On the morning of 12 June, the crew of the Greek-owned cargo ship MV Tutor spotted a small and unmanned skiff approaching the ship.
They called the security team, who came and saw the skiff slowly approaching. Despite having rifles capable of taking out a small boat, they waited and then were forced to take cover as a result of a large explosion. Minutes later, they noticed another boat approaching and another explosion occurred. They were forced to evacuate the cargo ship with the help of a US Navy cruiser.
Some 12 days later, the Houthis published a video to confirm their attack on the MSC Sarah V vessel in the Red Sea with a Hatem 2hypersonic ballistic missile manufactured in Yemen. The Hatem 2 is believed to be a variant of the Iranian Kheibar Shekan missile, which was used in the attacks on Israel in April this year.
In order to understand the new missile technology available to the Houthis, Al-Ahram Weekly reached out to Fabian Hoffmann, an expert in missiles systems at the University of Oslo in Norway.
The Hatem 2 “looks like a pretty standard ballistic missile,” he said, adding that “the winglets on the top section suggest that the reentry vehicle probably has some limited ability to manoeuvre. Given that the missile typically reaches hypersonic velocities during its descent before slowing down as it approaches the ground, I’d say that the claim could indeed be true that this constitutes a true hypersonic weapon system.”
“However, hypersonic speed is not unusual with these types of ballistic missiles. It definitely does not look like a boost-glide vehicle, which would have improved manoeuverability. If the reentry vehicle can manoeuvre, it’s likely to be rather limited. That’s why I believe that nothing will really change in response to this new missile. I don’t think there is anything the Houthis can do with it that they couldn’t do with other types of missiles they have imported or manufactured.”
“It will probably be as vulnerable to US and Western ballistic missile-defence systems as other Houthi missiles.”
The Poseidon Archer Operation that began in January has had a significant impact on eliminating the Houthis’ targeting capabilities by destroying radar installations and command centres to neutralise the group’s ability to coordinate multiple and simultaneous attacks.
However, more recently Houthi attacks on commercial ships have again increased significantly, this time with a higher success rate. They have hit five commercial ships compared to previous months, which confirms the Houthis’ ability to absorb US and British strikes while also compensating for losses of monitoring and targeting systems such as radar, as well as developing better versions of missiles and unmanned systems that have been smuggled into Yemen in the form of small components and reassembled.
The Houthis also no longer rely solely on the Iranian spy ship Behshad for intelligence as they formerly did.
According to US Central Command (CENTCOM), on 26 June “US forces successfully destroyed one Houthi radar site in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen. It was determined that the radar site presented an imminent threat to US Coalition Forces and merchant vessels in the region.”
Two days later, US Central Command Forces successfully destroyed seven Iranian-backed Houthi unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and one ground control station vehicle.
The Houthis rely on an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which aims to distract an opponent’s forces by dispersing the main force into small scattered forces while exploiting the local terrain and tunnels to hide ammunition to sustain fighting for long periods. Since March this year, the Houthis have been preparing to conduct a long-term war, as demonstrated by their relying on underground installations.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a US think tank, “while the Houthis used caves and simple tunnels in their earliest days as an armed group, more recently they have pursued much larger installations, refurbishing both pre-war Yemeni army tunnel systems and building entirely new underground facilities.”
“The group has opted to construct large installations visible on satellite imagery rather than exclusively adhering to the clandestine mode of tunnel construction favoured by groups like Hamas and Hizbullah. The size of the entrances, which are large enough to accommodate heavy vehicles, raises questions about whether these refurbished and newly constructed underground facilities could eventually be used to conceal parts of the Houthis’ strategic-missile and UAV arsenal.”
The sending of the US aircraft carrier Eisenhower and US combat units to the Mediterranean will have a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the US units currently in the Red Sea, and the Houthis will be able to intensify their attacks in the coming days with the arrival of more munitions and Iranian monitoring and targeting systems.
This raises concerns about the fate of numerous commercial ships in the area, which lack proper protection from naval forces.
Hoffmann said that things “would be easier for the Houthis in this case, but if the US and European destroyers and frigates are fully loaded up on munition, they should be able to deal with salvo attacks, at least initially. The question then becomes how many attacks they can withstand before they run out of missile-defence interceptors, so it’s a race to the bottom.”
“Who has more ammunition? The Western ships or the Houthis?”
Fabian Hinz, an expert on missiles and drones, said that “the Houthis have generally relied on drones and ballistic missiles to attack ships. Their cruise-missile arsenal contains models based on Iranian production. Cruise missiles are generally slower than ballistic missiles but fly low to the ground, making them harder to detect and more precise because they can be guided throughout their flight. Russia could supply the Kh-31 supersonic anti-ship missile, which is air-launched but can be converted to ground launch and has been widely exported, including to Venezuela and Yemen before the Civil War.”
Such dangerous weapons, if available in the Houthis’ arsenal, may encourage the Iran-backed militia to carry out attacks not only on commercial ships but also on military naval units in the Red Sea due to the high speed of these missiles, allowing them to evade air defences.
If the Houthis are successful in recovering their prior ability to coordinate multidirectional swarm attacks at the same time, naval units may be paralysed and defencive formations collapse.
Hoffmann said that “Western missile defence has proved very effective in dealing with salvo attacks, so I don’t think they could very easily overwhelm the defences of a carrier strike group, for example. Keep in mind that a single hit on a carrier probably would only cause limited damage. The Soviets calculated during the Cold War that they would have to score 12 hits to take a carrier out of commission, for example.”
* A version of this article appears in print in the 4 July, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: