Their significance is measured by three questions that precede the visit and remain pertinent after it: Why is this visit taking place now? What does each side want from it? And what can calculations of power and interest permit the two sides to achieve on the ground?
Seen from this perspective, the forthcoming visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Egypt goes beyond the bounds of an important diplomatic occasion. It comes ten years after his previous visit to Cairo in 2016 and coincides with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, at a moment when the global centres of power, wealth and technology are being reordered and many countries, Egypt among them, are seeking to broaden their options and safeguard the autonomy of their decision-making amid intensifying international competition.
Seventy years in search of independence
When Egypt decided on 30 May 1956 to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, the decision was more than a mere matter of protocol. Cairo was leading a broad national liberation movement and seeking a world that would not be monopolised by the old colonial powers, while Beijing was trying to break the isolation imposed upon it and reclaim its place among nations. The two countries thus converged around the principles of independence and the right of peoples to choose their own path.
Over the 70 years that followed, China moved from a country seeking recognition to a major power aspiring to take part in shaping the international order and building a new multipolar world. Egypt, for its part, has retained, despite the crises and transformations it has faced, a position that the maps of politics and trade cannot ignore. In one place, it brings together the Suez Canal, the Arab world, the African continent, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. These are more than elements of a geographical description: they are instruments of power when used well and strategic burdens when left without a guiding vision.
The inclusion of Egypt in the Chinese president’s foreign itinerary therefore constitutes recognition of its strategic and political importance. It also obliges Cairo to define precisely what it wants from Beijing. China knows its interests well: secure trade routes, markets for its exports, new locations for its industries and partners across the Global South.
Big numbers and the harder question
Much has been accomplished since Cairo and Beijing elevated their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2014. Chinese companies have participated in developing the Central Business District in the New Administrative Capital and the Light Rail Transit system, as well as energy and telecommunications projects, while the China-Egypt TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Ain Sokhna has become a major base for Chinese investment. The Executive Programme for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for 2024–2028 has also provided a framework for translating political will into tangible projects.
In 2025, bilateral trade reached approximately $19.52 billion, up from $17.38 billion in 2024, an increase of about 12.3 per cent. Around 2,800 Chinese companies operate in the Egyptian market, with cumulative investments exceeding $8 billion, according to some official estimates. Yet figures, however impressive, do not tell the whole story. Trade may be growing, but its balance remains uneven; the number of companies may be large, but the contribution of some of them to technology transfer remains limited.
From project execution to industrial localisation
There are encouraging signs that economic relations with China are beginning to shift in the direction Egypt seeks. New Chinese investments have moved into the manufacture of solar cells and panels, energy-storage systems, export-oriented textiles, packaging materials and wind turbines. Construction has begun on the first integrated wind-turbine factory in Egypt and Africa, with an annual production capacity of two gigawatts, alongside a project to generate 2,000 megawatts of wind power. Another project, worth about $200 million, is intended to manufacture energy-storage batteries, transfer cell-manufacturing technology and use locally sourced inputs.
This is precisely the kind of project Egypt needs: Chinese investment channelled into industry, generating exports, bringing in foreign currency, transferring knowledge and building national capabilities. There is a profound difference between a project that adds a new building and one that adds new technology to the Egyptian economy.
A realistic assessment of Egyptian-Chinese relations, however, requires distinguishing among projects already under execution, agreements that have received approval, and projects still at the study and negotiation stage. The proposed phosphate and aluminium complexes, each targeting investment of up to $2 billion, represent two important opportunities. Their value should not, however, be counted as realised investment before they advance to actual implementation.
The Suez Canal: From transit to value creation
At the heart of Egyptian-Chinese relations stands the Suez Canal Economic Zone, particularly the TEDA zone, which hosts more than 200 companies with investments exceeding $3 billion and supports more than 70,000 direct and indirect jobs. A recent expansion of the TEDA zone entails a $100 million investment in infrastructure and the addition of 2.86 square kilometres to its area.
Egypt’s ambition must extend beyond the establishment of a successful industrial zone. Many experts argue that the Suez Canal corridor should be transformed into an integrated Egyptian-Chinese platform for production, exports and logistics linking Asia, Africa and Europe. This would enable Egypt to move from collecting transit fees on trade to participating in the production of some of the goods being traded and creating value around that trade.
Recent disruptions in the Red Sea, especially at the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, have shown that the Suez Canal is not an exclusively Egyptian concern, just as the security of Chinese trade is not remote from Egyptian interests. Every ship diverted away from the Red Sea raises the cost of Chinese trade, reduces canal revenues and strains global supply chains. A shared interest therefore arises between Cairo and Beijing in stabilising maritime corridors and developing ports, bunkering services and ship-repair facilities, without turning the Red Sea into an arena for renewed militarisation or an international rivalry whose cost the region cannot bear.
