Fifty-one states were invited to Riyadh on 30 July, 43 attended, and 14 signed. These numbers, more than the ceremony itself, explain Saudi Arabia’s proposed multinational maritime defence coalition. They also explain why, within days of its launch, the same institution was being described in four different ways.
For Riyadh, the coalition is part of a region-first security architecture. By bringing together 14 founding members in the coalition under Saudi chairmanship, Saudi Arabia is showing that the Gulf and Red Sea states can build their own security framework rather than relying exclusively on Western-led operations.
The message is directed not only at Tehran but also at Washington and Brussels: Saudi Arabia intends to become a security provider, not simply a security consumer.
The coalition’s own charter, however, is more restrained. This describes a purely defensive, non-aligned framework rather than a mutual defence pact. It names no adversaries and commits members only to protecting maritime security in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.
That careful wording has allowed countries as different as Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nigeria to join the coalition without formally entering an anti-Iran alliance.
Western defence planners are likely to read the initiative differently, however. From their perspective, the coalition complements rather than competes with existing multinational naval missions. A regional framework allows local states to assume greater responsibility while continuing to coordinate with established Western operations.
The Houthi Movement in Yemen and its regional allies naturally see another reality altogether: a coalition created to reduce their ability to threaten shipping through the Bab Al-Mandeb. Whether or not the charter names them is politically irrelevant, since they know why the coalition was formed.
These different narratives are not evidence of confusion. They are the coalition’s greatest political strength. The deliberately neutral language of its charter allows every participant to explain its decision to join in terms compatible with its own strategic priorities. Constructive ambiguity is therefore not a weakness but one of the main reasons the coalition has become possible.
Saudi Arabia’s decision to move on the coalition now reflects more than the latest Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. During the past two years, Riyadh has watched Western naval operations contain, but not eliminate, the threat to Red Sea shipping, while Saudi Arabia’s own dependence on secure maritime trade has grown under its Vision 2030 strategy.
A coalition commanded from Riyadh rather than joined by Riyadh transforms that growing vulnerability into political and strategic leverage.
The difference between 43 participants and 14 signatures should not be interpreted as failure. It reflects a deliberate core-plus approach, with 14 countries accepting binding commitments from the beginning, and many others choosing political participation without immediate legal obligations.
Nor is the coalition closed. The 14 signatories are founding members, and the framework remains open to additional states that may decide to join later. Riyadh has therefore succeeded in establishing an institution that is capable of gradual expansion.
The reasons for remaining outside the founding group vary from country to country.
Russia was never a likely participant while it was absorbed by the war in Ukraine and was scaling back its earlier ambitions for a permanent naval presence in Sudan.
China’s decision is better understood through its level of engagement than through the absence of its signature. Beijing has major commercial interests in the Red Sea and maintains a naval base in Djibouti, yet it was never likely to join a structure over which it would exercise limited influence.
The UAE’s position is different. Abu Dhabi attended the ceremony in Riyadh but chose not to become a founding member of the coalition. Its decision is best understood as a preference for maintaining strategic autonomy rather than as disagreement with the coalition’s objectives.
Oman’s position reflects a different logic. Muscat’s policy of positive neutrality has long made it a trusted interlocutor with Tehran, the Gulf states, and Western capitals alike. Joining a military framework, however carefully drafted, would have reduced that diplomatic advantage.
The significance of the coalition is measured not only by which countries signed, but also by the level of representation. All 14 founding members sent their military chiefs of staff to the meeting, signalling political commitment rather than diplomatic courtesy.
Egypt did not hesitate to sign up to the coalition alongside Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia. Egypt’s interest in the security of Bab Al-Mandeb is no less direct than Saudi Arabia’s. Just as Saudi exports depend on safe maritime routes, Egypt’s economic interests depend heavily on uninterrupted traffic through the Suez Canal.
Within the 14 founding members of the coalition, one grouping deserves particular attention. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have the potential to emerge as the coalition’s strategic core. Their military weight, geographic positioning, and shared interest in securing the region’s main maritime corridor suggest that they could shape the coalition’s future direction more than the formal equality of 14 member states might imply.
The real test of the coalition will come when it faces a serious maritime incident requiring coordinated operational decisions. Leadership also brings responsibility. By placing itself at the centre of the new framework, Saudi Arabia is assuming responsibility for both the coalition’s achievements and its shortcomings.
A final question remains. Does the coalition answer Washington’s long-standing call for regional partners to shoulder a greater share of the burden of protecting strategic sea lanes?
Read one way, it does precisely that, since it is a regional structure working alongside existing Western missions while assuming greater local responsibility. But read another way, it reflects Riyadh’s determination to reduce its long-term dependence on external security guarantees by building a regional institution under regional leadership.
The writer is former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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