One year after US President Donald Trump returned to the White House, the international climate appears more unstable than it was a year ago. This is less the result of one major crisis than of several tensions unfolding at the same time and being handled with speed rather than patience.
Decisions are taken quickly, escalation is used early on, and diplomacy often struggles to keep pace. In this context, talk of a possible US strike against Iran is not surprising. It fits a broader pattern in which pressure has taken priority over careful sequencing and long-term planning.
Iran’s return to the centre of attention follows directly from this setting. The possibility of a US strike should not be read as the opening of a new chapter, but as the continuation of unfinished business. Since the brief 12-day confrontation in June 2025, many in Washington and Tel Aviv have felt that the issue was left unresolved. That episode ended without a clear settlement, without a stable deterrence arrangement, and without a political plan for what would come next.
The current drift towards escalation reflects concerns that time may no longer be working in their favour and that pressure alone may not produce the results once anticipated.
However, the reasons driving this surge in pressure and escalation at this moment remain far from clear. They are multiple and often overlap. Some in Washington and probably also in Tel Aviv appear to believe that conditions may now be more favourable for decisive action against Iran, either because intelligence assessments point to internal vulnerabilities or because they assume the consequences can be contained.
Other arguments have also been brought into the discussion. Allegations of severe repression inside Iran, including claims that hundreds of demonstrators have been killed by the authorities, have resurfaced and are presented as part of the justification for possible intervention. These allegations may or may not be true, but they are not, on their own, sufficient to explain the scale of the current US military posture.
They do not account for the movement of major US naval assets from the Pacific to the Gulf, nor for the level of readiness now being considered. This suggests that the current moment is not simply reactive. It points instead to a context that was anticipated in advance, in which different narratives are being assembled around decisions that were already under consideration.
Alongside this, some in Washington view Iran through a wider strategic lens, linking the issue to broader efforts to pressure China by targeting energy routes and key nodes across different regions. Energy itself also plays a role, as Iranian oil and gas continue to matter in a tight and fragile global market.
There is also a personal and political dimension that cannot be ignored. Under Trump, US foreign policy has often been shaped by a search for momentum. Visible successes are highlighted, and public impact is prioritised over careful sequencing.
Claims of progress on Gaza, the portrayal of the Venezuela operation as quick and effective, and appearances at international platforms such as the Davos Forum all feed a narrative of decisive action that can be carried from one theatre to the next.
In this context, Iran risks being treated less as a complex case in its own right and more as the next test of a broader approach, where foreign escalation helps shift the political agenda at home as much as it advances strategic goals abroad.
Together, these factors push the crisis into a familiar deterrence trap. Strong rhetoric raises expectations, while stepping back carries political and strategic costs. For the United States, and for Trump personally, this creates a narrowing corridor of choice. Having raised the level of pressure and military readiness so publicly, de-escalation risks appearing as retreat.
In such conditions, escalation can begin to drive decision-making, rather than the other way around, gradually entrapping the administration in a course of action that becomes harder to reverse without political damage.
This brings the debate to a basic but often overlooked question: what would success actually mean?
From Washington’s perspective, success is usually defined in limited and short-term terms. It means weakening Iran’s military and strategic capabilities, restoring a degree of deterrence, keeping escalation under control, protecting energy markets, and avoiding a long and costly military commitment.
Israel approaches the issue from a different angle. For Tel Aviv, success is not about temporary damage, but about making sure Iran cannot recover, rebuild, or retain room to manoeuvre. Under Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, partial outcomes are seen as risky, because they leave open the possibility that the same threat will return later. The emphasis is therefore on long-term results, even if this involves sustained pressure and higher costs and risks.
Beyond the military and political risks lies a deeper concern. Any strike carried out without a clear and broadly accepted legal basis would further weaken international law. Whatever the record of the Iranian regime, eroding the remaining restraints on the use of force by the American administration sets a dangerous precedent, especially after the Venezuela episode.
The real danger lies not only in escalation itself, but in what follows it. A strike launched without a credible plan for the day after risks opening the door to wider regional breakdown, as retaliation, miscalculation, and opportunistic moves by other actors interact in unpredictable ways.
Any such escalation would also unfold in an international environment where other major powers have clear interests at stake. China and Russia may not seek direct confrontation, but they are unlikely to remain neutral if Iran is destabilised or global energy routes are threatened.
At this point, an Egyptian perspective becomes unavoidable. Egypt does not approach this crisis through alignment for or against Iran, nor through endorsement of escalation. Its strategic outlook, shaped by long experience with war, diplomacy, and repeated regional breakdowns, places clear emphasis on international law, state sovereignty, and the containment of chaos.
The writer is a lecturer in global studies.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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