The year 2025 was far from routine in the history of international relations or in the political trajectory of the region stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa.
It was a year of exposure rather than continuity and one that brought long-accumulating structural shifts suddenly to the surface, manifesting themselves in overlapping crises, open conflicts, and visible changes in the foundations of the international system.
From an Egyptian perspective, 2025 marked a clear transition from a phase dominated by crisis management to one in which political pathways, prospects for regional stability, and the resilience of the regional order itself were placed under direct scrutiny. This unfolded at a time when the capacity of the major powers to impose stability was visibly declining, while reliance on unilateral force was increasing, often detached from legitimacy, multilateral consensus, and the principles of international law.
Within this unsettled environment, Gaza remained the most powerful symbol of regional instability, not only because of the unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe there, but also because it reshaped in fundamental ways the relationship between the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the wider architecture of regional security.
Developments throughout 2025 made it clear that the prolonged absence of a political horizon for the Palestinian cause is no longer a distant or manageable risk, but an immediate and systemic threat. Its repercussions extend beyond the immediate theatre of conflict to affect the stability of neighbouring states, the security of vital maritime corridors, and broader international balances.
From Cairo’s standpoint, the war in Gaza was not simply a military confrontation; it was a defining test of the limits of force and a stark demonstration of the failure inherent in managing conflict rather than resolving it.
Over the two years following the events of 7 October 2023 and their cascading consequences, Egypt assumed a central role in containing escalation, steering de-escalation efforts, and advancing interim arrangements aimed at securing a ceasefire, facilitating prisoner exchanges, and enabling the flow of humanitarian assistance.
Experience, however, has shown that de-escalation alone cannot suffice. The persistent obstruction of any transition to a second phase — one that entails clear political obligations related to ending the war, consolidating governance in Gaza, establishing mechanisms for stabilisation and peace support, initiating reconstruction, and ultimately reopening a credible political process towards a two-state solution — has exposed the fragility of the prevailing approach.
It is therefore essential that Egypt and other mediators work to codify the provisions of the second phase in detail, whether through a new UN Security Council Resolution or a formal political document adopted at a prospective international conference, potentially a “Sharm El-Sheikh II,” designed to regulate the arrangements of the “day after”.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely to continue seeking to narrow the scope of this phase, invoking the issue of Hamas’ disarmament. Cairo, however, has addressed this matter within a flexible framework that allows for a weapons handover to the Palestinian Authority (PA), to Egypt, or to the United Nations, drawing on historical precedents such as the supervised disarmament of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) under the Good Friday Agreement in the UK.
Maintaining Gaza in a prolonged condition between war and no war, as Egypt has consistently argued, is inherently unsustainable and will continue to generate recurring cycles of violence unless this logic is decisively reversed.
Sudan and the region: While regional attention remained focused on Gaza, the war in Sudan deepened largely beyond the global spotlight, becoming by 2025 one of the most severe humanitarian and security crises affecting both Africa and the Middle East.
What began as an internal power struggle evolved into an existential threat to the unity of the Sudanese state and the survival of its institutions, with direct consequences for Red Sea security, the Horn of Africa, and Nile water security.
From an Egyptian perspective, Sudan constitutes a strategic depth whose stability is inseparable from Egypt’s national security. Its fragmentation or collapse would open the door to cross-border chaos that would be exceedingly difficult to contain. Throughout the year, Cairo consistently emphasised that the Sudanese crisis has no military solution, and that any approach bypassing an inclusive political process would lead only to prolonged attrition, the internationalisation of the conflict, and competing external interventions.
As 2026 begins, the central challenge remains how to move from a fragile ceasefire towards a comprehensive political process capable of preserving state unity, rebuilding institutions, and preventing Sudan from becoming a permanent source of instability on the borders of the Arab world and Africa.
In Libya, 2025 further entrenched a condition of chronic stagnation and neither full-scale war nor genuine peace. The result has been sustained political and institutional fragmentation, an oil-dependent economy functioning in the absence of a unified state, and persistent, competing foreign interventions.
From Egypt’s standpoint, the Libyan crisis is no longer a deferred political issue, but a direct security concern affecting the western border, Mediterranean stability, irregular migration flows, and the proliferation of weapons. Experience has shown that the cost of maintaining the status quo far exceeds the cost of a political settlement. Durable stability in Libya, as Cairo maintains, remains contingent upon unifying state institutions, ending the illegitimate armed presence, and holding credible elections under UN supervision that reflect the will of the Libyan people without exclusion.
