The latter, however, acquired international legitimacy after it was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council on 17 November 2025 through Resolution 2803. It also gave rise to a number of institutional mechanisms, foremost among them the Peace Council, whose members were appointed and some of whose bodies have already begun operating.
All available indications suggest that the first phase of the American plan, which consists of twenty provisions, has already been implemented. This phase includes the ceasefire that entered into force on 9 October 2025, the return of all Israeli hostages and the bodies of those who had died, Israel’s release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, the entry of humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance into the Gaza Strip—despite its continuing inadequacy—and the reopening of the Rafah crossing in both directions.
The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran shifted the attention of both Washington and the broader international community toward the conflict and its repercussions, diverting focus from the implementation of the American plan. This, in turn, provided Israel with the opportunity to press ahead with its plans in Gaza, whether by expanding the territory under its control to nearly 70 percent of the Strip or by continuing the targeted assassinations of Palestinian leaders. Matters have gone even further, with Israeli extremists openly calling for the re-establishment of settlements in Gaza, as existed before Israel’s final withdrawal from the Strip in September 2005.
In fairness, it should be noted that Egypt’s serious diplomatic efforts never ceased throughout this period in an attempt to overcome the obstacles hindering the implementation of the American plan. Egypt held dozens of meetings with the Qatari and Turkish mediators, Hamas leaders, the various Palestinian factions, and Miladinov, the Executive Director of the Peace Council. These intensive consultations succeeded in reaching practical solutions to several outstanding issues, which could provide fresh momentum for advancing President Trump’s plan once its implementation resumes.
It is also worth noting that Israel has consistently insisted on the disarmament of Hamas and the Palestinian resistance factions as one of the principles explicitly stipulated in the American plan (Provision 13), together with the requirement that Gaza should pose no threat to its neighbours (Provision 14). Israel has further declared that it will not withdraw from the Strip unless these commitments are fully implemented. This is the same approach it has adopted in southern Lebanon, where it refuses to withdraw from the areas it occupies until Hezbollah is disarmed. It is evident that this Israeli position enjoys acceptance within the United States and among much of the international community.
Against this backdrop, Hamas announced on 6 July its decision to dissolve the Government Emergency Committee that it had established to administer the Gaza Strip and its intention to transfer its responsibilities to the Technocratic Committee designated to govern the territory under the American plan (Provision 9), whose members were appointed on 14 January 2026. Hamas argues that, through this decision, it is acting within the framework of implementing President Trump’s plan, particularly Provision 13, which stipulates that Hamas and the other factions should play no role in governing Gaza. On this basis, Hamas is calling on Israel to fulfil its own obligations in return for this step. It should be noted, however, that Provision 13 also includes the disarmament of Gaza.
Israel rejected Hamas’s decision, describing it as part of the movement’s continuing strategy of manoeuvre aimed at buying time while continuing to govern the Strip indirectly. From Israel’s perspective, unless the issue of Hamas’s weapons is resolved, it will continue its occupation of Gaza and will not permit any positive measures to proceed, including the entry of the Technocratic Committee or the launch of the reconstruction phase. Such a position ultimately amounts to suspending the implementation of the American plan altogether.
The American plan, therefore, is now facing clear obstacles that are preventing the completion of its subsequent stages, which are intended ultimately to lead to Palestinian self-determination, the establishment of the Palestinian state, and an agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian sides on a political horizon, as set out in Provisions 19 and 20. In other words, Israel has made the implementation of all subsequent provisions of the plan contingent upon the prior disarmament of Hamas. Unless this issue is resolved, the catastrophic conditions in the Gaza Strip are likely to persist for an extended period.
This deteriorating situation requires urgent action to restore the process to its intended course through effective American intervention aimed at preserving the plan that bears President Trump’s name. I believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu’s forthcoming visit to the White House represents an appropriate opportunity for the U.S. President to press Israel to abandon its current extremist approach in Gaza and to honour its commitments, particularly by halting targeted assassinations, approving the deployment of the Technocratic Committee, initiating a gradual withdrawal, ensuring a genuine flow of humanitarian assistance, and beginning the reconstruction process.
At the same time, Hamas must also recognise the importance of the time factor and implement the provisions of the plan that it has already accepted, including reaching an agreed solution to the issue of its weapons—a matter it has discussed repeatedly with Egypt and the mediators. Such a step would help counter Prime Minister Netanyahu’s efforts to consolidate Israel’s occupation of Gaza, a strategy that is unfolding in parallel with the unprecedented measures aimed at the gradual annexation of the West Bank. Ultimately, this demands a strong sense of national responsibility to deny Israel the opportunity to exploit the Gaza crisis as a launching pad for bringing the Palestinian cause to an end.
*The writer is deputy director general of the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies ECSS.
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