From this idea flow principles that have come to occupy a central place in Chinese political thought: the primacy of sovereignty, the pivotal role of the state in achieving development, the rejection of externally imposed political models, equality among civilizations, and the pursuit of a world order whose rules and standards are not determined by one civilization alone.
In its official discourse, China does not present its experience as a model that others should replicate, but as evidence that modernization can be achieved without Westernization, and that non-Western societies can produce their own conceptions of the state, legitimacy, and world order.
Yet this vision did not emerge in its current form all at once; it was shaped by changes in China's conception of itself and its place in the world. China moved from its historical position as a civilizational center, through the experience of foreign penetration and the loss of sovereignty during the "Century of Humiliation," to the reconstruction of the state after the 1949 Revolution based on unity, independence, and national liberation.
With reform and opening up, development and the restoration of comprehensive national strength became the core of the national project, and China moved toward integration into the global economy and international institutions. Today, the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" has come to mean a transition from a state seeking to safeguard its sovereignty and achieve its development within the existing order to a major civilizational power aspiring to participate in shaping that order's rules, concepts, and future.
Under President Xi Jinping, this transformation acquired a more comprehensive intellectual expression. Xi rearticulated the concept of "Chinese modernization" and brought it to the forefront of official discourse as a state-led path to development that does not equate modernity with Westernization.
He also linked the project of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" to the completion of modernization, the restoration of China's standing, and confidence in its civilizational continuity. At the global level, these elements crystallized into a vision that affirms sovereignty and multiple paths to development, makes development a pillar of international justice, and adopts "building a community with a shared future for mankind" as a framework for cooperation based on consultation, mutual benefit, and respect for civilizational diversity. Xi Jinping's visit to Egypt, his first in ten years and one that coincides with the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, offers an occasion to read this vision from an Egyptian perspective and from within the experience of the Global South; that is, as a vision of politics, modernity, and world order, not merely as a program for Chinese foreign policy.
First: From the Civilizational Center to Developmental Rise
The present Chinese vision cannot be understood without returning to the profound transformation in China's image of itself. In the traditional imperial conception, China did not see itself merely as one state among others, but as the center of a broader civilizational and political order. The concept of "all under heaven" expressed a conception of a world in which humanity was ordered within a shared moral space, and in which the legitimacy of rule was determined by its ability to preserve order and achieve harmony. This was not a system based on sovereign equality in the modern sense, but on graduated relationships between a civilizational center and peripheries connected to it to varying degrees. Invoking this heritage does not mean that contemporary China seeks to revive the imperial order; the modern state was, in fact, formed through the collapse of that centrality and the struggle to restore sovereignty.
Yet from the Opium Wars onward, China confronted the superiority of the Western powers and then Japan, lost control over parts of its territory and ports, and had unequal treaties imposed upon it before entering decades of division and conflict. The "Century of Humiliation" became a reference point in Chinese political memory: the question was no longer how China should govern a world centered upon it, but how it could restore its unity, independence, and capacity to determine its own destiny within an international order shaped by powers more advanced than itself. With the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's rise became associated with ending fragmentation and foreign intervention, and during that period China presented itself as a revolutionary power supporting liberation movements and the Third World.
The decisive shift came with Deng Xiaoping, when the priority moved from world revolution to domestic development, and peace and openness became prerequisites for national revival. Integration into the world economy served as a means of acquiring the knowledge, technology, and resources needed for modernization, without adopting the Western political model.
This orientation continued under Jiang Zemin and then crystallized under Hu Jintao through the concept of "peaceful development," which presented China's rise as non-threatening to the international order and as a source of shared benefits, and through the concept of a "harmonious world," which called for lasting peace, common prosperity, and cooperation among different systems and civilizations. The success of the development project, however, gradually transformed China from a state that needed a stable environment to achieve its revival into a power seeking to help determine the nature of the world order itself.
Second: From the Developmental State to the Civilizational State
China's transition from poverty and isolation to the status of a major economic power did not lead it to abandon the developmental state, but to incorporate it into a broader conception of the Chinese self. Under Xi Jinping, development ceased to mean only catching up with the more advanced countries and became part of the project of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," which links economic and technological power, the unity of the state, confidence in Chinese culture, and the ability to choose an independent political path. Chinese discourse therefore views the rise not only as a developing state's arrival among the advanced countries, but as an ancient civilization's restoration of its standing after a long historical interruption.