In the Horn of Africa, developments during 2025 were equally unsettling, returning Somalia to the forefront of regional and international concern not only because of its internal fragilities, but also due to intensifying global competition over this strategically vital region. Israel’s recent announcement recognising Somaliland introduced a new and destabilising dimension, reopening debate over the risks of undermining the principle of territorial integrity and the wider implications for African and Red Sea security.
From an Egyptian and Arab perspective, this move is widely viewed as a dangerous precedent that could encourage secessionist tendencies elsewhere and disrupt security balances in one of the world’s most sensitive regions.
Against this backdrop, Red Sea security assumed heightened strategic importance, both as a critical artery of global commerce and as a cornerstone of Egyptian national security. The events of 2025 highlighted the growing risks associated with the militarisation of this vital waterway and the convergence of regional crises along its shores from Gaza to Sudan to the Horn of Africa.
As 2026 begins, the challenge lies in developing a collective framework for Red Sea security grounded in regional cooperation, respect for the sovereignty of littoral states, and the prevention of the Sea’s transformation into an open arena for regional and international power competition. The broad regional and international condemnation of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, voiced by the UN Security Council, the Arab League, and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, may provide an entry point for coordinated regional action.
Equally important is the resumption of the Djibouti Dialogue between the Somali federal government and Somaliland, aimed at reaching a fraternal formula that preserves Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity. In parallel, the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, established in 2020 and headquartered in Riyadh, should convene without delay to formulate a coherent strategy for safeguarding the region’s security and stability.
The international level: As 2026 began, the international community was confronted with a deeply troubling and unprecedented development: the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife following a direct US military intervention. This act constituted a blatant violation of the core principles of national sovereignty and the established rules of international law — foremost among them is the prohibition on the use or threat of force and the inviolability of state sovereignty. The repercussions of this incident extended far beyond Venezuela itself. It triggered sharp regional and international divisions and generated widespread concern about the dangerous precedent it sets — one that weakens the international legal order and revives the logic of “might makes right” in the management of disputes. It also signals the use of force to seize resources and impose coercive regime change, threatening stability across Latin America. Several states were explicitly named as potential targets in the region, including Colombia, as well as Iran beyond it, opening the door to similar patterns of intervention in other parts of the world.
At the global level, the war in Ukraine continued throughout 2025 without resolution, reinforcing the reality that the international system has entered a phase of prolonged great-power confrontation.
The repercussions of this have been felt acutely across the Middle East and Africa through disruptions to energy and food markets and mounting economic pressures on developing economies. From Egypt’s perspective, the conflict has exposed the fragility of the global economic order and the limited capacity of international institutions to shield vulnerable states from the consequences of conflicts in which they have no direct stake. Recent diplomatic engagements in Washington may yet open a path toward a settlement that alleviates some of these pressures at both the regional and international levels.
In Asia, the intensifying US-China rivalry continued to reshape global power dynamics, with indirect implications for the Middle East as regional actors seek to diversify partnerships and avoid strategic dependence on a single pole. This evolution coincides with the expanding role of groupings such as the G20 and the BRICS group of nations, reflecting a broader effort by developing countries to claim greater influence in global economic governance.
Economically, the international debt crisis emerged as one of the most severe structural challenges of 2025 and remains likely to deepen in 2026. Many countries across Africa and the Middle East have faced unprecedented pressures resulting from high global interest rates, declining investment flows, and slowing growth.
Experience has demonstrated that traditional international financial institutions, in their current form, are no longer capable of delivering sufficient or equitable solutions. This reality underscores the need for the fundamental reform of lending mechanisms, debt restructuring frameworks, and a shift toward development-centered financing rather than austerity-driven conditionalities that undermine social stability.
In this context, Egypt views platforms such as the G20 and BRICS as essential arenas for rebalancing the international economic system, defending the interests of developing states, and strengthening the voice of the Global South on issues of finance, development, and technology transfer. As 2026 begins, the challenge will be translating these platforms into tangible policies that ease debt burdens and support investment in infrastructure, energy, and food security.
The central lesson of 2025 is that the world has entered a phase of unprecedented strategic fluidity, marked by the erosion of established rules without the consolidation of a stable alternative order. Within this unsettled environment, Egypt has positioned itself as a state committed to stabilising its surroundings rather than exporting crises, and to building bridges rather than deepening polarisation.
As 2026 unfolds, the challenges are formidable, but the opportunities remain real. Moving beyond crisis management towards the construction of durable political settlements is no longer merely a normative aspiration. It has become a strategic necessity to safeguard national security, protect the interests of societies, and prevent a descent into wider instability.
In this context, the Egyptian vision, anchored in balance, active diplomacy, and the integration of security and development, remains among the few realistic pathways towards a less volatile future in a region that has long borne the costs of intervention and political upheaval.
*The writer is a former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 8 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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