On the evening of 20 July, Israeli pilots gathered at the Nevatim Air Base to be told by their commander that they were going to attack targets roughly 2,000 km from Israel. The pilots were confused. Would they be attacking Iran?

They were told they would be attacking the port of Hodeida in Yemen in response to the hundreds of Houthi group attacks that had been carried out since the beginning of the Israeli war on Gaza.

The jets took off, accomplished their mission, and safely returned to their bases. It then only took a few hours for the sirens in Eilat in southern Israel to sound, warning of the arrival of another ballistic missile from the southern Red Sea.

While the missile was intercepted, the Houthis were not deterred despite the success of the Israeli attack.

The day before the attack, Israelis in Tel Aviv heard the humming of drones at low altitude, and then an explosion, which led to the death of one person. There was confusion amid the military leadership: was the drone responsible from Syria or Lebanon?

Yahya Srei, a Houthi spokesman in Yemen, claimed responsibility for the drone targeting Israel.

Fabian Hinz from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) wrote that “looking at some of the debris, first there is a video showing the UAV’s [unmanned aerial vehicle] piston engine. This one is clearly an Iranian Mado 275, an unlicensed copy of the German Limbach L 275. The engine mount itself shows some interesting similarities to the Houthi Sammad 3 long-range UAV. We are seeing a slightly more capable version here.”

The Houthis chose a quality weapon for this specific mission, which was very carefully planned, but Israel has a multi-layered air-defence network that is considered one of the best in the world.

Called “sky shield,” it consists of various systems to deal with different threats. The penetration of the Yemeni drone and the killing of an Israeli citizen in the capital caused confusion among military analysts.

To better understand what happened, Al-Ahram Weekly reached out to Mike Mihajlovic, an expert in air-defence systems and a former air-defence operator.

“This recent attack on Tel Aviv (and more will come) resulted from careful planning and execution. Israeli defence networks, especially radars and assigned missile batteries, are concentrated on the east and north towards Lebanon,” Mihajlovic said.

“The Houthis noted that there was light coverage from the sea, where besides Israelis, there are always some NATO ships around, as well as the airfield on Cyprus that can cover the Mediterranean side. The Houthis decided to use the approach from the sea, and Tel Aviv was and is an ideal target for that kind of attack.”

“The Houthis don’t know the radar coverage, but there are friendly forces that have the means to find shallow gaps, so a drone can be programmed to approach from that side. The damage on this occasion was not significant, but the prestige of the Israeli integrated defence system is damaged and panic could easily spread among the civilian population.”

As a result, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had little choice but to launch a retaliatory attack on Yemen aimed at reassuring the Israeli public, on the one hand, and threatening Iran and its militias on the other.

The idea was to try to regain the prestige of the strategic deterrence adopted by Israel for decades, explaining the name chosen for the operation – “Outstretched Arm.”

According to reports, the Israeli mission included F-35 and F-16 fighter jets carrying out the strike, an F-15 with an Ofir reconnaissance pod for the battle damage assessment mission, two G-550 intelligence-gathering and electronic jammer aircraft, and refuelling aircraft.

The target was approximately 2,000 km away, namely the oil and fuel depots and power plant in Hodeida. These are targets that may serve the Houthi military effort, but they are not themselves military in nature. Attacking them was meant to have a clearly destructive effect, starting fires that would be difficult to control.

The attack would have satisfied the Israeli desire for revenge by highlighting the damage, less obvious with underground targets, even if they are of great or greater importance.

The Israeli strike was similar to the attack on Sudan in 2009 and the offensive scenarios for which the Israeli Air Force is constantly training, which is to attack using large formations secured and supported by electronic warfare aircraft to carry out highly accurate and destructive attacks over long distances.

The Israeli government made the best political use of the attack on Yemen, similar to the hostage-liberation operations in Gaza, aiming to ensure security, fully protect Israel’s borders, deter potential hostilities, and send a direct message to Iran.

Netanyahu commented that “it was a reminder to our enemies that there is no place that Israel cannot reach.” Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that “Iran has many arms; you struggle with one arm here, you struggle with others there, and it demands excellence to be used against each one of them.”

Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant said that “the fire left raging by the strikes on Hodeida is seen across the Middle East, and the significance is clear.”

However, based on previous experience, the use of force against the Houthis may not have been the best option. Hundreds of airstrikes have been inflicted on Yemen and Houthi-controlled areas over recent years, but the Houthi attacks have continued.

The Houthis are unconcerned about human casualties, whether civilian or otherwise, and they possess a broad arsenal of weapons including cruise missiles, drones, and ballistic missiles. They have developed modern equipment and have succeeded in compensating for losses despite a naval blockade.

The Israeli strike on the Houthis also provided them with more legitimacy to continue their attacks and to show to the Yemeni people that they are fighting Israel for a Palestinian victory.

“Bear in mind that the drone attack on Tel Aviv was just a preliminary attack. More will follow, and the direction will likely be from the sea coordinated with overland attacks. This is going to stretch Israeli defences to the limit, and in the case that, for example, hundreds of these drones attack in the timeframe of 15 minutes, Israel will run out of missiles and will need to reload, which is when the second wave may come,” Mihajlovic said.

“With multidirectional and multilevel attacks using combined drones and ballistic missiles, Israel will request direct US involvement…and more US air-defence systems will be required to face these attacks.”

It seems as if Israel and Iran are entering a new phase of the war. Israel is trying hard to restore the deterrent factor, but it is having difficulty achieving this through military operations against opponents that have built their strategy to counter the Israeli strategy and to drag the Israelis into exhausting battles without caring about civilian losses.

The question remains of why Israel does not end or de-escalate the Gaza crisis through peaceful and diplomatic means. The Iranian-backed militias are using it to legitimise their combat operations against Israel and to obtain local political gains.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 25 July, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly