How should one react to the assassination of an important guest in one’s own house?
This question is looming over Iran’s political and security establishments in the wake of the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran by Israel on 31 July.
As Tehran weighs its options, more US warships and fighter jets are heading to the Middle East, signalling Washington’s clear warning about the potential repercussions if Iran retaliates for the assassination of Haniyeh. European and Arab diplomats have also cautioned Iran against a wider conflict in the Middle East.
In times of major security crises, the Iranian political and military elite usually present a unified front. However, the assassination of Haniyeh in the heart of Tehran has sparked differing viewpoints among Iranian officials due to the gravity of the situation, its internal and regional repercussions, and the risks of a direct war with Israel.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with some senior advisers, advocates for a strong but measured military response to protect Iran’s regional standing and avenge Haniyeh’s death without getting entangled in a full-scale confrontation with Israel.
The cautious approach, influenced by past experiences, aims to avoid falling into a potential trap set by Israel. Iranian officials acknowledge that Iran has not been this close to a comprehensive confrontation with Israel since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, primarily due to the actions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against Iranian interests in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria.
As highlighted by Mohammad Javad Zarif, strategic adviser to the new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the assassination was likely intended to provoke an impulsive response by Tehran, overriding calculated diplomacy.
On the other hand, some top officials in the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard and hardline conservatives in the country are advocating for a strong military response, even if it risks a wider regional conflict involving Iran and its allies on one side and Israel and the US on the other.
A former senior Iranian official close to Pezeshkian told Al-Ahram Weekly that those urging caution have valid reasons to consider the broader implications of any response.
“Israel has no real strategic gain to make from the assassination of Haniyeh other than provoking Iran into a direct military confrontation with Israel and, consequently, the US. This has been Netanyahu’s hope for years. Thus, Tehran’s calculations must be extremely careful,” he said.
“Hamas did not foresee the brutality of the Israeli response to the 7 October attack, including the destruction of Gaza and the reoccupation of half the Strip. Netanyahu’s unpredictable behaviour poses a significant challenge for Iran.”
Iranian officials argue that the Israeli government’s actions are irrational and are aiming to provoke Tehran into an uncalculated military response, thereby drawing the US into the conflict alongside Israel. Such a scenario would distract from the atrocities in Gaza and expand the conflict, while relieving the domestic pressure on Netanyahu, which is precisely what he desires.
Complicating the calculations further, the major Arab countries are reluctant to involve themselves in the conflict and are not pressuring the US to restrain Israel. Iranian sources have indicated that acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani contacted several Arab foreign ministers to gauge their positions on the Israeli escalation. Many, while publicly condemning Haniyeh’s assassination, wish to remain neutral.
Some Arab states indicated that the most they could do is caution the US and Israel that Netanyahu’s policies will complicate their positions regarding normalising their relations with Israel.
Despite warnings from Washington and the European nations, Iran seems to be calculating that the cost of inaction might surpass the risks of retaliation. In other words, Iran feels compelled to respond, not only due to regional dynamics but also because of domestic considerations.
With Pezeshkian newly inaugurated as president, Iran is keen to avoid appearing weak on the home front. The regime is acutely aware of the significant blow dealt by the assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran, and any perceived weakness could embolden internal adversaries.
The Iranian official told the Weekly that “internal factors will inevitably influence the nature of the response.” The regime recognises the presence of vulnerabilities, opposition groups, and factions waiting for an opportunity to challenge its authority. Therefore, the Revolutionary Guards are inclined to take action to deter internal dissent, he said.
However, they also wish to avoid provoking extensive Israeli and US military reprisals that could destabilise the country further.
The exact circumstances of Haniyeh’s assassination remain unclear, with conflicting reports emerging. The official Iranian narrative, which raises more questions than answers, claims that a short-range missile struck the wing of the government building where Haniyeh was staying.
However, Tehran has not provided concrete evidence or clarified where the missile originated or why it was not intercepted. Following the incident, several security officials responsible for the building’s safety were arrested and several Revolutionary Guard officers dismissed.
The Western media, including the New York Times and the UK Daily Telegraph, suggest that Mossad may have recruited Iranian agents to plant explosives in the guest house, detonating them remotely. If true, this version represents a significant security lapse in a supposedly secure area of Tehran.
However, they have not provided evidence to support this account.
The assassination, occurring as foreign diplomatic delegations attended Pezeshkian’s inauguration, seems to have been meant to deliberately undermine Iran’s security credibility. The fact that the attack happened in Tehran signals that even Iran’s most protected allies are vulnerable.
Haniyeh’s assassination has further complicated an already volatile Middle East. Beyond the immediate potential for a broader regional conflict, the event casts doubt on the prospects for a ceasefire in Gaza between Hamas and the Israeli government.
For Pezeshkian, who campaigned on promises of improving relations with the West and lifting economic sanctions to bolster the economy, the incident forces a reassessment of Iran’s strategic approach, including the consideration of military escalation.
There is growing scepticism about achieving a ceasefire before the US presidential elections in November, and there is also speculation that if Vice President Kamala Harris succeeds current President Joe Biden, she may exert pressure on the Israeli government to cease hostilities.
This suggests that the upcoming months will be particularly challenging for the region.
An Arab diplomat in London told the Weekly that the Arab countries feel they are in a difficult situation.
“US officials are pushing to divide the region into a camp supporting Iran versus a US-Israeli camp, without recognising the complexities of Arab public opinion or the sensitive political situations in many Arab countries,” he said.
According to diplomatic sources, the Arab capitals expressed their discontent with Israel following Haniyeh’s assassination, arguing that Israel’s actions might strategically benefit Iran.
This perspective aligns with Iranian officials advocating for “strategic patience.” They believe that a measured response, calculated carefully, would better serve Iran’s long-term interests, especially as the country faces internal crises and seeks to avoid a broader conflict with Israel and the US.
The current difficulty of understanding Washington’s intentions also makes a measured response wiser from Iran’s perspective.
Typically, it is safe to assume that a US administration would avoid engaging in a large-scale war in the Middle East during an election year. However, both Iranian and Arab officials have expressed that deciphering Washington’s stance has become increasingly challenging, particularly due to limited direct communication with Biden.
It has become uncommon for Biden to personally engage with many Arab leaders, an Arab diplomat remarked.
“Who is actually making decisions in Washington? Is it President Biden, or is it a circle of officials and the national security team around him? This uncertainty is alarming. We are potentially on the brink of an international conflict, and we are unsure who holds the decision-making power in Washington or whether they can restrain Israel,” he said.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 8 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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