An important opportunity opened in May 2026, when China began applying a full tariff exemption to imports from the African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations, including Egypt, for a period of two years. Yet the exemption will not automatically increase Egyptian exports to the Chinese market. The real test lies in whether Egyptian products can meet Chinese standards, ensure consistent volumes, secure transport, refrigeration and marketing, reach Chinese consumers, and understand their preferences and tastes.
Egypt therefore needs a clear programme to increase its agricultural, food, pharmaceutical, textile and engineering exports. The government, export councils, industrial federations, business organisations and experts on China must all participate in this effort. Preferential tariff treatment represents an opportunity; converting it into actual and sustainable exports requires planning, production, marketing and follow-up.
Chinese finance: between opportunity and debt
In the financial sphere, the bilateral local-currency swap agreement between the Central Bank of Egypt and the People’s Bank of China was renewed in June 2026 and increased from 18 billion to 30 billion yuan for a renewable three-year term. The agreement can support trade and investment and reduce reliance on intermediary currencies. Egypt’s accession to BRICS also creates opportunities to draw on the New Development Bank and diversify its financing instruments.
BRICS is no magic gateway, however, and Chinese financing is not a free grant. A loan remains a debt that must be repaid, whoever the lender may be, and acquires developmental value only when directed towards a productive project capable of generating returns, jobs and foreign currency. What is required is not a shift from one financier to another, but a transition from managing debt to structuring productive development projects.
Africa and the digital silk road
President Xi’s visit to Egypt also creates scope to move beyond bilateral partnership towards cooperation in third-country markets, particularly in Africa. Egypt possesses knowledge of the continent, a network of relationships and a strategic logistical position, while China has financing, technology and implementation capacity. If these elements are combined within a balanced framework, the two sides could undertake joint projects in energy, transport, agriculture, health and telecommunications that serve the needs of African states instead of treating them merely as markets or arenas of influence.
Many observers therefore stress that Egypt’s role in this equation should not be limited to offering its strategic location or facilitating contacts. Its companies, experts and financial institutions must participate in designing, implementing and managing the projects. Only then will trilateral cooperation become a means of building Egyptian and African capacities instead of serving merely as an overseas extension of Chinese companies.
Technology, in my assessment, will be one of the most important tests of the next stage of Egyptian-Chinese cooperation. Cooperation is expanding in artificial intelligence, cloud computing, data centres, telecommunications and electronics. Egypt could become a regional hub for the Digital Silk Road, but this requires combining the benefits of Chinese technology with the protection of data security and digital sovereignty. What is needed is not merely the importation of devices and platforms, but also the training of personnel, the establishment of research and development centres, an increase in local content, and stronger cooperation in cybersecurity.
China’s growing political and security role
The political and security dimension will figure prominently at the summit between the Egyptian and Chinese presidents, particularly in relation to the Palestinian question, the situations in Sudan and Libya, Red Sea security, the transformations in the Gulf following the US-Israeli war against Iran, and the future of the international order. Egypt and China broadly converge on respect for state sovereignty, opposition to the displacement of Palestinians, support for the establishment of a Palestinian state, and a preference for political settlements over open-ended wars.
Recent experience has nevertheless shown that Beijing, despite its considerable economic weight in the Middle East, remains cautious about assuming direct security and military burdens. In the foreseeable future, it is not seeking to replace the United States or replicate its network of alliances and bases. China prefers diplomacy, mediation and the cultivation of economic influence, while avoiding military entanglements that could drain its resources.
From agreement-intensive to production-intensive relations
All things considered, President Xi’s visit to Cairo represents a major opportunity to strengthen the Egyptian-Chinese partnership. It also offers an important opportunity to maximise Egyptian interests by broadening Egypt’s alternatives and room for manoeuvre abroad, thereby safeguarding the autonomy of its national decision-making.
The success of the visit will depend not only on the number of memoranda of understanding or agreements signed during it, but also on what happens after the Chinese presidential aircraft departs Cairo International Airport: how many factories enter production, how much technology is transferred, how many jobs are created, by how much Egyptian exports rise and how many projects are completed on schedule.
Major visits can open the doors of history, but they do not guarantee passage through them. Between opportunity and achievement lies a distance that can be bridged only by clarity of vision, administrative competence and the will to implement. If the two countries succeed in crossing that distance, 2026 may become not merely a year marking seven decades of relations, but the beginning of a transition from an agreement-intensive relationship to a production-intensive one, and from the breadth of cooperation to the depth of partnership.
* The writer is deputy director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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