In a report titled “The Sudan War and the Redistribution of the Burden of Asylum: Economic and Social Implications for Egypt amid Limited International Funding”, the Forum for Development and Human Rights Dialogue (FDHRD), a NGO, argues that Egypt’s role as a major host country of refugees has turned it into a recipient of costs generated by a conflict in which it is not a party.
The report, issued in August, says the issue should not be reduced to whether Sudanese refugees represent an economic “burden” or “gain” for Egypt. Rather, it describes the central problem as the “redistribution of the burden of asylum”, with the costs of the war extending beyond Sudan through pressure on public services, education, healthcare, housing, labour markets, and infrastructure.
“Migration on a large scale redistributes the costs of war outside Sudan,” the report says, arguing that an increasing share of the conflict’s social and economic costs is being borne by Egypt through the additional demand for public services and resources.
The report points to a widening gap between the resources required to support refugees and those available from international donors. It cites the Egypt Refugee and Resilience Response Plan (ERRRP) 2025, prepared by the Egyptian government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), as requiring $339.3 million to support refugees and affected host communities, targeting 1,861,345 people, including 1,142,331 Sudanese.
According to figures cited in the report, UNHCR’s operations in Egypt were only 29 per cent funded in June 2025, leaving a reported $97 million gap. The report also cites a May 2025 funding level of 26 per cent against needs of $137.7 million.
The FDHRD report says the funding shortfall has become more significant when measured against the number of people requiring assistance. It cites UNHCR figures showing that the average funding available per person fell from about $11 a month in 2022 to $4 in 2025, a decline of roughly 64 per cent.
The broader UNHCR picture indicates that the mismatch between needs and funding has persisted.
UNHCR’s June 2026 data put the number of refugees and asylum-seekers registered in Egypt at about 1.1 million. It says that 1,098,708 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered in Egypt as of June this year, including 851,947 Sudanese, who accounted for roughly 77.5 per cent of the registered population.
UNHCR has also described Egypt as the largest host country for people fleeing the Sudan conflict. Its data show that the number of registered refugees and asylum-seekers in Egypt increased sharply after the war began in April 2023. It said in June 2025 that the number of registered refugees and asylum-seekers had surpassed one million, with Sudanese accounting for 73 per cent at the time.
The scale of the Sudanese influx, however, is broader than the number registered with UNHCR. Egyptian government figures cited by official sources in 2023 put the number of Sudanese already living in Egypt before the war at around five million.
Then foreign minister Sameh Shoukri said in June 2023 that the Sudanese arriving after the outbreak of the conflict were in addition to around five million Sudanese who had been living in Egypt for decades.
The UNHCR currently records 1.5 million new arrivals from Sudan into Egypt since 15 April 2023, with the figure last updated on 31 January 2025.
The figures reflect different measures of the population. Egypt was already home to around five million Sudanese before the war, while 1.5 million Sudanese have arrived since its outbreak. The roughly 1.1 million figure, by contrast, refers to refugees and asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR in Egypt, including people of different nationalities.
Against this backdrop, the FDHRD report argues that the economic impact of the Sudanese presence is more complicated than a simple calculation of costs. It acknowledges that increased consumption can stimulate demand, while refugees may establish small businesses and expand local markets. It also says landlords, suppliers, and some businesses may benefit from increased demand.
At the same time, it warns that the effects are uneven. Low-skilled workers, informal-sector workers, women, and young people may face greater pressure in some circumstances, while increased demand can add to housing and service pressures in areas hosting large numbers of refugees.
Meanwhile, it cautions against attributing Egypt’s broader economic difficulties to refugees. It says the country’s economic crisis has “multiple structural, financial, monetary, and international causes” and that refugees cannot be held responsible for inflation or rising living costs.
Instead, it argues that large population inflows can exacerbate existing shortages and pressures, particularly in housing and public services.
The report further contends that when humanitarian organisations lack sufficient funding to provide healthcare, cash assistance, education, and protection, the underlying needs do not disappear. Instead, some of those needs may ultimately place additional pressure on Egyptian institutions and host communities.
The government has stressed the scale of its wider hosting responsibilities. Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has previously said that state institutions have “spared no efforts” to ensure that foreigners residing in the country enjoy their rights, while bearing a significant responsibility on behalf of the international community.
Abdelatty put the number of migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers hosted by Egypt at 10.7 million people from 62 nationalities.
“Egypt is keen to ensure that they enjoy all basic services and that they are integrated into Egyptian society and not forced to remain in refugee camps or centres,” Abdelatty said. But he warned that Egypt’s ability to continue accommodating such populations was being tested by insufficient international support relative to the pressures it faces.
For the FDHRD, the longer the Sudan war continues, the less sustainable a predominantly short-term humanitarian response becomes.
The report calls for a shift towards longer-term development financing that can strengthen public services, infrastructure, and employment opportunities in host communities, rather than focusing solely on assistance to individual refugees.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 3 September, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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