The October 1973 War was not just a battlefield triumph for Egypt; it was a strategic game-changer that reshaped the dynamics of Middle Eastern diplomacy.
The war granted Egypt a powerful negotiating position, enabling its diplomats to engage with Israel not from a position of defeat, but from one of strength. This distinction is critical in the study of international negotiation where there is a vast difference between entering peace talks as a defeated nation and negotiating from a position of victory.
Egypt’s approach to the peace process following its military success exemplifies the principles of peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. Unlike nations forced into concessions under pressure, Egypt leveraged its 1973 battlefield success to dictate historically just terms, safeguard its influence, and expand its range of diplomatic options. The post-war period saw Egypt skillfully navigate an array of diplomatic challenges, from Israeli provocations to regional resistance, ultimately demonstrating not just its ability to make peace but to build peace and sustain it.
Before the actual negotiations leading to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, a crucial phase unfolded; the “pre-negotiation phase.” On 27 November 1977, as a young diplomat stationed at Egypt’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, the present writer was entrusted with a highly sensitive task. A top-secret message from president Anwar Al-Sadat had to be decoded, translated, typed and delivered to Israel’s UN ambassador for transmission to prime minister Menachem Begin. The urgency of this mission underscored the meticulous diplomatic groundwork laid before any formal peace discussions began.
This move culminated in the Mena House Peace Conference in December 1977, where Egypt’s strategy became evident. The conference, chaired by Egypt’s seasoned diplomat Ahmed Esmat Abdel-Meguid, was designed as a preparatory step, not an endpoint. Egypt ensured UN involvement, securing an international framework for the peace process.
A critical but often overlooked aspect was Egypt’s insistence on Palestinian representation and presence at the negotiating table, a move that, had it succeeded, might have altered the course of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Despite the absence of a Palestinian delegation, Egypt symbolically raised the Palestinian flag, sending a clear message about its commitment to a just and comprehensive peace.
One of the defining moments of the peace process in the pre-negotiation phase was the Ismailia meeting between president Al-Sadat and prime minister Begin. The negotiations witnessed intense legal and diplomatic confrontations, particularly over the interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. Begin attempted to manipulate the language of this, arguing for an Israeli withdrawal to “secure and recognise boundaries” rather than a full return to the pre-1967 lines. Egypt, armed with international law and backed by experts like Esmat Abdel-Meguid, firmly countered these distortions, reinforcing its demand for the full Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.
Throughout the process, the Egyptian delegation remained vigilant with regard to Israeli attempts to prolong the negotiations through diversionary tactics. One such ploy was the insistence on maintaining the Yamit Settlement in Sinai, which Egypt unequivocally rejected. When Al-Sadat famously declared that the settlers should “plough it under,” Israel twisted his words, alleging that he had called for it to be “burned,” a deliberate distortion designed to fuel media propaganda. The phonetic resemblance between both words in Arabic was clear.
Another contentious issue was Israel’s demand for compensation in exchange for vacating two military bases in Sinai, a demand Egypt rebuffed, reinforcing its stance that every inch of Sinai was sovereign Egyptian territory. In these negotiations, Egypt’s diplomats displayed an unwavering commitment to national interests, refusing to concede land for the sake of expediency.
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS: By 1978, the negotiations had reached their climax at Camp David in the US, where two critical documents emerged: one outlining the framework for a comprehensive Middle East peace, and another detailing the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.
Contrary to revisionist narratives, Egypt did not seek a unilateral separate peace; rather, the first document enshrined Palestinian rights for self-determination and the right of return elements often ignored in discussions of Camp David.
The Egyptian negotiators also recognised the long-term implications of Israel’s nuclear capabilities, prompting discussions on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Upon a request from the late ambassador and minister Nabil Al-Arabi, a white paper was drafted to incorporate this principle into the provisions of the treaty, but Israel, unsurprisingly, rejected it.
The proposal built upon a 1974 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The ideas incorporated in the white paper included the prohibition of nuclear testing in the region, the storing of fissile material for military purposes, and the stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of Israel by a third party. This initiative reflected Egypt’s foresight in tackling not just immediate territorial concerns, but also broader strategic security issues.
Egypt’s bold peace initiative came at a steep diplomatic cost. The Arab League relocated its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis, and Egypt faced attempts to suspend its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. In one dramatic moment at the UN, the present writer, then a junior diplomat, confronted a clandestine and surreptitious move to expel Egypt from the movement during a late-night session in one of the meetings of the movement’s bureau, of which Egypt at the time was not a member. By skillfully exposing the procedural flaws of this motion, Egypt thwarted this attempt in a testament to the resilience of its diplomatic corps.
Despite these challenges, Egypt stood firm, securing a Peace Treaty with Israel that ensured the full return of Sinai without compromise. The treaty also set a precedent for Arab-Israeli negotiations, demonstrating that strength, strategy, and legal precision, rather than mere political expediency and myopic decisions, are the keys to successful diplomacy.
The Egyptian-Israeli peace process remains a textbook case of sound negotiation strategy. The October War granted Egypt not just a military victory but also a diplomatic advantage, allowing it to negotiate from a position of strength rather than one of submission. The lesson for future diplomacy is clear: wars may be fought on the battlefield, but they are won, or lost, at the negotiating table.
By maintaining a firm stance, leveraging international law, and refusing to yield to unjust pressure, Egypt crafted a peace that safeguarded its territorial integrity and set a precedent for diplomatic engagement in the region. In an era when negotiations often unfold under duress, Egypt’s strategy stands as a powerful example of how to secure peace without surrendering national interests.
* The writer is a former diplomat and a member of Egypt’s negotiating team in the process that culminated in the signing of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 27 March, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: