Contrary to overly optimistic assessments in several Arab capitals that the war in Ukraine would be short, the two-week conflict seems to be in danger of dragging on and may not end with the possible Russian siege of Kyiv.

Tension, or at least apprehension, is starting to find a place in ruling quarters across the Arab world, including in those capitals that thought that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be able to block Ukraine’s NATO aspirations without having to send troops into Russia’s largest neighbouring state.

“We did not anticipate a war or a long war, and we are not sure what will come out of it,” commented one Arab diplomat who declined to be identified.

According to this and other diplomatic sources who spoke from more than one Arab capital, the realisation that the war on Ukraine will drag on has been looming since late last week. It was this realisation, according to one source, that prompted “a sense of pragmatism” to prevail in the Arab vote in last week’s UN General Assembly Resolution against the invasion of Ukraine.

“There was a lot of determination, for lack of a better word, from the key Western countries. But there was also a realisation that things are not going to be easy for the Russians,” commented the same diplomatic source.

“Ultimately, despite the fact that for many Arab capitals Russia has come to be a partner of choice over the last decade due to its transactional approach to relations, none of these capitals would wish to undermine their consequential ties with the US and other Western allies,” the source said.

Today, Arab diplomatic sources say that the Arab capitals are not willing to give up on the ability of Russia to find a way to “fix things” in Ukraine. However, the same diplomatic sources admit that it looks “quite challenging”.

The tough and escalating economic sanctions against Russia, they argue, are not their worst fear about the ability of Russia to recalibrate, especially as long as these sanctions do not affect oil and gas exports, as seems to be the case for some leading European capitals, including Berlin.

What seems to be worrying for the Arab capitals, the same sources say, is rather a “Ukraine quagmire” of sorts into which Russia will have to send mercenaries to fight a long guerilla war with determined Ukrainian forces and possibly also funding from the West.

The overall Arab assessment is that unlike in the performance of Russia’s military in some of its previous wars, either in Grozny in the 1990s or Aleppo a little over five years ago, the challenge in Ukraine is going to be very different given the nature of the military or paramilitary assistance the West is offering to Ukraine.

Russia, the same sources say, is not going to be defeated in Ukraine. However, it could be “overwhelmed” in a long and frustrating war that will not bring good news back home to people suffering as a result of economic sanctions.

Unlike the largely “toothless” economic sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 over the annexation of Crimea, the same sources argue, this time the sanctions “will have an impact, even if in the longer rather than the shorter term”.

The question of Russia’s ability to continue to play the same role it has been playing in the region, especially as a supporter of leaders frustrated by the US Biden administration, is only one of many questions being contemplated in the Arab capitals.

In the words of one Cairo-based foreign diplomat, “clearly there are concerns, and clearly there are constant recalculations”.

In the view of this and other foreign diplomatic sources in Cairo and other regional capitals, these recalculations do not suggest the possibility of any of the Arab capitals compromising on the investments they and the Russians have been putting into the “transactional alliances” of the past decade or so.

“Joint interests have been established, and nobody, not even in Europe, is planning to cut relations with Russia,” said another Cairo-based foreign diplomat.

What the West is expecting of its partners in the Arab countries, several foreign diplomats say, is a position of “no hesitation on denouncing” the war in Ukraine.

CRITICISM: The vote in last week’s UN meeting, the same diplomats say, came as an encouraging sign in this direction.

It was, they say, “much better” than the position expressed in the extraordinary Arab League Council meeting that convened earlier last week. They add that it was also better than the position of the UAE, the current Arab member of the UN Security Council and chair of the council for the month of March, in its vote on a council resolution that was put to the vote earlier in the conflict.

All eyes now are on the Arab foreign ministers meeting that was scheduled to open this week at the Cairo headquarters of the Arab League. An Arab League source said that a draft resolution that will be considered by Arab diplomats will not go as far as to explicitly condemn the invasion of Ukraine, despite the wishes of some member states to do so.

“Kuwait and Qatar think it is the right thing to do, but not Saudi Arabia or the UAE,” he explained. The language, the source said, would be middle of the road, “something quite similar to what Egypt said at the UN meeting following its vote for the resolution.”

