Between 2014 and 2020, according to the government’s narrative, Egypt had no choice but to view its foreign policy relations in simple terms of black and black. Over the past 12 months, however, that has changed, a shift made possible, says one source, because of the return of political stability following the dramatic transition Egypt passed through in 2013.

“In the beginning we needed very strong allies on whom we could count. We needed the support, and at the same time had to be very mindful of countries that wanted to shake things up for us,” said the source.

Today, he added, Egypt has reached a place where it can navigate its relations with other states and contain disagreements, even on fundamental issues.

TURKEY AND QATAR, SLOW PROGRESS: The year began with Joe Biden’s inauguration as the 46th president of the United States. Biden entered the Oval Office on 20 January with a foreign policy agenda that aimed to complete his predecessor’s downsizing of the US presence in the Middle East.

The differences between the administrations of Donald Trump, who had a strong chemistry with President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, and Biden, was bound to impact not only on bilateral relations, but on Egypt’s relations with other regional players who, after Biden’s victory, were forced to recalibrate their ties with Washington.

Turkey, say diplomatic sources, was one of the countries wrongfooted by Trump’s departure from the White House. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had lost a solid ally who had allowed him to push Ankara’s boundaries when it came to managing regional relations.

“Our problem with Turkey was all Turkey’s doing. Erdogan thought he could influence political developments in Egypt to suit his regional agenda. He kept trying, and Egypt kept pushing back, though but we never really encroached on any of his regional interests,” said an official source close to the file. But after Trump left the White House, and Ankara came to understand that Egypt’s post 2013 regime could not be manipulated, Erdogan realised that his attempts to “interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs were not going anywhere”.

Cairo, which had avoided harming economic relations with Turkey despite recalling its ambassador from Ankara in 2013, was ready to engage in a rapprochement with Turkey, beginning with security and intelligence talks on Libya where the two countries were backing rival parties. Low level, unannounced security talks then took place in Ankara and Cairo, followed in spring by a visit to Egypt by Turkey’s assistant foreign minister.

Turkey has accommodated several of Egypt’s demands with regard to the operation of Istanbul-based TV channels critical of the Egyptian regime, while Cairo accommodated some of Turkey’s demands on Egyptian hospitality to Turkish opposition figures. Yet very little real progress has been made.

In the autumn, Egypt’s assistant foreign minister headed a large delegation to Ankara for the second round of talks. Both sides played down the prospects of much progress being made, correctly, it turned out.

 “Things are moving slowly,” said a diplomatic source, “and it might be quite a while before we can talk about the resumption of full diplomatic relations.”

“It can, however, safely be argued that the phase of confrontation and animosity has come to an end and that this year we both embarked on a new phase of meeting somewhere in the middle. There will be ups and downs, but it is hard to think that we will move backward. Both countries have decided it is in their interests to learn how to live with their differences.”

Four years after Cairo joined Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Manama in enforcing a boycott on Doha to prompt a change in its foreign policy choices, especially on the Arab front, Qatar is being welcomed in from the cold. While Cairo’s spin is that Doha has come to realise the post-2013 political dispensation in Egypt is here to stay, Doha’s take is that Cairo has come to terms with the fact that it needs to accept Qatar for what it is.

In January this year, a summit in the Saudi city of Al-Ula came to an agreement to end the boycott in return for a Qatari commitment to shift its attitude towards Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, especially with regards to the coverage of the four countries’ domestic affairs by Al Jazeera satellite channel.

Egyptian diplomats say there has been “quite a shift” away from Al Jazeera’s onetime consistently hostile coverage of Egyptian affairs, and that the shift has been accompanied by growing co-operation, not least over managing the situation in Gaza. In May this year, Egypt and Qatar engaged in “significant contacts” to secure an end to Israel’s war on the Strip and start reconstruction. And according to Egyptian government sources, Qatar is working to “significantly expand” its investments in Egypt.

YESTERDAY’S ALLIES, TODAY’S PARTNERS: While Cairo-based foreign diplomats contrast the thaw with Qatar with the clouds that seem to be gathering over Egypt’s relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Egyptian diplomats balk at the comparison. Egypt and Qatar, they say, will continue to have fundamental disagreements about the role of political Islam across the region, something that came to a head following the removal of Mohamed Morsi in June 2013.

Doha, say local sources, has not abandoned its close association with Islamist movements across the region, especially in Libya, and its alliance with Ankara underlines this position. While Abu Dhabi and Riyadh do not entertain the same sympathies, the sources concede that Egypt has some other “issues” with its allies of the past seven years. Points of contention relate mostly to the speed of normalisation with Israel that the UAE has been adopting, and conflicting visions of Red Sea security.

