The 2026 US National Defence Strategy that the Trump administration released last month, and which I wrote about last week, differs from the previous defence strategy that the administration of former president Joe Biden adopted in October 2022 in dealing with the Middle East, Russia, and Europe.
As explained last week, the two top strategic priorities for the Trump administration are given as the Defence of the Homeland and Deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.
Going over the sections of the strategy that deal with the Middle East, Russia, and Europe, it becomes clear that the United States in the coming few years, and until a new strategy is published during the term of another administration, will enter a period of retrenchment when it comes to the Middle East and Europe.
This retrenchment is disguised as burden-sharing. As far as Russia is concerned, it is obvious that the present administration, unlike the previous one, does not see Russia as an immediate threat to American national interests or to Europe. If this year’s strategy speaks of Russia as a “threat,” it is one that is limited to the countries of Eastern Europe. It is interesting to note that the document describes this presumed threat as “manageable”.
It accuses Russia of resorting to force to impose border changes and to “reimpose an imperial sphere of influence.” However, it still minimises any threat that Russia may present to Europe and NATO. The strategy also speaks about a “European NATO”, a rare description in the United States, and it stresses that Europe “dwarfs Russia” in terms of economic scale, population, and what it calls “latent military power”.
Surprisingly, the document says that while Europe is still important, it has a “smaller and decreasing share of global economic power”. In consequence, the United States will prioritise defending the US homeland and deterring China, it says. It also states that America’s NATO allies are more powerful than Russia and that they are therefore positioned to bear a primary responsibility in providing for conventional defence, while the United States will provide “critical but limited support”.
In the meantime, Europe is called upon to take the lead in supporting Ukraine’s defence. This is a far cry from the positions of the Biden administration in this context.
The 2026 strategy describes Israel as a “model ally” and adds that the United States will “further empower” it to defend itself and to “promote our shared interests”, building on US President Donald Trump’s efforts, described as “historic”, to secure peace in the Middle East.
Of the American partners in the Gulf, the document says that they are able and willing to do more to defend themselves against Iran and its “proxies”. Moreover, the United States will promote “integration” between regional partners “so that they can do even more together”. This is an implicit reference to integrating Israel into a Gulf-Arab-Israeli military coalition, or an “alliance of sorts”.
In the present regional geopolitical context, I am not sure that such a concept can materialise, unless, at least, there is the successful implementation of Trump’s peace plan for Gaza. The Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement make this doubtful.
If there is something in common between the 2022 National Defence Strategy and the one published this year it lies in the way that Washington views Iran and its relations and policies in the region. The two documents portray Iran as the enemy and the source of insecurity and instability in the Middle East. The same accusations are found in both, from Iran’s working on improving its ability to produce a nuclear weapon to building and exporting “extensive missile forces”, drones, and advance maritime capabilities that could threaten the free flow of oil and international trade.
Iran also stands accused of supporting “terrorist” groups and “military proxies” in the region. It should be mentioned that after the release of the strategy, the United States deployed significant military assets closer to Iran, both naval and air, and there has been persistent speculation that Trump could order a major attack on Iran if negotiations with the Iranians fail.
The two sides held talks in Oman on 6 February. Further talks are expected, but no date has been announced.
If the global strategic objectives of the United States remain unchanged under the Biden and Trump administrations, as spelled out in the 2022 and 2026 US National Defence Strategies, their strategic priorities and approaches are different. In dealing with the Middle East, the two administrations agree that Israel is an ally, described by the latter as a “model ally”, and that Iran is the designated “enemy”.
After the wars that Israel has unleashed on the Palestinians, the Lebanese, the Syrians, and the Houthis in Yemen, I doubt if most Arab governments, including America’s partners in the region, see eye to eye with the Trump administration in thinking that the real battle in the Middle East pits them against Iran.
To secure peace in the region Israel should be reined in. But given the way in which the 2026 US National Defence Strategy conceptualises Israel as a “model ally”, there is no indication that the American administration will muster the political will to do so.
The writer is former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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