“I think we are talking about language that will stress the need to address the root causes of the crisis in Ukraine and the need to pursue a peaceful settlement with an eye on the humanitarian situation,” the source said.

The issue, however, is not about a resolution “that would somehow be agreed on.” Instead, it is about possible scenarios for the conflict and its impact on key issues in this part of the world. “This is what the real worry or the real hope is based on, depending on who we are talking about,” he explained.

One top question in this respect, several Arab and foreign diplomatic sources agree, is Syria. It was the heavy-handed Russian military intervention in Syria that reversed the situation on the ground in favour of the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad in 2015.

Relations between Moscow and Damascus have had a few hiccups since then. However, informed diplomatic sources say that Al-Assad was never unaware of what the presence of Russia means. Syria was the one Arab country that voted against the UN General Assembly Resolution, along with four other states.

Today, according to sources in Damascus, the Syrian regime is keeping a close watch on the situation in Ukraine and hoping that Russia will be victorious. The sources argue that there is “no immediate worry” that Putin will need to downsize his military presence in Syria.

Regional diplomatic sources agree that it is unlikely that Putin will come under pressure to compromise on the investment he has made to be present in the Mediterranean and in a country as crucial for the region as Syria.

Meanwhile, the same sources anticipate that Syria might have to live with the fact that Russia might not be as resilient in stopping the recent increases in the Israeli attacks on Iranian and Syrian targets around Damascus and elsewhere in the country.

In the words of one of these sources, “I don’t think that the West is keen to shake the situation for Al-Assad or elsewhere in the region. It is not a priority for anyone now.” But the possible distraction of Russia, he added, might slow down an already unhurried process of normalisation of the Al-Assad regime within the Arab framework.

It is Syria’s economy, which is quite dependent on trade with Russia and Ukraine, that might suffer added pressure. However, regional diplomatic sources agree that these pressures, even if they lead to food riots, will not shake Al-Assad.

There is also the possible breakthrough in the nuclear deal between the West and Iran, despite some Russian attempts to put hurdles before the finish line of the deal. “If Iran is freed from the sanctions and is back on the oil market, as would be most in the interest of the West, Tehran will have enough financial flexibility to support some regional allies – always in return for favours – including Al-Assad and Hizbullah,” he explained.

In addition to the Iranian and Israeli roles, the same regional sources argue, short-term developments in Syria will also be a function of the Turkish role.

Turkey, currently joining the initiatives that have so far included France, China and Israel, is hoping to host the first high-level meeting between the foreign ministers of Ukraine and Russia on 10 March. The meeting will come only a couple of days after a meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Israeli counterpart Isaac Herzog in Ankara.

But neither Arab nor foreign diplomats seem to be anticipating any immediate shift on Syria, apart from shifting a few lines that could eventually bring Al-Assad to give in to political concessions down the road if only to help with Arab re-integration.

By comparison, there are increasing question marks on the impact of the war in Ukraine on Libya and the Sahel and Sahara. It is in this part of Africa that Moscow has installed its Wagner Group mercenaries in cooperation with several Arab capitals that have been eying oil and other interests.

Unlike the mercenaries posted in Syria, well-versed sources note, those in Libya and Mali are mostly of Russian or East European descent. Unlike the mostly Arab fighters in Syria who would be mostly alien to the cultural topography of Ukraine, those in North Africa and the Sahel and Sahara are more likely to be pulled out to Ukraine in the event of a long guerilla war.

Already, the political situation in Libya has been going through a period of unease with the current rivalry between the UN-supported Libyan Prime Minister Abdel-Hamid Dbeibah and his rival prime minister Fathi Bashaghah selected by the Libyan House of Representatives.

The latter, who has the support of several regional and international capitals, including both Paris and Moscow, might have to worry about the way forward, especially in case of the breakdown of the talks between Moscow and Paris on the details of the political map.

A security hiccup in Libya, Egyptian sources say, would be the last thing that Cairo would hope for, especially if it ended up being in favour of Dbeibah, who is closer to Turkey, than to Bashaghah who is closer to Egypt.