The idea of "Chinese modernization" is the clearest expression of this transformation. It accepts the need for industrialization, scientific progress, higher productivity, and better living standards, while rejecting the equation of modernization with Westernization or the assumption that all societies must follow the same historical and political path taken by the West. According to the official formulation, Chinese modernization combines the task of modernizing a society of enormous scale, the pursuit of common prosperity, a balance between material progress and cultural and moral advancement, harmony between humanity and nature, and a peaceful path to development. This is not merely a list of objectives; it embodies a position on modernity, namely that it is a shared human process, while its institutions and paths may vary according to history, culture, and national circumstances.
In this context, Zhang Weiwei develops the concept of the "civilizational state" to explain China's distinctiveness: it is neither merely a modern nation-state founded in the twentieth century nor an ancient civilization that remained outside the modern era, but an integration of an enduring civilization with a sovereign state possessing institutions and extensive organizational capabilities. China's size, diversity, and historical continuity also make it an entity whose complexity exceeds the model of the homogeneous nation-state.
From this perspective, political unity is not merely an administrative arrangement, but a condition for the continuity of a highly diverse entity and for preventing its return to fragmentation. Although this concept does not constitute a fully developed official doctrine, it converges with official discourse in affirming civilizational continuity, political independence, the value of unity and stability, and the need for a state capable of long-term planning, policy experimentation, and the mobilization of resources around shared objectives.
The difference extends to the concept of legitimacy. In intellectual debates surrounding the Chinese model, competitive elections are not considered the sole criterion of governance; legitimacy is linked to producing outcomes that improve citizens' lives, selecting officials who possess competence and experience, and the state's ability to respond to problems, correct its policies, and preserve order and independence.
In this context, the political thinker Daniel Bell articulates this dimension through "political meritocracy," in which the normative model combines participation at the local levels, policy experimentation at the intermediate levels, and the selection of senior leaders on the basis of experience and competence. Its application is not without problems, and gaps separate it from the theoretical ideal, but the significance of the idea lies in its definition of good governance through capacity and long-term responsibility, not through the moment of electoral mandate alone.
The Communist Party occupies a central position in this conception, presenting itself as the force that rebuilt the state, led development, protected unity, and achieved independence. Marxism was not presented as an imported doctrine to be applied literally, but was connected to Chinese reality, cultural heritage, and practical experience. China thus describes itself simultaneously as a socialist, developmental, and civilizational state. This self-image explains why its view of the world is linked to rejecting the imposition of external models: the defense of multiple development paths is not a separate external principle, but an extension of China's belief that its own success rested on shaping institutions suited to its history, size, and priorities.
Third: From Integration into the International Order to Participation in Reshaping It
The contemporary Chinese vision of world order begins by distinguishing between existing international institutions and the distribution of influence and intellectual frames of reference within them. In its declared discourse, China does not call for dismantling the international order or withdrawing from it, but upholds the United Nations, international law, and multilateralism while calling for the reform of global governance institutions and broader participation by non-Western countries. The "Global Governance Initiative," proposed by Xi Jinping in 2025, formulated this orientation in five principles: sovereign equality, respect for international law, multilateralism, a focus on the interests of peoples, and a focus on practical results. China's objective is thus no longer confined to securing a place within the existing order; it has come to include influencing its rules and concepts.
Sovereignty occupies a central position in this conception, based on a historical experience that associated its loss with foreign intervention, division, and the disruption of development. This underlies the emphasis on territorial integrity, non-interference, and the right of every society to choose its system and developmental path.
This language resonates with countries of the Global South whose modern formation was associated with decolonization and the protection of independent decision-making. Yet it also raises the question of how to reconcile the independence of states with the need for shared rules and responsibilities in a world whose problems transcend national borders.
China places development at the heart of its conception of international justice, proceeding from the view that legal equality remains incomplete if many countries lack infrastructure, financing, and technology. In this context, Xi Jinping launched the "Belt and Road Initiative" in 2013 to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe through policy coordination, infrastructure networks, trade, finance, and people-to-people exchanges.
He then proposed the "Global Development Initiative" in 2021 to accelerate implementation of the United Nations 2030 Agenda through cooperation in areas such as poverty reduction, food security, health, development financing, industrialization, and the digital economy. China presents the two initiatives as instruments for building capacity, but their practical outcomes remain linked to project terms and the balance of power between China and its partners.
