For more than 14 years, successive rounds of talks have been marked by high expectations, temporary breakthroughs, and recurring deadlocks.
Despite the involvement of regional actors, the African Union, and international mediators, the dispute has consistently resisted resolution, underscoring the deep mistrust and divergent national interests at play.
February 1999: The Nile Basin initiative is formed. The partnership of Nile riparian states aims to provide a forum for the cooperative development and management of the Nile’s water, including a new multilateral treaty.
May 2010: The Nile Basin states sign the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement or the Entebbe Agreement. Egypt and Sudan refuse to sign because the new agreement does not protect their historic share of Nile water.
The Entebbe Agreement is meant to redraw the water shares among the Nile Basin countries and replace the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water agreements that allocated 55.5 billion cubic metres of water to Egypt and 18.5 billion to Sudan and gave them the right to veto any projects upstream.
March 2011: Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi lays the cornerstone for the new dam, on the Blue Nile in the country’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, some 20 km from the Sudanese border. The construction starts soon afterwards.
April 2011: Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers renames the Millennium Dam the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Addis Ababa announces the construction of the dam after signing a $4.8 billion contract. Egypt expresses concern over the surprise announcement and the size of the dam.
September 2011: Cairo and Ethiopia agree to form an international panel of experts to study the impact of the dam on Egypt and Sudan. The panel begins its work in May the following year.
July 2012: Egypt’s then president Mohamed Morsi visits Ethiopia to discuss African cooperation and the GERD.
May 2013: The panel of experts issues a report that recommends further investigation into the dam’s hydrological impacts, especially on downstream countries’ water supplies and power generation, risks from climate change, and geotechnical issues. The panel recommends “a full transboundary environmental and social impact assessment… conducted jointly by the three countries.”
June 2013: Negotiations are halted following the revolution in Egypt.
June 2014: Negotiations resume as President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi comes to power.
August 2014: Egypt and Ethiopia agree to implement the 2013 recommendations and hire two consultancy firms.
September 2014: Water ministers from Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia sign an agreement to form a tripartite committee to oversee the consultancy work.
October 2014: French and Dutch consultancy firms are selected to conduct the studies.
March 2015: Leaders sign the Khartoum Declaration of Principles (DoP), agreeing to “no significant harm” and cooperation on filling and operating protocols for the dam.
September 2015: The Dutch consultancy firm withdraws, citing concerns over a lack of guarantees for impartial work.
December 2015: Foreign ministers sign the Khartoum Agreement, restating their commitment to the DoP.
January 2016: French engineering consultancies Artelia and BRL are chosen to start impact studies.
May 2017: The French firms issue a preliminary report; Cairo accepts it, while Sudan and Ethiopia express their reservations.
November 2017: The 17th round of talks on the dam in Cairo fails. Egypt declares the negotiations have reached a deadlock.
December 2017: Cairo suggests the World Bank become a party to the negotiations.
January 2018: Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn visits Egypt but later rejects World Bank involvement. Sudan supports Ethiopia’s rejection. Leaders meet at the African Union Summit and agree to resume the talks, but Desalegn resigns shortly afterwards.
March 2018: Abiy Ahmed replaces Desalegn as prime minister of Ethiopia.
April 2018: The first “nine-party meeting” (ministers and intelligence chiefs) concludes without an agreement.
May 2018: Second nine-party meeting is held, issuing a document that establishes the National Independent Scientific Research Study Group (NISRSG).
June 2018: Ahmed visits Egypt and reassures President Al-Sisi that he wants to aid development in Ethiopia without harming the Egyptian people. While he repeats this promise on various occasions, his words are never translated into an agreement to organise the filling and operation of the dam in the interest of the three countries.
September 2018: The NISRSG meets. Ethiopia proposes that the filling timetable be determined by annual studies of floods and rainfall.
August 2019: Egyptian minister of water Mohamed Abdel-Atti hands a proposal outlining Egypt’s vision for the filling and operation rules of the dam to his Ethiopian counterpart Seleshi Bekele during a visit to Addis Ababa. Egypt officially proposes a seven-year filling period and a minimum annual release of 40 billion cubic metres of water.
September 2019: Ethiopia rejects Egypt’s proposal describing it as “not practical”. Addressing the UN, President Al-Sisi calls on the international community to play a “constructive role” in urging all the parties to be flexible in the negotiations in order to reach an agreement.
October 2019: The Trump administration sends an invitation to the foreign ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to meet with US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and President of the World Bank Group David Malpass.
A joint statement is issued in the first meeting, held in November, in which the three ministers set a timetable for meetings to resolve outstanding issues and stress their “joint commitment to reach a comprehensive, cooperative, and mutually beneficial agreement” on the filling and operation of the GERD in accordance with the 2015 DoP. They agree to hold four rounds of negotiations in Cairo, Khartoum, and Addis Ababa and set mid-January as the deadline for reaching an agreement.
October 2019: The tripartite talks reach a deadlock; Egypt calls for international mediation. The Trump administration invites the parties to meet in Washington.
November 2019: Meetings begin with the US Treasury and World Bank; a timetable is set to resolve outstanding issues by mid-January.
January 2020: A draft agreement on the framework for filling and operating the GERD is finalised in the US.
February 2020: Ethiopia skips the final signing session for internal consultations; Egypt initials the agreement, but Sudan declines to sign without Ethiopia.
April 2020: Ahmed announces the first filling will begin during the upcoming rainy season (July to mid-September).
June 2020: Egypt asks the UN Security Council to delay the filling; Ethiopia responds that it has no legal obligation to seek Egypt’s approval.
July 2020: Ethiopia starts the first filling; tripartite talks restart under African Union auspices with international observers.
December 2020: Military clashes over the Al-Fashaga border region between Sudan and Ethiopia delay negotiations.
Early 2021: Further rounds of talks fail to reach an agreement on the filling and operation of the dam.
April 2021: The talks end; Ethiopia announces it will proceed with the second filling.
June 2021: Egypt objects to the second filling in a letter to the UN Security Council.
September 2021: The Security Council issues a presidential statement calling for a legally binding agreement within a reasonable timeframe.
July 2023: Al-Sisi and Ahmed meet in Cairo and agree to finalise an agreement within four months.
September 2023: Ethiopia completes the third and fourth fillings of the dam without an agreement.
December 2023: Cairo announces the end of the negotiations, citing Ethiopia’s refusal to engage on legal or technical solutions.
September 2024: Ethiopia announces the end of the fifth filling and the completion of the dam’s construction. Egypt sends another letter to the UN Security Council, warning it reserves the right to take “all measures under international law” to defend the existential interests of its people. Ethiopia responds by urging the UN to note Egypt’s “repeated threat to use force”.
July 2025: Trump mentions the possibility of the US intervening to solve the dispute quickly, but no immediate steps are taken.
September 2025: The dam is inaugurated. Egypt and Sudan decline the GERD inauguration invitation, calling the ceremony illegitimate; Egypt warns the Security Council of its right to defend its interests.
January 2026: Trump sends a letter to President Al-Sisi offering to restart US mediation to resolve Nile water sharing “once and for all”. President Al-Sisi welcomes the mediation proposal, highlighting the Nile as Egypt’s lifeline.
For 14 years, Egypt and Sudan have opposed what they describe as Ethiopia’s “unilateral acts” to control the flow of the River Nile. Egypt has repeatedly attempted since 2011 to reach an agreement through negotiations to regulate the filling and future operation of the GERD without undermining development in Ethiopia.
Trump’s January 2026 proposal raises the hope that it may lead to a long-sought-for agreement. But some question whether he will succeed where the US failed six years ago.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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