When the results of the first round of the Iranian presidential elections were announced last week, it became clear that none of the candidates had secured over 50 per cent of the vote, necessitating a runoff scheduled for next Friday between reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian and conservative candidate Saeed Jalili.

It also became clear that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would find it very difficult to gloss over the historically low voter turnout.

Pezeshkian received approximately 10.5 million votes, or 42.5 per cent, while Jalili received 9.5 million votes, or 38.6 per cent. Conservative politicians Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and Mostafa Pourmohammadi received 3.4 million and about 200,000 votes, respectively.

In a significant setback for Khamenei’s hopes of widespread participation in the voting, official figures revealed that the election had seen the lowest voter turnout in a presidential election since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

While casting his vote, Khamenei emphasised the importance of popular participation, stating that the “strength, dignity, and reputation of the Islamic Republic depends on a large voter turnout.”

This historic decline in voting highlights the disappointment of the electorate, particularly among social segments that support the reformist movement. It also reflects their indifference and lack of confidence in the candidates’ ability to effect meaningful change in the country.

Announcing the results, Mohsen Islami, spokesman for Iran’s Election Commission, stated that the participation rate was only 39.9 per cent, although polls had indicated that voter participation would be higher than the previous record low of 48.8 per cent in the 2021 elections, won by President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a plane crash in May.

The parliamentary elections in Iran held in March saw a turnout of just 41 per cent.

The Iranian Interior Ministry reported that one million votes had been invalidated, a significant number and indicating widespread frustration among the Iranian populace with the presidential candidates.

A prominent Iranian reformist politician who served as a minister in the government of former president Mohamed Khatami, told the Al-Ahram Weekly that the low rate of participation represented a greater danger to the supreme leader than the reformists returning to power.

“I do not think that even in his worst nightmares, the supreme leader expected the participation rate to be only around 39 per cent, despite including a name close to the reformists on the list of candidates,” he said.

“Even the 2021 elections, which excluded reformist candidates entirely and were meticulously orchestrated for Raisi to win, resulted in a higher participation rate of 48 per cent. The sharp decline in voter turnout in recent years signifies a radical shift in how the majority of Iranians perceive the elections, marking a turning point in citizens’ relationship with the regime.”

The blame game began immediately after the result. Former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who supported Pezeshkian’s campaign after the Guardian Council refused to approve the nomination of major reformist figures such as former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, stated that the sharp decline in the turnout was due to people’s dissatisfaction with the way they are governed.

Participation was noticeably low in Iran’s border provinces, where ethnic minorities constitute a majority. Reformists argue that this indicates that large segments of Iranians, particularly outside the cities and major urban centres, have decided to punish the regime for ignoring them and failing to respond to their demands to alleviate economic suffering, improve living standards, and enhance political participation.

Conversely, conservatives blamed the low turnout on the government of former reformist president Hassan Rouhani, citing a lack of achievements during his eight-year tenure. The right-wing Kayhan newspaper, close to the conservatives and Khamenei, said that Iranians were disappointed by the state of the economy and that Rouhani’s successor Raisi had not had enough time to reform the economy that Rouhani had bequeathed to him.

This criticism of the reformists and their record was seen in reformist circles in Iran as a sign that the supreme leader and his advisors are preparing the ground for Jalili’s presidency.

Nevertheless, the low turnout rate will exert immense pressure on Khamenei, presenting him with difficult choices. Despite his preference for a conservative candidate to continue Raisi’s hardline approach towards the West, Jalili’s accession to the presidency would mean that all political institutions in Iran would be under conservative control, potentially leading to increased alienation and indifference among the segments of society that support the reformist movement — a dangerous scenario for the authorities in Iran.

However, the historic decline in the voter turnout poses a problem not only for the supreme leader but also for the reformist movement, which has failed to convince the Iranian public of the efficacy of voting to bring about economic, political, and social change.

“The truth of the matter is that the reform movement in Iran has failed. This is a fact that must be acknowledged. There are many divisions within the reform movement,” the Iranian reformist politician told the Weekly.

“There is a faction in the reform movement that wants to stand on middle ground, meaning not to frighten the conservatives, and to satisfy a section of the reformists with slow, gradual reforms and in full agreement with the supreme leader.”

“Pezeshkian is an example of this approach. But the very low turnout rate in the first round shows that the Iranians rejected this approach and responded to the requests of the more radical reformists who are under house arrest, such as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, not to vote,” he added.

Despite the efforts of leaders of the reformist movement to push Iranians to vote en masse in the runoff by using fear factors about the conservatives’ controlling all political institutions in Iran and warning of Jalili’s presidency after he pledged not to negotiate with the West to revive the nuclear agreement, declaring his preference to circumvent Western sanctions and neutralise their negative impact, it does not seem that they have managed to persuade the voters to show up for the runoff.

One young Iranian woman who holds a degree in architecture and works as a saleswoman in a furniture store in Tehran to support her family requested anonymity when speaking to the Weekly. She said she had not voted in the elections, and almost no one in her family had either. She expressed her desire to emigrate to Europe due to the restrictions on Iranian women, particularly the compulsory hijab. These are expected to become more severe if Jalili is elected.

“There is a civil challenge to the regime on many levels. More girls and women are not wearing the hijab in defiance of the idea of controlling women’s bodies and decisions. But these daily civil challenges have not yet led to political openness, and I do not think this will happen any time soon,” the young woman said.

If the reformists fail to convince their supporters of the importance of voting in the second round of the elections, the low turnout will have significant repercussions and could pave the way for a conservative victory.

A low voter turnout typically benefits the conservative movement due to the strong commitments of their grassroots supporters. The elimination of conservative candidate Ghalibaf from the presidential race is likely to result in his supporters rallying behind Jalili, giving him an advantage in the runoff against Pezeshkian.

The reformists’ only path to victory lies in securing greater popular participation in the runoff, necessitating a substantial shift in public sentiment and convincing voters of the importance of voting.

However, the outlook is bleak following Mir Hussein Mousavi’s decision to boycott the elections. Mousavi, the most prominent and popular leader of the reform movement and also head of Iran’s Green Movement, has been under house arrest since 2011.

The responsibility now falls on other reformist leaders, such as former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, to mobilise the reformist voter base to participate massively in the runoff.

Meanwhile, the conservative movement has begun to consolidate behind Jalili. If elected, he is expected to prioritise improving Iran’s regional relations but is unlikely to resume diplomatic talks with the West to revive the nuclear agreement and lift the sanctions on the country, especially if Donald Trump wins the US presidential elections next November.

Conversely, if the Pezeshkian campaign can successfully rally the reformist base, it could still secure a victory. In this case, Iran could see a relaxation of internal pressures, particularly regarding the role of the “morality police” in enforcing the compulsory hijab, and an improvement in the tense relations between Tehran and the West.

However, discussions of a Pezeshkian presidency appear to be overly optimistic. The reformist movement is struggling for its political survival, not only due to restrictions imposed by the conservatives and the supreme leader, but also because it has been abandoned by large segments of the Iranian population.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 4 July, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly