A noticeable uptick in the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups has accompanied the spate of military coups in the Sahel and West Africa, the latest of which occurred in Niger, then Gabon. The militant groups seized on the disruption and the fragile state of security in these countries to intensify operations in the region. For example, the Al-Qaeda affiliate, Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has besieged the vicinity of Timbuktu in northern Mali since August. Before this, on 9 June, the Shabaab Al-Mujahideen (Shabaab) attacked Pearl Beach in Mogadishu, Somalia, killing 15 people including both soldiers and civilians.
In mid-August, the Nigerian Defence Ministry announced that 17 soldiers were killed and dozens injured in a terrorist attack near Niger’s border with Burkina Faso. In north-central Burkina Faso, many soldiers and civilians were killed during a terrorist attack at the beginning of September. In addition, the General Staff of Burkina Faso reported that more than 65 terrorists were killed during counterterrorist operations in the west of the country in August 2023.
Terrorist activity has spread to Nigeria where, in mid-August, 13 people were killed in an attack by Boko Haram against the village of Wulari in north-eastern Nigeria. In neighbouring Niger, the army released a statement on 15 August reporting that six of its soldiers were killed in the west of the country, including the platoon commander.
In July, the UN released a report warning of the increased opportunities open to IS affiliates and similar organisations in the Sahel to expand their areas of control in a part of the continent that has been called the “Coup Belt” because of coups that have taken place since 2000 in Mali, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon. Insurgent groups have also been taking advantage of the situation. Of particular note is the surge in tensions and intermittent clashes between the Malian army and the Azawad movements and the sudden flare-up in cross-border skirmishes between the Chadian armed forces and the Chadian rebel group called the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR), which is based in southern Libya. Observers fear that spill-over from this could aggravate the crises in Libya, Sudan and elsewhere in the Sahel and Sahara.
In a related development, the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel), which is active in the tri-state border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, seized on the turmoil in the Coup Belt to expand its area of control in those fragile states. Not only have the new regimes in Niger and Gabon been preoccupied with consolidating their hold on power, they have also had to gird themselves militarily and logistically against a possible Western-backed military operation by ECOWAS to restore the old regimes.
Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali have pledged to support Niger militarily and already mobilised forces to this end. The political reorientations in the countries that have experienced military takeovers combined with their need to strengthen their defences against Western-backed attempts to undermine them could hamper their ability to defend themselves against terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara for the foreseeable future.
Alongside their military activities, terrorist organisations have begun to present themselves as an alternative to the state. They tend to target remote and peripheral areas and border villages where they try to smear the image of post-coup leaderships. Some of these organisations wield tremendous power, often across state borders and continents. Some possess the military capacities of state armies and a broad, multi-sectoral economic base, albeit consisting primarily of illicit activities. Foremost among extremist organisations in West Africa are JNIM, Ansar Al-Din, the Mourabitoun, Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Al-Islam, IS, and the Macina Liberation Front. There are many smaller and lesser-known groups, probably with more modest military capacities.
Other factors beyond the wave of military coups in the Sahel and West Africa have contributed to the rise in terrorism. One is the sudden withdrawal of UN forces, which had been stationed for years in Mali and some other Sahel and Sahara countries. Also, in November 2022, Paris officially ended the French-led Barkhane counterterrorism operation in the Sahel. The disappearance of the Western forces created a vacuum which terrorist groups readily exploited. Observers have also linked the recent spike in terrorist attacks to the halt in security and intelligence coordination between Western powers (Washington and Paris) and the countries in the Coup Belt, making it harder for these countries’ armies to track terrorist activity and defend themselves against terrorist groups.
In light of the foregoing, terrorist activity will probably proliferate further, posing direct and increasing threats to Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Guinea. The repercussions of the turmoil in these countries will radiate outwards into neighbouring countries, following the trajectories of what appears to be the inclination of terrorist organisations to expand operationally into the Gulf of Guinea and East Africa.
Upheaval in the Sahel could also erode the control of the central state, aggravating factors of instability and creating environments conducive to greater manoeuvrability of terrorist groups in the peripheries and marginalised enclaves. The more ground the terrorist movements gain in the peripheries, the more they will influence conditions in the interior of the Sahel countries, jeopardise their stability and hamper their ability to counter or, at least, neutralise the mounting threat.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 September, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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