Security and stability in Libya, the same sources say, is not just about the security of the over 1,000 km western border of the country. It is also about the business deals and job opportunities that Libya has been set to offer at a moment of unmistakable economic pressure.

THE GULF: Meanwhile, the same Egyptian sources argue that what Egypt has to worry about in the current state of affairs goes beyond the management of Libya, something that one well-informed source suggested was not always something that Cairo and Moscow saw eye-to-eye on.

Like the UAE, and to lesser extent Saudi Arabia, Egypt has seen in Putin a partner who can focus on what is mutually beneficial without bringing to the table questions about internal affairs.

Egypt, the same sources say, has managed to a great extent to dispel Russian concerns that Cairo only sees Moscow as an alternative at times of tension with Washington.

There has been a great deal of cooperation on many fronts. The nuclear reactor in Dabaa might be considered the possible gem of this cooperation, despite the fact that it has been coming along slowly. However, there has also been a wide range of other forms of cooperation, ranging from trade to industry and not excluding military agreements.

The profile of this cooperation, according to one government source in Cairo, has never been to the liking of the US, but Egypt has insisted on pushing it forward, with the occasional accommodation of the concerns of the US, which remains for Egypt a key partner on the military front.

Today, according to the same government source, Egypt is far from wanting to give up on that cooperation. However, he added, the question is rather one of “how to do it” in view of the current and possible future economic sanctions Russia is facing.

A great deal will depend on how the next episode of the war unfolds. However, there is also a realisation in Cairo that there is reason to worry about the pace of cooperation.

Still, Egypt, the same source said, is not all negative. He argued that despite concerns over increasing grain prices for a country that imports close to 80 per cent of its grains from Russia and Ukraine, and worries over the impacts of soaring oil prices, Egypt is set to make a few gains with extra shipments of LNG (liquefied natural gas) that will be sent to Europe to help manage the northern continent’s worries over energy supplies.

“Egypt has been working hard to expand its status as an energy hub, and there is an opportunity for sure, though this is not a very big one because we don’t have the gas resources of a country like Qatar,” said an insider in the energy industry in Egypt.

Meanwhile, according to a Washington-based diplomatic source, the US is encouraging its Gulf allies, especially in Riyadh, to introduce a short-term increase in oil production to prevent prices from jumping beyond the $150 a barrel mark. As the week was coming to an end, prices were already at $140.

Saudi Arabia had declined this request earlier in the conflict, but it is now, according to the source in Washington and another in Riyadh, more willing to show flexibility.

“This is not just about the calculations that Riyadh has to do as it sees Tehran coming back in from the cold, but also about the calculations it has to do as it sees Putin, its new partner, at a moment of testing,” said the Riyadh-based source.

Moreover, according to a source in Abu Dhabi, the fact that the US, “in a very transactional deal,” agreed to pass new UN sanctions against the Houthis in Yemen will contribute to a possible détente between Washington and both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, notwithstanding the disagreement between these two Gulf capitals on the management of the war in Yemen.

Ultimately, he said, a new reality in Russia and a new reality in Iran will introduce new thinking in the Gulf. Kuwait, he added, is playing “an important role” in calling for consultations to spare the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) from any hiccups.

The basis of the Kuwaiti diplomatic line, he explained, is to relaunch the US-GCC alliance in a fashion that will “give more space to mutual economic and security interests over mutual disagreements on issues of governance and so on.”

The US, he said, seems to be open to this. After all, with no signs of plans for Washington to reconsider its withdrawal from the region, it would not wish for tension in the Middle East to prevail in parallel with tension in Europe.

For the next weeks and months, Arab diplomatic sources agree, the US is likely to wish to preserve its cards for use against the presence of Russia, and maybe also of China, in the region rather than spend them on the dossier of governance.

This scheme, they add, could shift if China were to turn its back on Russia or if Russia were to paint itself into a worse corner in the conflict in Ukraine.

In the words of one Egyptian diplomatic source, “certainly it is a moment of constant recalculation for everyone.”

*A version of this article appears in print in the 10 March, 2022 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.