In line with the well-established tradition of evaluating US presidents on their first 100 days in office, this article will focus on US President Donald Trump’s declarations and actions on the Middle East in this period, as well as the potential future implications of his administration’s policies in the region.
As with other domestic and foreign-policy issues, Trump has proven to be less ideologically rigid than initially anticipated, at least in some areas. Contrary to early impressions, he has not adopted a fixed or dogmatic approach towards all issues. Instead, he has appeared to adopt a more pragmatic, deal-making approach and one more reminiscent of a real-estate negotiator than a hard-line right-wing politician trying to impose a pre-decided policy direction.
The most significant Middle East issue addressed during Trump’s first 100 days in office was the Israeli war on Gaza. Several aspects of the Trump administration’s response to this are worth noting.
First, it is notable that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the first foreign leader to visit Trump after he took office, reflecting the longstanding strategic alliance between the US and Israel. While the former Biden administration had made efforts, though inconsistently, to either pressure or try to persuade Israel to de-escalate the war on Gaza and eventually to bring it to an end, the Trump administration appeared to offer Israel carte blanche to resume its military operations.
This included implicit approval for Israel to resume its military actions in Gaza, making the ceasefire successfully brokered by Egypt and Qatar and backed by the previous administration short-lived.
Second, during Netanyahu’s visit to the US, Trump proposed turning Gaza into an “Middle East riviera” after bringing it under US control and depopulating it by relocating its residents to other Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan. While the administration initially seemed determined to pursue this plan, it eventually backed down in the face of strong and unified opposition from the Arab countries, including of course the Palestinians, and from key international and regional actors with the sole exception of Israel.
This Arab opposition was particularly focused on the resettlement of the Palestinians from Gaza in other Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan. It was further expressed through a limited Arab Summit meeting held in Saudi Arabia and then a broader Arab Summit held at the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo. The latter meeting adopted a plan proposed by Egypt for the reconstruction of Gaza, effectively pushing the Trump administration to abandon its Gaza “riviera” initiative.
Third, Trump maintained a firm and uncompromising stance in support of the Israeli government against efforts to hold it accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Israeli war on Gaza. These efforts took place particularly at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Trump administration went so far as to consider taking measures against individuals, especially if they are US citizens, and institutions, especially if they are registered in the US, that expressed support for or solidarity with these actions.
This illustrates the administration’s unwavering and clearcut alignment with and unconditional support for the current Israeli government and its policies, regardless of broader international or humanitarian concerns. This is an issue on which the Trump administration has maintained its position without any change and without showing any flexibility.
Another major Middle East issue that saw changes during Trump’s first 100 days in office was Iran. Trump began his presidency by using quite hostile, and occasionally aggressive, rhetoric towards Iran, particularly concerning its nuclear programme and its network of regional allies, seen as threats to both US and Israeli security. Some observers believed military conflict between the US and Iran might be imminent and inevitable.
However, the administration then quickly shifted direction. It agreed to initiate indirect talks with Iran in Oman over the nuclear issue and later described the initial stage of these negotiations as positive and advancing. While some analysts have remained sceptical about the potential success of these negotiations, citing Trump’s 2017 withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal brokered under the Obama administration, they often overlook a relevant precedent in the successful resolution by the first Reagan administration, also Republican, of the US hostage crisis in Tehran in January 1981 that began under Democratic President Jimmy Carter in November 1979.
Given this historical context, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the prospects for the current US-Iran talks, not only concerning the nuclear file but possibly also extending to other military and political dimensions of Iran’s role in the region. This is the case despite the Iranian government’s repeated statements that it will not allow the discussions to go beyond the nuclear issue with a view to ending the sanctions on Iran. An
The writer is a diplomat and commentator.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 8 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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