The profound transformations witnessed in the Middle East over the past decade have revived the question of the role of the so-called “middle powers” – states that do not belong to the major power blocs but possess the political, diplomatic, and economic capabilities to influence the course of conflict, war, and peace – can play.
This role is particularly relevant regarding the possibility of preparing for new negotiations between the United States and Iran, not only on the nuclear issue, which has been the focus of interactions between the two sides since the beginning of the millennium, but also on Iran’s missile capabilities and Tehran’s regional policies, which have become a central factor in regional instability.
In this context, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE emerge as middle powers that possess, to varying degrees, the tools of influence and mediation and have a direct interest in limiting the recurring slide towards military confrontation and building a more sustainable regional security framework.
Experience has shown that addressing the Iranian nuclear issue in isolation from the broader regional context only leads to temporary and fragile solutions. The 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, despite its importance in temporarily curbing the Iranian nuclear programme almost completely ignored the concerns of regional states regarding Iran’s missile capabilities and its network of alliances with non-state actors from armed militias to transnational movements.
This disregard contributed to deepening the trust deficit between the United States and its regional allies and created a widespread impression that major understandings were being forged over the heads of regional states, rather than in partnership with them. This is where the importance of the role that mediating powers can play in reconnecting the US-Iranian negotiation process with regional security considerations becomes clear.
Saudi Arabia occupies a pivotal position in any such effort, given its political and economic weight and its standing within the Arab and Islamic world, and because it is one of the countries most directly affected by Iran’s regional policies.
In recent years, Riyadh has shown an increasing inclination to employ diplomacy alongside deterrence, as evidenced by the de-escalation process with Iran mediated by China. This shift does not reflect weakness, but rather a growing awareness that open conflict is exhausting for all parties and that the absence of a structured regional security framework leaves the region vulnerable to uncontrolled escalation.
If Saudi Arabia were to become involved in preparing for US-Iranian negotiations, it could play a dual role: clearly conveying Gulf concerns to Washington, while simultaneously testing Tehran’s willingness to move from a policy of influence through proxies to a more institutionalised and disciplined approach.
Egypt, on the other hand, bases its mediation capabilities on a long history of diplomatic engagement and its position as a central state not directly involved in Gulf-Iranian power struggles. Cairo maintains balanced relations with the United States and has open, albeit limited, channels of communication with Tehran, in addition to its traditional role in shaping ideas about Arab regional security.
Egypt can contribute particularly to developing a more comprehensive vision for a regional security system that goes beyond bilateral or quasi-bilateral arrangements and includes clear rules for arms control, respect for state sovereignty, and regulating the behaviour of non-state actors. Egypt’s experience in mediation efforts, from Gaza to Libya, lends it credibility in dealing with highly complex environments.
Turkey plays a more problematic but indispensable role. It is a member of NATO and a security partner of the United States, while simultaneously maintaining close economic and political ties with Iran, competing with it in some areas and cooperating in others.
This intermediary – and contradictory – position gives Ankara a unique ability to convey messages between the two sides, but at the same time it presents a challenge in separating its role as a mediator from its own regional interests, particularly in Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, Turkey’s involvement in any preliminary track for broader negotiations could help connect security issues, rather than addressing them in separate negotiating silos.
Qatar and the UAE represent different but complementary models of mediating power. Qatar has built its diplomatic capital on hosting difficult negotiations and opening channels with opposing parties, including the United States, Iran, and non-state actors. This role gives it a practical ability to facilitate back-channel communications and pave the way for initial understandings.
In contrast, the UAE relies on its extensive economic influence and multifaceted relationships with Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran simultaneously, and in recent years it has shown increasing interest in de-escalation and engaging in long-term security and economic approaches. Abu Dhabi can contribute by introducing the economic and developmental dimension into any regional security framework, making stability a tangible interest rather than a mere political slogan.
However, the true value of these mediating powers lies not only in facilitating negotiations on specific issues, but in their collective ability to push for the idea of a regional security system as the necessary framework for limiting wars and conflicts. The absence of such a system is what has historically allowed rogue behaviour by regional states like Israel and Iran, whether through the excessive use of military force or through the violation of unwritten rules of engagement. It is also what has allowed the proliferation of non-state actors, from armed militias to transnational organisations, and transformed them into instruments in regional and international conflicts.
Any new US-Iranian negotiations, however comprehensive, will remain vulnerable to failure unless they are integrated into a broader vision that acknowledges the interests and security concerns of the region’s states and imposes clear limitations on missile proliferation, the use of proxies, and unilateral policies that disregard international law.
This is precisely where the role of mediating powers becomes crucial, not merely as technical mediators, but as key players in shaping a more stable and secure regional order. This tole should be viewed as part of a campaign for an alternative political and security project based on sharing responsibility for stability and transforming competition from a zero-sum conflict into the management of disagreements within agreed-upon rules.
Ultimately, the future of security in the Middle East cannot be reduced to a bilateral understanding between Washington and Tehran, no matter how important this may be. The regional equation has become far more complex, and the power dynamics more intricate. Therefore, the role that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE can play is to redefine the terms of negotiation itself, making it an entry point for building a regional security system that limits the logic of perpetual war, curbs rogue behaviour, and opens the door to a less violent and more governable and stable Middle East.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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