The urgent international attention being paid to the unfolding events in Sudan speaks of the importance the regional and international powers attach to the country in relation to strategic regions in the continent, especially the Horn of Africa and Central and West Africa.
The fact that it also sits atop large reserves of natural and mineral wealth, such as gold, oil and uranium, has intensified the regional and international competition to gain a strategic foothold in the country in order to expand spheres of influence in the continent.
As a result, many are becoming increasingly worried that the global powers will begin to meddle in the conflict to serve their own particular aims.
Sudan’s location in north-eastern Africa has attracted many major powers, which see it as a strategic bridge to Sub-Saharan Africa from the direction of the Red Sea and between the northern and southern portions of the continent.
Sudan borders Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. It is close to and influences strategic regions that are the focus of international and regional concern such as the Middle East, the Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Sudan is also part of two vital strategic regions, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, and it is an extension of the Sahel and Sahara.
In addition to serving as a potential gateway to the Horn of Africa, central to regional geopolitical equations, Sudan, the third-largest country in Africa since the secession of South Sudan, overlooks the Red Sea, one the world’s most important maritime links.
This 720 km sea connects the Mediterranean to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean via the Bab Al-Mandab at its southern entrance and the Suez Canal at its north. About $700 billion in international trade passes through the Red Sea, making it vital to international trade and the global economic infrastructure.
Sudan also has a port on the Red Sea in the shape of Port Sudan, an important logistical and commercial hub including a trade zone and a major oil refinery through which South Sudan’s oil is transported overseas.
Port Sudan is Sudan’s only sea port and is thus vital to the country’s foreign trade. It has a capacity of about 1.3 million containers a year. Situated at the midpoint of the western littoral of the Red Sea, Port Sudan is thus half way between two chokepoints in international maritime traffic: the Suez Canal and Bab Al-Mandab.
Its importance will increase exponentially with the potential launch of a transcontinental railway line from Port Sudan to Dakar, Senegal, which will also give four landlocked countries access to the sea.
Rich in mineral wealth, Sudan has the world’s third-largest reserves of uranium and over the past five years it has ranked as the third-largest gold producer in Africa and the 13th largest in the world, with an annual production of an estimated 100 to 250 tons.
In addition, it has 200 million acres, or about 45 per cent of the arable land in the Arab world, and over 108 million head of livestock. With its huge potential for agricultural expansion and other assets, Sudan has the potential to become a regional, if not global, food basket and a key to regional and international food security.
The global powers’ growing interest in Sudan is driven by both geopolitical and geostrategic and economic motives.
In the short term, the international community wants to restore calm, set the transitional process back on track towards general elections, contain disputes among Sudanese stakeholders, and prevent Islamist organisations from returning to power. It also seeks to forestall waves of violence and chaos, especially in eastern Sudan, for fear of possible spillovers eastward into the Sahel and West Africa and westward towards the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.
The Western powers are determined to safeguard maritime routes in the Red Sea. But they also have their sights set on maximising their economic and military interests in Sudan as a promising market in its own right and as a gateway to other African markets. Sudan’s natural and mineral wealth are another lure.
The international community and the Western powers are eager to contain the threat of terrorism, especially given how the upheaval and poor border security could facilitate the infiltration of the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist groups into the country.
They also want to keep Sudanese territory from being exploited as a transit route for illegal migration into Libya and from there to Europe and for arms smuggling to Gaza, Egypt and other destinations. The security of Port Sudan is critical for these reasons, but also because it can serve as a keystone in the maritime security network in the Red Sea.
Some of the global powers have an interest in influencing the geopolitical map and the balance of power in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and Red Sea. Russia is keen to secure a foothold on the Red Sea in Port Sudan, in order to strengthen its political and military/security influence in the area.
A naval facility on the Red Sea would better enable Russia to secure its maritime interests and give it more rapid access to other locations along the so-called arc of crisis and instability that stretches from the Levant and Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa, Indian Ocean, and the Gulf.
The global powers are thus alarmed by the ongoing crisis in Sudan, which threatens their strategic interests in the country and the region as a whole.
The US is worried that the potential collapse of the political transition process could cast Sudan back into widespread unrest and a potentially expanding cycle of violence and anarchy. The impacts this would have on the Red Sea region would pose a direct threat to US interests in terms of maritime navigation and trade and security in the Horn of Africa and Middle East.
Washington is also concerned by the growth of Chinese and Russian influence in Sudan, especially in the light of rumours that the Russian Wagner Group might get involved in the Sudanese conflict if it escalates.
Russia wants to strengthen its influence in Sudan as part of efforts to expand its presence in Africa in order to counter the US and Western influence there. According to US reports, it has begun to use the Wagner Group towards this end through collaboration with the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Russia’s interest in Sudan is linked to two main Sudanese assets: gold, which it hopes to access with the help of the Wagner Group, and Port Sudan, where it plans to construct a naval base in accordance with an agreement signed with Khartoum in 2020. This Red Sea base, which would host 300 troops and four military vessels, is central to Moscow’s plans to expand its influence in the Red Sea region and other strategic regions in Africa.
For Beijing, the escalating crisis in Sudan is a source of grave concern as it jeopardises China’s vast investments in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere in East Africa. China is also concerned by a possible interruption in the flow of South Sudanese oil to Port Sudan, as it has obtained around five per cent of its oil imports from Africa in recent years.
Like other regional and world powers, China is worried by the possible spread of the conflict to the Red Sea and the threat that this would pose to international maritime trade. An estimated $1 billion worth of Chinese trade passes through the Red Sea daily.
The longer the armed conflict in Sudan continues, the more the international stakeholders will be tempted to get involved in it, aggravating and further militarising the Sudanese crisis. Sharpening domestic political and regional rifts, especially if fuelled by outside meddling, could spiral out of control into a full-scale civil war with unpredictable consequences, not just for Sudan, but also for the region as a whole.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 4 May, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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