That ceasefire had been reached only after difficult and lengthy negotiations, as well as significant efforts, under Pakistani mediation and with support of other countries including Egypt, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye. Although the agreement remained in place for some time, with varying degrees of commitment from both parties, it has now effectively collapsed.
Numerous developments have emerged concerning the recent escalation in US-Iranian confrontations. Here, however, we will focus on only a selection of these developments without claiming to cover them all. Some of the remaining developments may be discussed in future articles.
The first of these developments concerns reports circulating across various media outlets about internal disagreements within the top authorities in both parties to the current conflict, the United States of America and Iran. These disagreements reportedly exist not only at the political level but also within the military establishments regarding the wisdom of escalating military operations.
Some observers believe that certain reports may represent deliberate leaks intended to mislead the opposing side, while others argue that many of these reports exaggerate the extent and severity of such divisions, which are, after all, a natural phenomenon within the highest levels of government in any country, provided there remains a single ultimate individual or entity with final decision-making authority.
Nevertheless, the reality is that these disagreements date back to the outbreak of the war itself at the end of February 2026. Various statements by political and military leaders on both sides, along with numerous hints and indications by some of them, suggest not only that these differences exist but that they have intensified in recent weeks, reflecting divergent views over how the current phase of the conflict should be managed.
The second development is Israel's withdrawal, albeit a "temporary" one, from the military confrontation with Iran, particularly when compared to the period before the ceasefire. Israel has refrained from carrying out military operations against Iran in recent weeks, while Iran has likewise avoided launching attacks against Israeli targets during the same period.
The implicit message from Tehran appears to be that, so long as Israel refrains from direct military action against Iran, Tehran will likewise avoid striking Israeli targets.
From the Israeli perspective, this approach also appears understandable, as Israel is primarily preoccupied with dealing with the Lebanese Hezbollah and the broader Lebanese situation and is reluctant to become entangled in prolonged, attritional direct military confrontations with Iran. This is especially true given what appears to be growing uncertainty within the Israeli political leadership regarding its understanding of the US administration's intentions and plans towards Iran.
This uncertainty comes alongside increasing political and partisan divisions within Israel itself, which undoubtedly remain a persistent concern for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, particularly in light of accusations from some opposition politicians that the US administration no longer consults him on all matters related to the war on Iran.
The third development concerns the scale and geographical reach of Iran's responses to US attacks through strikes against locations inside Arab countries, whether in the Gulf region or in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Iran argues that these are American targets, while the Arab states affected insist that the attacks are hitting their own national facilities, including vital infrastructure, particularly within the energy sector. Only days ago, the Speaker of Iran's “Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament)”, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, warned that if Washington continued targeting Iran's infrastructure and energy facilities, Iran possesses the capability to prevent any country in the region from producing or exporting oil.
This Iranian escalation against a considerable number of Arab states has led to increasingly widespread and stronger condemnation of Iran's military attacks and expressions of solidarity with the targeted countries from other Arab countries, foremost among them Egypt. These attacks are increasingly viewed as threats to regional security and stability, to Arab national security, and to the direct interests of Arab countries whose citizens work in large numbers throughout the Arab countries in the Gulf. The growing sharpness of the Arab response has been further intensified by Iran's recent attacks against countries that had previously served as mediators between Tehran and Washington, including Oman and Qatar.
The fourth development discussed here is Iran's renewed mobilisation of its regional allies, particularly the “Ansar Allah” movement (internationally and in the media commonly known as the “Houthis”) in Yemen, as well as several Iran-backed Shiite armed groups in Iraq, to participate alongside it in military operations against the United States and its allies. Meanwhile, Washington has recently increasingly relied on British military bases to launch attacks against Iran. This has effectively expanded the geographical scope of the conflict and steadily increased the number of parties involved, adding to the expansion that had already begun with the Forty-Day War, which started on 28 February 2026.
This widening of the conflict has produced several consequences. The first is that Saudi oil facilities have come under attack from Iraqi Shiite armed groups aligned with Iran, raising the prospect of a diplomatic crisis between Baghdad and Riyadh, despite the Iraqi government's swift condemnation of the attacks, its disavowal of those responsible, its pledge to investigate the incidents, and its insistence that Iraqi-Saudi relations should not be undermined.
The second consequence is Iran's formal declaration at the highest official levels that the United Kingdom has become a legitimate target for future Iranian strikes because it has become a party to the conflict by allowing the United States of America to use British military bases to attack Iran. The British government has rejected and denounced these declarations.
The third, and perhaps the most significant, consequence of the renewed expansion of the conflict is the Houthis' threats to close navigation in the Red Sea and, at other times, to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia.
The danger posed by such actions extends far beyond the immediate parties to the conflict, affecting vital economic interests of numerous countries across different regions of the world, perhaps with consequences comparable to those resulting from Iran's previous closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
These four developments can be interpreted in either of two ways. On the one hand, they may indicate an increasing likelihood of a new war, broader in scope than the Forty-Day War and far more destructive and violent in its consequences.
On the other hand, they may simply represent attempts by both the American and Iranian sides to strengthen their respective negotiating positions ahead of any future negotiations, particularly through renewed mediation efforts by several parties, most notably Oman and Pakistan, with the support of some other countries, aimed at narrowing differences, reducing tensions and resuming negotiations.
This second option’s opportunities could be further strengthened by ongoing appeals from major international actors, including Russia, China, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and others, as well as influential regional powers such as Egypt and Türkiye, urging both Washington and Tehran to adopt negotiations rather than military escalation, thereby avoiding potentially disastrous consequences for all concerned.
*The writer is an expert on international relations and global politics.
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