The lust for revenge has gripped all social and political quarters in Israel in the wake of the successful Palestinian attack on 7 October. The Israeli military establishment, stunned, demoralised, and confused since the attack, is beleaguered by three types of pressure: one telling it to avenge those killed in the 7 October attack, another holding it responsible for the attack and vowing to bring it to account, and a third from the current emergency government which has locked horns with the army leadership in a muted debate over the priorities of the forthcoming phase of military action against Gaza. The debate is focused on the goals of the ground forces that have been amassed at the border since 11 October. Most scenarios for the anticipated military action include a main role of some sort for these forces, but they would face many challenges that are subject to debate.
The first is the Israeli hostages taken by the Palestinian factions. Tel Aviv has so far been unable to determine how many hostages there are and how many of them are still alive following Hamas’ threat to kill a hostage every time Israel struck a civilian target without warning. Then, there is likelihood of many casualties among the hostages during a ground invasion, which would fuel public anger in Israel against their military establishment. That would not be the first time that Israeli military and security forces have sacrificed hostages. A precedent occurred in the Kamal Adwan fedayeen attack in 1978, resulting in the death of 38 Israeli hostages. If the Israeli forces adopt a similar approach, they will have the additional problem of finding the bodies of the dead hostages.
The second challenge is whether a full-scale Israeli land incursion into Gaza will spark a broader regional conflict on other fronts, such as Lebanon and Syria, or attacks against Israeli interests by parties further afield, such as Iran or the Ansarullah (Houthi) Movement in Yemen. Members of the Iran-affiliated “Axis of Resistance” have stated that they might enter the battle against Israel in the event of the latter stages a ground invasion of Gaza. There have already been intermittent exchanges of fire between Hizbullah and Israel since 8 October, when Hizbullah struck Israeli military targets in Shabaa Farms with anti-armour mortars and short-range missiles. A noticeable uptick in the use of electronic warfare tactics and mock attacks appears to have caused some havoc in the Israeli command and control system in the north, which could impede Israeli military performance should the situation escalate on those fronts.
Naturally, the spectre of the human costs that Israel would pay in the event of a ground incursion is a major challenge for Israeli military planners. Israel, under the current circumstances, cannot afford significant casualties after the record toll among Israeli civilians and military personnel since 7 October. Yet, from previous limited incursions into northern and eastern Gaza, the Israeli military authorities are aware of the many potential pitfalls and dangers involved in such offensives. The Palestinian factions have been preparing for years for a potential Israeli ground offensive. The operation on 7 October revealed the sophisticated military capacities they possess, from equipment such as anti-tank missiles and kamikaze drones to the highly trained combatants and combined arms tactics involving storming operations, diversion tactics and urban guerrilla fighting. Therefore, despite the intensive bombardment intended to level the areas where the Israeli forces would enter, a ground offensive would still be very hazardous and costly. Moreover, the Israeli army’s previous experience in urban warfare, for example in Suez and Ismailia in 1973 or in the villages of southern Lebanon in 2006, does not give it cause for optimism. The problem is compounded by the current situation in the West Bank, where the Israeli army is facing Palestinian demonstrations and militant activities. A ground offensive in Gaza could ignite a third Palestinian Intifada throughout the entire occupied territories.
Then, there is the regional and international factor. This, too, is important in determining the shape and magnitude of the forthcoming Israeli military step. The outpouring of Western solidarity with Tel Aviv on 7 October has begun to recede in the face of what looms ahead in Gaza. Voices in the West have begun to urge Tel Aviv to confine itself to the military actions it has already taken and not to escalate further. Some have observed that the Israeli shift from a defensive to an offensive posture has taken a much longer time than usual in accordance with basic Israeli military planning. After the Egyptian surprise attack on 6 October 1973, for example, it took Israel two to four days to call up reserves. On this occasion, the Israeli army was unable to begin to fully mobilise reserves until the eighth day of the Israeli counter operation. The Israeli command and control structure clearly suffers significant shortcomings, signs of which are the repeated “false warnings” on the northern front with Lebanon.
In light of the foregoing, in addition to the question of whether human resources and economic factors would even permit Israel to sustain a protracted ground offensive, this option seems the worst of all possible courses of action for Israel. Shifting to an offensive on the ground will greatly increase the number of Israeli casualties, prolong military operations, and forfeit the ability to call off the operation when it wants to. Under such conditions, it would become less and less likely for Israel to achieve its aims, which would presumably be to eliminate the military capacities of the Palestinian factions and restore its control over all or part of Gaza.
The amassing of Israeli armoured vehicles, artillery and troops along the borders is nearly complete, as of writing. The preparatory fire for a ground offensive has been ongoing since the dawn of 10 October. Much of this has involved heavy aerial bombardment of areas such as Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun, with the aim of evacuating northern Gaza up to Wadi Gaza and the outskirts of the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza. These developments suggest that the Israeli army is set on severing off a portion of Gaza. This scenario seems the most feasible and the most consistent with the measures Israel has already taken on the ground, such as securing control of the fringes of Gaza, especially in the north, in the area adjacent to the settlements of Zikim and Sderot. The purpose of this is to expand the buffer zone around Gaza and create a no man’s land to forestall any new encroachments by Palestinian fighters against the Israeli settlements in the vicinity. This scenario might also include an Israeli operation intended to isolate Gaza from the Egyptian border, although this option appears less likely in view of the Egyptian position.
While this is the most likely scenario, there are three other possible scenarios. One is a full-scale offensive whereby Israeli forces invade Gaza along several axes to sever contact between Gaza’s governorates, disrupt and degrade the Palestinians’ material and human capacities, and reoccupy the entire Gaza Strip. This scenario is the least likely in view of the risks: the possible entry of other parties in the region, the high casualty cost for Israeli forces, and the possibility of a third Intifada.
The second is a limited ground operation. It would entail the entry of special forces tasked with specific goals, such as destroying certain targets or assassinating senior Palestinian resistance officials, and then withdrawing after inflicting the greatest amount of damage on their targets. This is the second most likely scenario, especially as Israeli military command already announced on the seventh day of operations that special forces had begun to carry out assignments in Gaza.
Sustained siege and bombardment is the third possible scenario, its aim being to weaken the Palestinian position ahead of any future negotiating process. Israel has shown an inclination to this strategy on several occasions, when it linked allowing drinking water, electricity and relief supplies back into Gaza to the release of Israeli hostages. However, this scenario does not begin to sate the widespread thirst for vengeance in Israel at present, and it is a tacit acknowledgement of Israel’s military “defeat” at the hands of the Gazan resistance factions.
In its quest for revenge, Tel Aviv is groping for the solution that will cost it the least in material and human terms and avoid igniting other fronts, such as the front with Lebanon which the Israeli defence minister said Israel has no interest in opening. It is a difficult equation. But it does rule out full-scale invasion as an adventure no Israeli official could afford to bear responsibility for. Whatever Israel’s next steps, they will become clearer from the preparation of the paths of attack and the directions of deployment of the artillery units.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 19 October, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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