater caution than those of states that never assumed the same legal obligations.
Whether this differentiated treatment is entirely justified remains a matter of legitimate debate. What is clear, however, is that the combination of advanced nuclear technology and revolutionary ideology generates unique anxieties in a world already concerned about the continued spread of nuclear weapons.
The deeper challenge going forward is to find a path that respects Iran’s legitimate security concerns and sovereign rights while addressing the international community’s genuine fears about strategic stability and nuclear deterrence in an increasingly multipolar world.
The writer is a researcher at the University of Florence.
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