Editorial: Egypt’s strategic reality - A nation in transition not decline

Al-Ahram Weekly Editorial
Wednesday 4 Jun 2025

In a recent article titled “The Losers of the New Middle East,” the UK Economist magazine offers a sweeping indictment of Egypt’s current trajectory economically, politically, and geopolitically.

 

It argues that Egypt, once a pivotal force in the Arab World, has faded into the margins of regional influence, burdened by debt and entangled in an array of infrastructure projects deemed overambitious or unnecessary. While such critiques are not new, what is striking about the Economist’s approach is the lack of historical context, strategic nuance, and understanding of the internal logic behind Egypt’s recent choices.

Egypt’s economic and geopolitical challenges are real. No credible observer would deny that the country has endured a series of compounding pressures: the aftershocks of the Covid-19 pandemic, the destabilising effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on food and energy prices, and a global monetary tightening cycle that has hit emerging markets with particular force. These developments have exposed Egypt’s vulnerabilities, especially its reliance on imports, its need for foreign currency, and its debt profile. But to attribute the current state of affairs solely to misguided policymaking, or to cast Egypt as a fading power clinging to illusions of grandeur, misses the broader strategic picture.

At the heart of Egypt’s national vision lies a fundamental demographic and geographic reality. The population now exceeds 105 million, and Cairo, the capital, is among the world’s most congested urban centres. The New Administrative Capital, criticised by the Economist as emblematic of state vanity, is in fact a response to a deep urban crisis. Designed to relieve pressure on Greater Cairo and to create a hub for digital governance, the project reflects long-term planning more than impulsive extravagance. It is intended not only to house government ministries but also to offer a more sustainable model of urban life – integrated, green, and technologically equipped.

Similarly, Egypt’s infrastructure agenda, from the expansion of the Suez Canal to the construction of highways, bridges, and railways, should not be interpreted as a detached exercise in monument-building. These are essential investments in a country seeking to rebalance its national economy, stimulate industrial zones, and better connect urban centres to rural peripheries. Such projects generate employment in the short term and form the basis for productivity and competitiveness in the long term. The fiscal cost is significant, but so is the potential payoff if implemented alongside reforms that increase efficiency and private-sector participation.

The Economist makes much of Egypt’s economic fragility, particularly inflation and currency devaluation. But it fails to account for how these pressures are being addressed. The government has pursued a gradual process of subsidy reform, currency liberalisation, and sectoral diversification, steps that are painful but necessary. Parallel efforts like the “Decent Life” initiative aim to close the development gap between urban and rural communities, bringing improved healthcare, education, and utilities to the country’s most underserved areas. These programmes are not merely symbolic – they reach millions and represent one of the largest grassroots development schemes in the world.

Geopolitically, the argument that Egypt has become irrelevant in a new regional architecture led by the Gulf states is an oversimplification. Influence in the Middle East is not determined solely by publicised accords or large sovereign wealth funds. It is also about diplomatic reach, military positioning, and historical legitimacy. Egypt continues to serve as a key mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has hosted dialogue among rival Libyan factions, and plays a stabilising role in the Red Sea Corridor. Its strategic location bordering Gaza, Sudan, and the Eastern Mediterranean makes it indispensable to any serious conversation about regional security.

Moreover, Cairo has maintained a foreign policy that balances traditional alliances with new partnerships. Its ties with Washington remain solid, despite periodic tensions. Meanwhile, Egypt has deepened economic and military cooperation with countries like Russia, China, and India, reflecting a more multipolar approach to diplomacy. It is also active in African institutions and engages constructively in the Arab League. To frame Egypt’s position through the narrow lens of exclusion from the Abraham Accords or Gulf-centric summits is to disregard the more subtle forms of power Egypt continues to wield.

Internally, Egypt’s governance model is undergoing its own evolution. There is much work to be done on transparency, on accountability, and on expanding public participation. These are legitimate areas of concern, and they merit open dialogue both domestically and internationally. Yet to reduce the state’s efforts to a cult of personality or a mere facade of reform ignores the institutional groundwork being laid across sectors. From overhauling public transport systems to digitising government services and expanding access to health insurance, the country is actively restructuring its capacity to serve its population.

What the Economist fails to recognise is that development in the Global South does not always follow Western models or timeframes. State-led modernisation, public-private partnerships, and large-scale investment in national infrastructure are not inherently unsustainable. In fact, many nations that have successfully transitioned to middle-income status, among them South Korea, China, and Turkey, have pursued similar paths. The key lies in maintaining fiscal discipline, ensuring public benefit, and adapting to feedback over time. Egypt’s approach is evolving, but it is anchored in national priorities not in imported blueprints.

There is a deeper issue at play in such critiques: the tendency to interpret every deviation from neoliberal orthodoxy as a sign of failure. But the 21st century is witnessing the erosion of that orthodoxy. New models of governance are emerging, especially in postcolonial contexts. Countries like Egypt are attempting to reconcile the imperatives of modernisation with the legacies of underdevelopment and the pressures of population growth. Their journeys will be uneven, but they should not be dismissed as doomed simply because they do not fit inherited paradigms.

This is not to claim that Egypt is immune to missteps or exempt from scrutiny. On the contrary, sustained progress depends on an active civil society, a robust media, and independent institutions. But responsible journalism must be more than a litany of grievances; it must strive for balance, context, and intellectual curiosity. Egypt is not a loser – it is a country in transition. It is contending with the constraints of its past while attempting to chart a path towards a more resilient, inclusive future.

As the region continues to shift, Egypt’s weight, historical, demographic, and strategic, remains a constant. Its challenges are considerable, but so is its determination to overcome them on its own terms. Dismissing that effort is not only unfair. It is also analytically unsound.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 June, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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