The international community stands at a critical juncture regarding the future of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), particularly in relation to its implementation in the Middle East. The current complex regional and international security scene, with the nuclear issue at its centre, reminds us once again of the priority of multilateral diplomacy as the best means to settle disputes.
Although the 1968 treaty remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, the prolonged impasse surrounding the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the region has contributed to wavering confidence in it.
Nevertheless, the NPT remains the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and counter proliferation in the eroding post-World War II world order. The current erosion of international law and humanitarian law, the influence of multilateral organisations, and the importance of the UN Charter need to be met with the dynamic outreach of multilateral diplomacy in order to prevent it.
The persistent gap between the commitments embodied in the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, which called for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs, and their practical realisation has elevated this issue from a regional concern to a broader test of the treaty’s political credibility and institutional resilience.
A nuclear-weapon-free zone is established through a legally binding multilateral instrument under which states undertake commitments to regional denuclearisation and verification. Such arrangements typically incorporate provisions for negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon states, reinforcing regional stability within the wider international security framework.
In the Middle East, the pursuit of such a zone represents not only a disarmament objective but also a confidence-building mechanism aimed at reducing strategic asymmetries and addressing long-standing security dilemmas.
The proposal for a Middle East zone free of WMDs has progressed through several pivotal stages. Initially advanced by Egypt and Iran in 1974, the concept had gained broad support within the UN General Assembly by 1980. In 1990, Egypt expanded the initiative to encompass all WMDs. The 1995 Resolution subsequently became an integral element of the political package that enabled the indefinite extension of the NPT, calling for the establishment of an effectively verifiable zone free of WMDs and their delivery systems.
The 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines later provided an important normative reference point, emphasising that such arrangements must not impede the inalienable right of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy for socio-economic development. In political discourse, the 1995 Resolution has often been described as a de facto fourth pillar of the NPT, reflecting its enduring significance within the broader regime.
For a Middle East zone to achieve lasting effectiveness, the universality of the NPT remains a central prerequisite. The continued existence of states outside the treaty, most notably Israel, India, and Pakistan, poses structural challenges to regional security and to the global credibility of the non-proliferation framework. Diplomatic and analytical assessments consistently underscore that accession by these states as non-nuclear-weapon states would constitute a critical step towards reducing nuclear risks and strengthening the integrity of the treaty.
While the Middle East faces unique political and security complexities, existing nuclear-weapon-free zones offer valuable technical and institutional lessons.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco demonstrates the feasibility of a legally binding framework capable of ending regional nuclear rivalries. The Treaty of Pelindaba illustrates that voluntary dismantlement can reinforce rather than diminish national security. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) provides an institutional model for mutual transparency and verification between historical rivals. Euratom offers an example of pooling nuclear expertise and infrastructure exclusively for peaceful purposes under centralised safeguards and monitoring mechanisms.
The 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Forum remains a vital reference point, highlighting the importance of combining declaratory policy with practical confidence-building measures.
Effective and comprehensive verification is indispensable for cultivating regional trust. An updated framework for the Middle East would require universal adherence to relevant international instruments, including the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Any existing weapons of mass destruction facilities would need to be dismantled by the possessor state before the formal establishment of the zone.
The IAEA would apply Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and deploy its verification tools, including routine and special inspections. A dual-layered system, integrating international oversight with complementary regional verification arrangements, may further enhance credibility and regional ownership.
Following the deadlock at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, diplomatic efforts shifted towards institutionalising discussions beyond the traditional five-year review cycle. The United Nations General Assembly-mandated conference track, launched in 2019, then created a structured and inclusive platform for sustained dialogue. By separating regional deliberations from consensus-dependent NPT Review Conferences, this process strengthened continuity, reduced procedural paralysis, and enhanced the institutional resilience of the broader non-proliferation regime.
The 2019 conference introduced mechanisms such as a rotating presidency, open participation for all states of the region, and intersessional working committees. It also advanced substantive discussions on scope, obligations, verification, and institutional arrangements, alongside the adoption of a political declaration committing participants to negotiate a legally binding treaty.
EGYPT’S ROLE
Egypt has played a pivotal and sustained role in preserving the momentum towards a Middle East zone free of WMDs. Its leadership is grounded in decades of normative diplomacy, from co-sponsorship of the 1974 initiative to the 1990 proposal expanding the agenda to all WMD categories.
Egypt has consistently emphasised that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution constitutes a decisive measure of political good faith and a critical factor in maintaining the balance and credibility of the NPT. Within the UNGA-mandated conference process, Egypt has supported institutional continuity, foundational political outcomes, and structured treaty deliberations.
Looking ahead, Egypt is well positioned to contribute as a regional hub for technical capacity building, fostering a culture of verification, strengthening professional networks, and facilitating dialogue between nuclear-weapons states and regional stakeholders.
Progress towards establishing the zone requires strengthened adherence to non-proliferation obligations and renewed commitment to regional security principles. This includes the elimination of WMDs to enhance the security interests of all states of the region, clear declarations of intent to address sources of tension, accession by Israel to the NPT and the placement of its facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, commitments preventing the external deployment of WMDs in the region, cessation of fissile material production for weapons purposes, and interim restraints on the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons pending the zone’s establishment.
Comprehensive declarations regarding fissile material stockpiles and dismantlement measures, undertaken in accordance with internationally agreed verification procedures, remain essential. Parallel attention must be devoted to nuclear safety, reactor security, and responsible waste management as regional interest in peaceful nuclear energy continues to expand.
At the global level, nuclear-weapon states bear a particular responsibility to advance disarmament, verification, and transparency. Structured reporting on Article VI commitments under the NPT, accelerated reductions in nuclear stockpiles, enhanced transparency measures, and the development of credible verification frameworks are central to reinforcing confidence in the regime.
Annual declarations to a United Nations-maintained registry could provide data on warheads, delivery systems, fissile materials, safeguards arrangements, and elimination timelines. A general verification model for dismantlement should specify technologies employed, inspection mechanisms, measurement methodologies, and compliance assurance procedures.
The pursuit of a Middle East WMD-free zone remains both a regional necessity and a global imperative. Its realisation would represent a decisive contribution to international peace and security, strengthening the credibility of the NPT and reinforcing the principle that durable stability is best achieved through verifiable commitments, transparency, and cooperative security arrangements.
Egypt is well placed to take forward this pressing case, by exercising a dynamic outreach diplomacy in major capitals as well as major international organisations, in collaboration with other major regional and international powers.
*The writer is a professor of international relations at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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