At first glance, the approach appears counterintuitive. Most Gulf governments have consistently called for restraint, sought to avoid becoming battlegrounds, and shown little appetite for being drawn into a direct confrontation between Iran and the United States. Yet they remain central to Iran’s strategic calculations.
The answer lies in Iran’s doctrine of deterrence. Tehran recognizes that it cannot match the United States in a conventional military confrontation. Instead, it seeks to raise the political, economic, and strategic costs of any American military action. The Gulf states occupy a pivotal place in this strategy because they host American military installations, facilitate US operations, and sit at the center of the global energy system. By threatening these countries, Iran is signaling to Washington that any attack on the Islamic Republic would inevitably endanger America’s closest regional partners.
Iran’s objective is not to conquer the Gulf or wage a sustained conflict against its Arab neighbors. Rather, it seeks to transform Gulf governments into advocates of restraint. If these states conclude that every escalation against Iran could expose their cities, ports, airports, energy facilities, and other critical infrastructure to retaliation, they have a powerful incentive to encourage diplomacy and discourage military confrontation. From Tehran’s perspective, turning America’s regional partners into voices for de-escalation is considerably more effective than attempting to confront the United States directly.
The economic dimension is equally significant. The Gulf remains one of the world’s most important energy-producing regions, while the Strait of Hormuz is among the most strategically vital maritime chokepoints. Tehran has long understood that even limited disruptions to shipping lanes or energy infrastructure can produce consequences far beyond the Middle East. Higher oil prices, increased insurance and shipping costs, market volatility, and interruptions to global trade rapidly transform a regional crisis into an international economic concern. In Iranian strategic thinking, economic disruption can sometimes achieve effects that military force alone cannot.
The strategy also carries an important psychological dimension. Iran seeks to demonstrate that regional security cannot be sustained while excluding Tehran from the regional balance of power. For decades, the Gulf security architecture has relied heavily on American military protection. By showing that even advanced missile defense systems cannot eliminate every threat, Iran aims to undermine confidence in those security guarantees. Every successful strike—or even a credible demonstration of capability—reinforces Tehran’s argument that lasting regional stability cannot rest solely on military alliances but requires political engagement with Iran itself.
Diplomatic leverage represents another important consideration. Tehran recognizes that the Gulf monarchies possess substantial influence in Washington through their security partnerships, economic relationships, and energy ties. Should Gulf leaders conclude that continued confrontation with Iran threatens their own security and economic interests, they are likely to intensify efforts to encourage American policymakers to prioritize negotiations over military escalation. In this way, pressure on the Gulf serves as an indirect means of shaping American strategic choices.
Yet this strategy carries significant risks. Every attack or threat directed against Gulf states may strengthen regional cooperation against Iran, encourage a deeper American military presence, accelerate investment in integrated air and missile defense systems, and reinforce security partnerships between Washington and its Arab allies. A doctrine intended to deter external pressure may ultimately produce the opposite outcome by consolidating the very regional coalition Tehran seeks to weaken.
This is the central paradox of Iran’s regional strategy. Tehran believes that demonstrating its capacity to impose costs strengthens deterrence and creates incentives for diplomacy. Its adversaries interpret the same actions as evidence that broader military cooperation and stronger containment measures are necessary. The result is a self-reinforcing cycle in which every effort to enhance deterrence simultaneously deepens mistrust and drives further regional militarization.
Ultimately, Iran places the Gulf states at the center of its deterrence strategy not because it regards them as its principal adversaries, but because they constitute the most effective channels through which American decision-making can be influenced. Tehran seeks to convince Washington that any military confrontation with Iran would not remain confined to Iranian territory. Instead, it would reverberate throughout the Gulf, disrupt global energy markets, unsettle international commerce, and impose substantial costs on every actor involved.
At its core, Iran’s strategy rests on a straightforward calculation. Unable to prevent American military pressure through conventional power alone, Tehran seeks to make the consequences of that pressure sufficiently costly that diplomacy becomes the more attractive course for all parties. Whether this strategy succeeds or instead accelerates the very confrontation it is designed to prevent remains one of the defining strategic questions confronting the Middle East today.
The writer is a Senior Professor of International Relations at King’s College London and Yale University
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