Politics is complex, yet it can be reduced to basic human instincts, the chief of which is fear.
The security dilemma is the utmost expression of fear and how it plays out in actors’ decisions and the way they see the world. In the context of power competition, state actions and behaviours are largely influenced by their desire to increase their power in response to perceived threats.
The theory emerged in the 1950s and was further developed during the Cold War, but it has gained increased relevance in recent years due to unfolding conflicts in Eastern Europe between NATO and Russia, in South Asia in the wars between India and Pakistan, and in the potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific between China and the US and its allies.
The security dilemma has always been around the corner in the Middle East, and the recent 12-Day War between Iran and Israel showcased how it works.
First coined in its modern form by US scholar John H. Herz in 1950, the security dilemma refers to a social condition in which groups or individuals coexist without being organised by a higher authority, resulting in an anarchic situation. According to Herz, the security dilemma is not rooted in the human condition. Rather, it is a social phenomenon.
In such a setting, groups or individuals are concerned about their security as a result of their fear of being attacked, dominated, or annihilated by others. To ensure their safety, they strive to acquire more power, which in turn makes others feel insecure and compels them to do the same. This leads to a vicious cycle of power accumulation and competition, where no one can ever feel entirely secure.
In this model, the spiral of power competition goes like this: (1) in order to achieve security, a nation (A) will tend to accumulate the sources of power, particularly military power; (2) nation (B) will perceive these measures as a threat to its security and will be compelled to do the same; (3) nation (A) will then feel insecure and threatened and will accumulate more power; and (4) the security dilemma thus perpetuates a power struggle and undermines efforts to establish amicable relations among political units.
US scholar Robert Jervis, another pioneer of the theory, emphasised that uncertainty and fears of actors’ present and future intentions are crucial in forming and maintaining the security dilemma.
Yet, while it can cause war, the security dilemma is not the sole reason for all conflicts. Combining both Herz and Jervis, one might claim that the security dilemma is a dynamic composed of four acts: anarchy, defensive measures, uncertainty, and the spiral of violence.
The Middle East is suffering from a huge security deficit today. The region has been disrupted and insecure since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, an event that acted like a Pandora’s Box in triggering unfolding insecurity dynamics.
This security deficit has been reflected in recent decades in a plethora of regional rivalries and international and regional interventions in intrastate conflicts and domestic politics. This regional disorder, which has become chronic, has caused the regional powers to make efforts to increase their security at the cost of triggering a negative feedback cycle that has left the whole region less secure than ever. And here lies the tragedy of the security dilemma in the region.
Taking place against the background of the genocidal Israeli war on Gaza and the long struggle of narratives to reshape the region, the recent 12-Day War between Israel, the US, and Iran manifested the dictates of the security dilemma in the Middle East. The region has lacked a hegemon or higher power to reinforce security among its political units. While the intervention by the US in the 12-Day War wreaked havoc in the region, the regional powers fell short in establishing a collaborative mechanism to resolve disputes or manage competition.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been engaged in competition with both the Western powers, led by the US, and regional powers, particularly in the Gulf and Israel. It has sought to increase its security by meddling in regional conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen and creating or building alliances with Shia non-state militant groups and building nuclear and missile capabilities.
It says that these capabilities are necessary to deter its adversaries. According to some Iranian officials, Iran’s military presence in Syria and Lebanon was essential to avoid fighting in Tehran and Isfahan.
Because of a deep-seated legacy of mistrust, Israel has perceived this Iranian strategy as an “existential threat” to its security. While it has struggled to stabilise the situation in the Gaza Strip following the 7 October 2023 attacks, it has exploited the spin-off effects of the war on Gaza to disarm the Syrian state after the collapse of the former Al-Assad regime and to strike severe blows to Iran’s proxies, notably Hizbullah in Lebanon. Decapitating the leaders of the Iran-backed “axis of resistance” has been integral to this strategy.
The results of the Israeli and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities have been inconclusive. Some estimates indicate that they just delayed the Iranian nuclear programme for months or years and were far from “annihilating” it as US President Donald Trump claimed. It will surely motivate Iran to rebuild its conventional military capacities and reclaim the control of its airspace to deter any future attacks by Israel.
Most importantly, the Israeli-US attacks might prompt Iran to accelerate the acquisition of nuclear weapons, in what US scholar Kenneth Waltz had called a “breakout capability”. Following the reduction of its political and military influence and the setbacks inflicted by Israel and the US, Iran might consider developing nuclear weapons to enhance its defensive position and establish a balance with Israel, the sole nuclear power in the region. This could potentially trigger an arms race and would not resolve ongoing rivalries or longstanding disputes.
The tragedy of the security dilemma lies in its inescapability. The only way to manage it is to reduce uncertainty and attain a “deterrent” or re-establish the regional security architecture on the collective interests of regional stakeholders. The regional powers should find a way to balance Israeli aggression, and they should live with the fact that collective security is only achievable with independence from foreign powers, the US in particular.
The writer is head of the Strategic Foresight Program, Future for Advanced Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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