Egyptian diplomatic sources insist that these differences have not compromised the overall volume of Egyptian relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. During the past eight weeks, the same diplomatic sources say, Cairo has been in close contact with both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh over the management of the situation in Sudan, and the three countries consult regularly on developments in Tunisia, Lebanon, and Syria. They also coordinate over the Arab League. In March, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh both supported the Egyptian diplomat and former foreign minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit’s bid for a second term as Arab League secretary-general.

Arab League sources make no bones about the fact that Gulf countries feel their crucial financial role in almost every Arab country qualifies them for a greater say in the pan-Arab organisation and across the Arab world in general. It is against this backdrop, says one source, that one should read the significance of their accommodation of Egypt by supporting Abul-Gheit.

The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) may have internal disagreements, but there is a consensus among them that their financial clout should translate into greater political influence. According to Washington- and New York-based Arab diplomats, it is something with which the White House agrees.

“The idea in Washington is actually more about ending inter-GCC squabbling. Washington thinks Gulf capitals, which are inevitably close US allies despite some hidden tensions, should be playing a bigger role in promoting regional stability,” said one Washington-based Arab diplomat.

THE WASHINGTON FACTOR: According to this diplomat, the direct and indirect channels that Washington has maintained with the Taliban since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and its commitment to nuclear talks with Iran, are essentially about securing stability in the region while simultaneously reducing direct US intervention.

He argues that it was because Washington realised that Egypt is well placed to secure these two elements on one of the most important fronts for US interests in the Middle East, the Palestinian-Israeli front, that the White House decided to engage in direct high-level consultations with Egypt.

Washington made another move towards Cairo in the autumn when it revived the long dormant strategic dialogue. Sources close to the meetings that convened in the US capital in November say that the rapport was forward looking, even if not particularly warm.

According to one of these sources, the lines are clear between what Cairo and Washington agree and disagree on. The two capitals agree on issues related to regional stability, and they disagree on a perennial bugbear in their relations, democractisation and human rights.

“There is nothing new there, except that we had fewer disagreements with the Trump administration,” the source said. He added that “the two sides are committed to working together on what brings them close, and to try and sort out their differences as much as possible.”

Officials in Cairo do not shy away from expressing dismay over the decision of the US administration to block a segment of its annual military aid to Egypt. They insist that this is unbecoming to the profile of bilateral relations between the two countries, especially on the military front. They blame it on what they qualify as the “radical leftist wing of the Democratic Party” and insist that Cairo will not allow these radicals to hold Egypt’s bilateral relationship with the US hostage to their “limited agenda”.

Washington, they argue, knows very well that it cannot overlook the role of Egypt in the region, especially when it comes to key issues like stability in the north and east of Africa, along the shores of the Red Sea, and on the Palestinian-Israeli front. They also accept that even if Egypt is not the leading player it once was, it remains influential.

“They don’t just approach us on Gaza. They also come to us on Libya, on the east of the Mediterranean, on Sudan and on Ethiopia,” said one official. He argued that an important sign of the value of bilateral relations for Washington is its “clear commitment” to Egypt’s water rights, as voiced by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during the launch of the strategic dialogue.

US Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffery Feltman has been in Cairo several times this year: in the second week of December he arrived to discuss the disagreements between Egypt and Sudan on one hand, and Ethiopia on the other, over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

PARALLEL PATHS, THE EU AND RUSSIA: As Cairo steers its relations with the US towards areas of agreement, it has been following a number of parallel paths of international engagement, not least with Russia, a key partner in terms of nuclear energy, military cooperation, and regional interests.

There is no surprise on the Russian side that for Egypt the US has been, and will continue to be, a crucial partner. Moscow understands that at times Cairo has to take foreign policy decisions to accommodate the US, and is under no illusions that Egypt can be to Russia what Syria or Libya once were. But as Russian construction of Egypt’s first nuclear power plant continues, alongside joint military drills and political consultations, both countries are working steadily to expand cooperation.

This year, after much ado, Moscow finally ended its ban on direct flights to Egypt, in place since late 2015 when a flight carrying Russian tourists home from Sinai was brought down over the peninsula, killing all those on board.

This year Cairo also worked to boost its relations with the European Union, resuming dialogue and meetings that have been suspended for over two years, due largely, though not exclusively, to the Covid-19 pandemic.

One source of disagreement in the relationship is Egypt’s human rights record, though it is fair to say it impacts less on Cairo’s relationship with the EU than it does on bilateral relations with some of the EU’s leading members.

“The issue of human rights goes up and down,” commented a government official. He added that for the most part leading European states, including France and Germany, appear to have decided to reduce pressure on Cairo and actually lend technical and intelligence support in view of the crucial role Egypt is playing in halting undocumented migration across the Mediterranean and facing up to terrorist groups across the Sahel, Sahara, and East Africa.

While the official conceded there are still disagreements on human rights issues, he noted that they have not got in the way of military sales, or security and energy cooperation.

*A version of this article appears in print in the 23 December, 2021 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.