The 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) for the Nile River Basin States, commonly known as the Entebbe Agreement, provides a legal framework for addressing disputes related to the use of the Nile River. Crucially, it allows upstream countries to undertake water projects on the Nile without having to notify downstream countries in advance. This puts Egypt at risk of losing essential water resources to which it had been entitled under the 1929 and 1959 Nile River agreements.
When, in May 2010, five upper riparian countries met in Entebbe, Uganda, to sign the agreement, their main political aim was to shift the balance of power in the Nile Basin away from Egypt and Sudan, by overriding previous agreements. They gave Egypt and Sudan a year to join the CFA. Naturally, Cairo and Khartoum refused to sign. Egypt’s position is based on an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling of 1989, stating that water agreements enjoy the same immutability as border agreements: they cannot be revoked or amended without the assent of all parties concerned. The upstream Nile Basin countries have argued that the agreements were concluded during the colonial era and are therefore not binding. Yet these same countries continue to abide by border agreements concluded by colonial powers.
According to its provisions, the agreement required six signatories to come into effect, so this could only happen after South Sudan gained independence. Juba signed the CFA this year. But South Sudan’s independence called the matter of the quorum into question. With the addition of another Nile Basin country, shouldn’t seven countries now be required to sign the CFA for it to come into effect, instead of the originally stated six?
Be that as it may, Egypt and Sudan are deeply concerned by the South Sudanese parliament’s ratification of the Entebbe Agreement. The speed with which this took place was quite disconcerting. It is worth recalling, in this context, how hesitant the original signatories were to ratify the agreement. It took Ethiopia and Rwanda three years to do so, ratifying it only in 2013. It took another two years for Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi to follow suit. Yet, the South Sudanese parliament took only a few months to ratify the agreement on 8 July.
To a large measure, this is probably linked to the ongoing war in northern Sudan. South Sudan has become more vulnerable to outside pressures since the oil pipelines from South Sudan to Port Sudan were damaged in the Sudanese conflict, interrupting South Sudan’s oil exports which are a major source of revenue. The pressure has been coming from Ethiopia which has long been campaigning for a redistribution of Nile waters that would deprive Sudan and Egypt of their historic shares. There is also a significant Israeli influence in South Sudan in the tourism and intelligence sectors. It is not unlikely that South Sudan’s decision related to the Entebbe Agreement aligns with Israel’s long-term desire to weaken Egypt, a country that, according to global rankings, possesses immense latent capacities due to its highly motivated human resources, which Israel might see as a threat.
How did Egypt and Sudan end up in this trap, where they risk being deprived of vital water resources because of a new agreement that could nullify their rights under previous agreements?
In 1999, Egypt came under considerable international pressure over the question of the Nile, particularly from the World Bank and the UN. At the time, Cairo did not fully appreciate the extent of the conflicting interests between the upstream countries, which are the majority, and the downstream countries, Egypt, and Sudan, and could not grasp the long-term strategic aims of those countries and their backers.
When the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was proposed in 1999, its declared aim was to develop the water resources of the Nile and generate collaborative projects among the basin countries. But instead of focusing on stated objectives, such as the 56 billion cubic metres lost every year to evaporation and transpiration in the Sudanese and Ethiopian marshes, the discussions homed in on reallocating shares to existing resources, namely the 82 billion cubic metres of water that flow through the Nile every year. These resources are the lifeblood of the peoples of the Nile Valley. Moreover, some participants pushed to exclude rain as a component of the overall resources available to Nile Basin countries. Yet, under international law, rainwater is a crucial factor in calculating countries’ quota rights to shared rivers like the Nile. In like manner, they also tried to exclude other water resources available to the Nile Basin countries.
Conflicting interests between Nile Basin countries played an important part in hampering the creation of a new, equitable framework agreement for the Nile.
Cairo and Khartoum insisted on their utilisation rights as established under the colonial era and 1959 agreements, arguing that the water security of their people depended almost exclusively on the Nile. The upstream countries countered with the notion of “equitable and reasonable” utilisation of the waters as an alternative to quantifying equitable rights or water use allocations.
Egypt and Sudan, in turn, objected to the current wording of the still unresolved Article 14(b). It states that the Nile Basin countries agree “not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin states.” Egypt and Sudan proposed an alternate wording: “not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin state.” The upstream countries rejected the proposed alternative, arguing that it established the principle of historical rights to the Nile for certain countries.
Egypt’s current position regarding the Entebbe Agreement is rather complicated. Essentially it has two options: either to sign the CFA, participate in its meetings and try to safeguard its rights; or to refuse to sign, in which case it would be vulnerable to others taking critical decisions in its absence, such as revoking its rights under historical water agreements.
I believe Egypt must change its strategic options if it is to protect its interests and wellbeing. It must develop a firm and decisive stance against international entities trying to corner it into sacrificing its artery of life under the rubric of “regional cooperation” by focusing on current uses of Nile waters (82 billion cubic metres) and ignoring the feasible prospects of capturing the 56 billion cubic metres that go to waste. As a first step, Egypt should take the initiative to design and propose regional cooperation projects to augment available Nile water resources. International powers or agencies, such as the World Bank, might be interested in financing such efforts or, if not, Egypt could draw on its experience with the High Dam and turn to Eastern powers.
Egypt must also formulate a stronger and more comprehensive position on Ethiopia and its regional ambitions, especially as relates to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia is currently in the process of the fifth unilateral filling of the GERD reservoir, effectively creating a hydrological bomb. Egypt cannot remain passive. Creating a visible and effective deterrent power in the region appears to be the way forward to safeguard the water rights of current and future generations of Egyptians and other essential rights and needs of medium-sized countries such as Egypt.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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