Optics are crucial in Iranian politics.
In the days following the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran after attending the inauguration of new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, several European leaders including French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and European Council President Charles Michel reached out to Pezeshkian.
They urged him to de-escalate the situation, and the fact that some of these leaders had not contacted a sitting Iranian president for two or three years highlighted its gravity. These high-profile calls were precisely what Tehran sought, as they provide Iran with a pretext to delay its retaliation until it can carefully determine the timing and nature of its response.
The European leaders emphasised the importance of restraint. Macron urged Pezeshkian “to do everything possible to avoid a new military escalation, which would be in no one’s interest, including Iran, and which would cause lasting damage to regional stability.”
Starmer warned of “a serious risk of miscalculation” and stressed that “now is the time for calm and careful reflection.” Scholz echoed these sentiments, telling the Iranian president that the “spiral of violence in the Middle East must be broken now.”
Macron, Scholz, and Starmer also issued a joint statement on Monday endorsing efforts by Egyptian and Qatari mediators to broker an agreement to end the war on Gaza.
In response, Iran emphasised its right to defend itself against Israeli aggression, rejecting calls for restraint as “lacking political logic” and contradicting principles of international law. Pezeshkian criticised the West’s silence regarding the “unprecedented inhumane crimes” in Gaza.
But signalling that the ongoing escalation in the region would not derail his administration’s domestic agenda, he also discussed the possibility of reviving the 2015 nuclear deal during the calls. The fact that he even touched on nuclear negotiations and the possibility of reviving the talks between Iran and the international powers underscores the complex geopolitical environment in which Tehran is deciding how to retaliate against Israel for Haniyeh’s assassination.
Iran and Hizbullah have indicated that retaliation against Israel is inevitable in response to the assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran and Hizbullah’s senior military commander Fouad Shukr in Beirut. However, the timing and nature of the response are still under consideration. Even a symbolic military response inside Israel may not be necessary if Iran believes it can achieve more through a strategy of restraint.
In a speech at Shukr’s memorial service last week, Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah hinted that Iran does not need to engage in a protracted battle, suggesting that the response will be “slow, deliberate, and courageous, not emotional.” He even joked that Iran’s regional allies often say that “Tehran is cutting the enemy’s throat with cotton,” a metaphor for slow but inevitable revenge.
An Iranian reformist politician close to the new Iranian president told Al-Ahram Weekly that the absence of an Iranian response so far is not a sign of weakness. Instead, it is a strategic calculation to ensure that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not succeed in dragging the entire region into open war, he said.
“President Pezeshkian expressed his views to senior officials in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, saying that Tehran should exercise patience and carefully consider its response before taking any action,” the politician said.
“In his discussions with European leaders, Pezeshkian established Iran’s legal right to retaliate under international norms, a point that was crucial for Tehran,” he added, though noting that establishing Iran’s legal right to respond is separate from its actual response and timing.
“Tehran is not interested in merely delivering a symbolic response, but rather in achieving an end to the war in Gaza, which is the root cause of the current regional crisis,” he said.
Following extensive regional and European diplomatic efforts, it appears that Tehran is leaning towards delaying any potential retaliatory action in favour of allowing the ceasefire negotiations in Gaza, scheduled for Thursday, to play out.
Iranian diplomatic sources suggest that if a ceasefire agreement seems attainable in the coming days, Tehran is unlikely to take any escalatory steps that could jeopardise the truce or hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in Gaza.
The Iranian mission to the UN in New York also stated on Friday that “we hope that our response will be timely and implemented in a way that does not undermine the potential ceasefire.”
According to Reuters, citing two sources, Iran is considering sending a representative to the ceasefire talks, marking the first such involvement since the conflict in Gaza began. While the representatives may not attend the meetings directly, they are expected to participate in behind-the-scenes discussions to maintain a diplomatic line of communication with the US during the ongoing negotiations.
There has been no official confirmation from Washington or other mediators on whether Tehran will take part in the talks indirectly.
Iran’s delayed response to Israel has also sparked some criticism. Many in Gaza and the region are urging Tehran to launch a strong retaliatory strike against Israel, hoping that this will pressure the Israeli government to reconsider its ongoing military operations in Gaza.
Social media platforms are abuzz with calls for Tehran to uphold its principle of deterrence of Israel.
But Iran’s strategic calculations as a state differ significantly from those of Hamas as an organisation, and the difference likely stems from their distinct strategic goals and regional interests.
Hamas, as a Palestinian militant group focused on the struggle against Israel, is primarily concerned with the immediate impact on its operational capabilities, internal cohesion, and its standing among the Palestinians. A retaliatory strike would be calibrated to maintain or enhance its support base and demonstrate resilience.
Iran, as a state actor with broader regional ambitions, will view how to respond within the context of its strategic rivalry with Israel and desire to project power and influence across the Middle East. Iran’s response might be more calculated, potentially seeking to leverage the situation to further its geopolitical goals, perhaps by coordinating broader responses through its network of regional proxies rather than focusing solely on immediate retaliation.
The difference in these calculations reflects Hamas’ localised focus versus Iran’s broader strategic considerations.
Such divergences between Iran and Hamas are not new. The relationship between the Shiite state and the Sunni Palestinian resistance movement is complex and has been marked by numerous twists and turns over the years.
It is a marriage of convenience driven by common political interests. Unlike Hizbullah in Lebanon, which aligns closely with Iran both religiously and ideologically, the relationship between Iran and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine is governed primarily by a common hostility to US-Israeli hegemony in the region.
The alliance between Iran and Hamas began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Iran, following its 1979 Islamic Revolution, sought to extend its reach into the Arab world. Although Hamas is a Sunni Islamist movement and Iran is predominantly Shia in terms of religion, their common enmity towards the US and Israel forged a natural alliance.
Tehran began providing Hamas with financial aid, military training, and weapons, helping the group establish itself as a significant player in the Palestinian Territories, especially after Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections.
However, the relationship between them experienced a major test at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Hamas distanced itself from the Iranian-backed Syrian government, aligning more with the Sunni majority opposition. This decision led to a noticeable decline in the level of trust, support, and coordination between Tehran and Hamas.
During the years that followed, there were many voices in Iran calling for severing ties with Hamas and the rest of the Sunni factions that stood against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. However, the Iranian establishment maintained a thread of kinship with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movement.
By the mid-2010s, both sides had begun to repair ties. Iran resumed its support for Hamas, recognising the group’s strategic importance in its broader anti-Israel and anti-Western agenda.
In recent years, the relationship has deepened once again, driven by a common interest in countering Israel’s influence and sustaining resistance within the Palestinian Territories. Iran continues to supply Hamas with financial assistance, weaponry, and military expertise, enhancing the group’s capabilities.
Tehran’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination will be influenced by multiple factors, with Iranian national interests being paramount. Many Iranians question the rationale behind risking their country’s stability in a conflict with the US and Israel that they perceive as not directly involving Iran.
They highlight the fact that Iran is already facing significant consequences due to the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel, especially since Hamas did not inform Iran of its plans to attack Israel on 7 October last year.
This sentiment is reinforced by a strong “Iran first” approach, which prioritises national interests. These considerations will heavily influence Tehran’s response, especially under the country’s new president who has promised to heed the will of the Iranian people and avoid unplanned or risky ventures abroad.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 15 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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