The concept of a "community with a shared future for mankind" seeks to reconcile sovereignty and interdependence, on the premise that economic, climate, health, and technological challenges cannot be managed unilaterally. It proposes organizing this interdependence through consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits. The "Global Security Initiative," announced by Xi in 2022 and followed by its concept paper in 2023, adds a call for common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security based on respect for sovereignty and the United Nations Charter, due regard for the legitimate security concerns of states, and the settlement of disputes through dialogue. These concepts remain a broad normative framework rather than fully developed institutional arrangements, and do not in themselves eliminate competition for power or disagreement over the meaning of security.
The civilizational dimension appears in the "Global Civilization Initiative," proposed by Xi in 2023, which calls for respect for the diversity of civilizations, recognition of common human values, a combination of preserving heritage and pursuing renewal, and expanded exchanges among societies. The initiative takes the principle of "modernization without Westernization" to the global level: just as China asserts its right to develop its own path, it affirms the right of other societies to shape institutions suited to their history.
It thereby poses a question that extends beyond the Chinese case: how can common values be combined with multiple ways of embodying them, without imposing a single model or turning particularity into civilizational insularity?
This conception reflects the People's Republic of China's transition from cautious integration into an order whose early institutional arrangements it largely did not help shape to an effort to redefine some of its concepts and rules. China does not abandon the nation-state or existing institutions, nor does it offer an integrated institutional alternative; rather, it seeks to reorder priorities within the system by placing development alongside political rights in the definition of progress, sovereignty alongside cooperation, and civilizational pluralism alongside common values.
This vision is linked to China's experience of achieving modernization while preserving political independence and civilizational continuity. Whether its rise will broaden this pluralism or produce new forms of inequality will be determined by practice, not by declared principles alone.
Conclusion: China and the Global South
The importance of the Chinese vision for the Global South does not derive only from China's status as a rising economic power or a counterweight to the West, but from its bringing back to the fore questions that have accompanied these countries since independence: the relationship between sovereignty and development, the state's role in modernization, societies' right to choose their systems, and the possibility of entering modernity without relinquishing historical and cultural particularity.
The Chinese experience broadens the debate over the relationship between economic growth and political development, and offers a language that links development to national dignity, cooperation to equality, and civilizational pluralism to peoples' right to participate in defining the meaning of progress.
This vision acquires particular significance from an Egyptian perspective. Egypt, like China, is a modern state grounded in an ancient civilizational memory. It experienced foreign intervention and the quest to restore independence, while state-building and development remained at the heart of the conception of its role.
This does not mean that the two experiences are identical or that Egypt is adopting the Chinese model; the intersection lies in the primacy of sovereignty, the importance of the developmental state, and the search for modernization that does not require cultural dissolution or political dependency. The 2024 Egypt-China joint statement reflected this language when it brought together respect for sovereignty and non-interference, the localization of industry and transfer of technology, support for the "Global Development," "Global Security," and "Global Civilization" initiatives, and a call to reform international institutions so that they become more equitable and representative of developing countries.
Xi Jinping's visit offers an opportunity to give Egyptian-Chinese relations a broader international dimension. Alongside expanding trade and investment and building productive and technological capabilities, the two countries can strengthen coordination within BRICS, the New Development Bank, the United Nations, and the frameworks for China's cooperation with Arab states and Africa. This coordination can focus on increasing the representation of developing countries in global governance institutions, reforming development financing practices, expanding access to technology and knowledge, and consolidating the right of states to determine their own priorities and developmental paths. Egypt's location and its Arab, African, and Mediterranean connections enable it to play a role that goes beyond receiving Chinese projects to contributing to the formulation of broader positions expressing the interests of the countries of the Global South.
On this basis, the importance of Egyptian-Chinese relations is not confined to the volume of trade and investment; it extends to their capacity to translate convergence on sovereignty, the primacy of development, and multiple paths to modernization into shared positions and institutional practices that are more equitable for rising and developing countries.
This does not require identical visions or the adoption of a ready-made Chinese model, but calls for broader participation by the countries of the Global South in defining progress and shaping the rules of finance, cooperation, and international organization. The deeper significance of China's rise lies in the fact that it not only redistributes global power, but also opens wider space for non-Western civilizations and societies to participate in producing the ideas and institutions on which the international order rests.
* The writer is a senior researcher at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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