The 7 October operation carried out by the Palestinian resistance factions in Gaza against Israel marked a turning point in the Palestinian cause at several levels. It reflected a major shift in Palestinian resistance strategies and tactics, and it exposed deep structural flaws in the Israeli security system.
The entire Israeli security doctrine will undoubtedly come under scrutiny in the post-war phase given the collapse of Israeli deterrence. There has also been a shift in the Israeli response to the Palestinian group Hamas, which, in the words of President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, “has gone beyond the right of self-defence to genocide”.
There is now global alarm over the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza and the possibility that the conflict could spiral into a regional war.
The Al-Aqsa Flood Operation carried out by the Palestinian factions in Gaza on 7 October was the first time in the Gaza-Israeli conflict that the Palestinian factions moved beyond missile strikes on Israel.
This time round, the missile barrages from Gaza served as air cover for a ground operation in which more than a thousand fighters invaded Israel and stormed Israeli settlements several km away from the border.
The fighters succeeded in seizing and securing control of three out of the 12 settlements in the vicinity in the first two days of the operation and penetrated several others. It appears to have been timed to coincide with a Jewish holiday, taking advantage of a reduced Israeli military/security presence.
The operation was also unprecedented in terms of the number of civilian casualties on the Israeli side. An estimated 1,500 Israelis were killed, thousands more were wounded, and an estimated 250 were taken captive.
This large toll, combined with shock at how unprepared Israel had been for the surprise attack and the Israeli government’s need to save face at a time when domestic political temperatures had reached a boiling point and large segments of Israeli public opinion are blaming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally for gross negligence, has led to the unprecedented brutality of the Israeli revenge against Gaza in actions verging on genocide.
The Israeli Military’s first order of business was to regain control over the settlements and re-establish security in the Gaza envelope. Then it began to implement its campaign of collective punishment of Gaza by unleashing waves of bombardment at a higher scale and greater intensity than ever.
While it has dropped bombs across all sectors of the Gaza Strip, it has mostly focused on the north with the aim of entirely clearing it of residents and levelling it to the ground. The Israeli army made this aim explicit in the leaflets it has dropped from planes ordering the inhabitants to evacuate the areas in the north of the Strip and move southwards towards the border with Egypt.
Israel has also cut off all electricity and water from the whole of Gaza, although it has partially restored it in some areas of the south. Such steps have left no doubt about Israel’s aim: to forcefully drive the Palestinians out of Gaza entirely as part of its plan to eliminate the Palestinian cause.
The Israeli revenge operation, now in its 17th day, also aims to up the pressure on Hamas and the civilian population of Gaza by imposing a total blockade on the Strip, including by preventing the entry of humanitarian aid on various pretexts.
It has deliberately bombed markets, bakeries, and utility and service structures. The ostensible military aim is to paralyse Hamas’ military capacities by destroying its infrastructure, but the tactics are clearly intended to cause as much human suffering as possible.
The most important achievement of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation was that it put paid to three components of the myth of Israel power: early warning, deterrence, and defence. On 7 October, the much-vaunted Israeli early warning system clearly malfunctioned, and it took hours for Israeli army units to come to the defence of civilians.
The resistance fighters had also not been deterred from staging a multipronged offensive against military targets and communities inside Israel.
Israel is currently trying to prove that the fourth and sole remaining component of its strategy is still intact: to resolve problems. Presumably this is to be translated into the total elimination of Hamas. In the process, Israel hopes to recover an element of “deterrence” through the sheer ruthlessness of its operations and the scale of human and material losses they inflict.
According to this Israeli logic, this will eliminate the resistance factions or at least debilitate them to the extent that they will not present a threat to Israel for years to come.
While most of the political and military circles in Israel favour the toughest possible response to Hamas, the Israeli public space has been the scene of heated debate over the nature of the military operation against Gaza and, above all, whether there should be a full-scale ground offensive or limited special forces operations.
Netanyahu and his Defence Minister Yoav Galant have encouraged a ground offensive aiming to “eliminate Hamas militarily and politically”. But the option faces numerous challenges, which helps to explain why it has not happened yet, despite the daily warnings that it is “imminent.”
The first challenge is the high chance of losses among Israeli troops. Second, there is the risk that some soldiers will be captured and then used as human shields to prevent Israel from carrying out further incursions into Gaza. The third challenge is the economic cost. According to some Israeli estimates, a ground offensive would triple the Israeli budget deficit.
Fourth, the US and Israel fear that an Israeli ground offensive against Gaza could open new fronts against Israel. The Lebanese front has already been experiencing exchanges of fire and skirmishes in recent days. There is also the threat that some pro-Iranian factions in the region could strike US targets and interests, as has already occurred in Iraq where rockets have targeted the Ain Al-Assad Base where US forces are stationed.
In addition, the US wants Israel to postpone any possible ground offensive as Hamas still holds some US citizens, and Washington hopes to secure their release.
In view of the potentially high risks and costs of a full-scale Israeli ground incursion into Gaza and the uncertainty that it will achieve its aim of eliminating Hamas and the other resistance factions, it appears that the Israeli government is leaning more towards the option of limited ground operations.
In this scenario, Israeli special forces would be sent in to achieve specific objectives, such as assassinating Hamas leaders, blowing up infrastructure, or freeing hostages. Some Israeli special forces are already on such assignments, according to Israeli Army Spokesman Daniel Hagari, who said that special teams had been sent into Gaza to collect intelligence on the whereabouts and conditions of the hostages.
The likelihood is that the Israeli army will hold off on a full-scale ground incursion and confine itself to limited assaults and special forces operations designed to accomplish tactical aims.
At the same time, it will continue with its policy of applying “maximum pressure.” This does not rule out escalation at some point in the future, however, this will be contingent on several factors, such as progress made in releasing the Israeli and foreign hostages, developments on the Lebanese front, and the success or failure of regional and international pressures to prevent escalation and promote a ceasefire.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 October, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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