This week, the Emirati capital Abu Dhabi hosted the steering committee of the Arab-Israeli Negev Summit to be held in Morocco next spring. The summit, held for the first time in Israel’s Sde Boker Kibbutz last year, was a meeting between the foreign ministers of Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, and the United States. Its aim was to implement the principles enshrined in the Abraham Accords in joint initiatives and projects in areas as diverse as regional security, energy, tourism, education and water security.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was supposed to be in Abu Dhabi on the first day of the meeting, Sunday 8 January, but the UAE cancelled the visit after the storming of the Al-Aqsa Mosque by his National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir on 3 January. The latter event garnered a strong reaction from all corners of the globe.

The UAE and China led the call to convene a UN Security Council meeting, requesting that Israel respect the status quo in the holy city. The Saudi daily, Arab News, reported that Netanyahu was “shocked by the reaction”, especially from Gulf countries that recently normalised relations with Israel under his previous premiership. He had held the strong view that “peace with Arab nations is possible without resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” according to a comment piece in the Israeli daily Haaretz by Zvi Bar’el. He concluded that the Emirati position “clarifies that even if peace between the two countries doesn’t collapse in the near future, the UAE has no intention of abandoning its diplomatic leverage – and the Palestinian issue isn’t going away.”

But beyond the strong statements of condemnation from Gulf capitals, and the cancellation of Netanyahu’s official visit to the UAE, what could those countries now at peace with Tel Aviv do to soften Israel’s aggressive policies towards Palestinians? Not much, according to many analysts in the region. Saudi political commentator Abdul-Aziz Alkhames told Al-Ahram Weekly that “relations [between Abraham Accords countries and Israel] will continue on the military, intelligence, economic and business level. The political side of the relationship may cool down.”

That view was echoed by Andrew Hammond of Oxford University who expected Abraham Accord Gulf parties “to do next to nothing. Business remains as usual and we won’t do anything beyond issue statements.” Yet, there might be a window for Gulf countries to do something to ease the tension. “The real place where pressure is being felt is in the countries that were slated for normalisation, like Oman and Saudi Arabia. Oman’s parliament has already said it won’t allow any further moves, which obviously happened at the government’s instigation… The question is: will Netanyahu try to tempt Saudi Arabia with some promise, like not annexing the West Bank?” Hammond added.

Before taking power, the prime minister-designate gave a lengthy interview to the Saudi Al-Arabiya channel in mid-December saying he “intends to pursue peace with Saudi Arabia” and urging Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. He reiterated that through the interview, saying, “I think peace with Saudi Arabia will serve two purposes. It will be a quantum leap for overall peace between Israel and the Arab world. It will change our region in ways that are unimaginable and I think it will facilitate ultimately Israeli-Palestinian peace.”

But after the Al-Aqsa event and continual statement by Netanyahu’s far-right allies in government, there is no peace window with the Saudis – at least for now. “I don’t think the Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman will fall into the trap of appearing responsible one way or another for the fate of the Palestinians… I doubt it because they don’t want responsibility. They know Netanyahu won’t honour anything,” Hammond said.

Aside from the fear of the Israeli prime minister presenting void promises he is not expected to keep, there is also a view in the Gulf that no amount of pressure will yield results. “I do not think anybody can pressure Netanyahu... If the US could not, who can?” Abdul-Aziz Alkahmes wondered, adding that “relations with Israel are needed as it is central for regional peace and facing threats from Iran. But Netanyahu and this government might not be the right partner. This looks like a ‘war cabinet’ and Netanyahu won’t be able to curb its aggression. Probably this government is doomed to fail. Any progress on normalisation with Saudi Arabia depends on Netanyahu’s ability to dissolve this cabinet and seek less extremist alliances.”

It might not be “business as usual” between Israel and the Gulf countries that joined the normalisation trend, but that does not mean the train of normalisation has been derailed. Pumping the brakes on the drive towards peace is a decision that lies with Israel. As Alkhames suggests, “Netanyahu will play the card of stopping settlements, annexations and other extremist policies by that government in return for normalisation with Saudi Arabia. This is clear blackmail, and relations can’t be built on blackmail. I do not think Saudi Arabia will accept that.”

That leverage for Saudi Arabia does not apply to states that have already signed for peace, particularly the UAE. But again, there is not much the Emiratis can do to force Netanyahu to stop his cabinet’s fiery policies.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 January, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly