Iran has a new government headed by a relatively moderate new president after snap elections in July that many inside and outside Iran hope will bring change to the Islamic republic.

The elections came amidst rising tensions between Iran and Israel and the US and an economic downturn caused by sanctions that have seen the country enduring a dire shortage of supplies.

Iran’s conservative-dominated Parliament last week endorsed the new Cabinet proposed by President Masoud Pezeshkian following five days of discussions to review all his 19 nominees, who are probably not his choices.

Iran has churned through 14 governments over more than four decades, all of which have failed to end the political upheavals and economic uncertainty that have bedeviled the Islamic republic since its inception in 1979.

Whether Iranians will see changes happening over the next four years will depend largely on whether Pezeshkian’s government has the chance to exercise real power and show momentum under the country’s rigid political system.

The July elections were crucial as they came after the sudden death of former president Ebrahim Raisi in May, who was widely seen as the most likely heir to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

Raisi had been groomed for the role for decades.

Iranian pundits predicted that any replacement for the conservative Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash, would come from Khamenei and the regime’s closed clerical or political circle.

The contest, however, was distilled into a sharp choice: on the one hand, a hardliner close to the centre of power, and, on the other, the reformist Pezeshkian.

The second round of the elections between Pezeshkian and hardliner and establishment-backed Saeed Jalili, delivered a surprising outcome due to the strategically complicated combination of rival forces on Iran’s political spectrum.

Despite a low turnout that reflected opposition to the political system, Pezeshkian’s win signalled the regime’s pragmatic approach by accepting a new president who might offer the disgruntled public different views.

But his election also means that Iranians want to see changes that will alleviate the hardship of their daily lives and policy shifts that give them a sense of optimism.

Many key questions also remain unanswered, especially what the elections mean for those Iranians who voted for change and whether Pezeshkian can deliver it.

During his campaign, Pezeshkian sought to galvanise the country’s moderates by pushing back against social restrictions and promising to halt Iran’s economic slide and reengage with the West over its nuclear programme.

In pre-election debates and his inauguration speech before the Iranian Parliament, Pezeshkian did not outline specific plans or set out concrete policies for his future administration.

Instead, he made broad statements such as for the need for national consensus and cooperation between the legislature and the executive in working together to meet the challenges facing Iran.

Pezeshkian outlined the goals of his administration, promising to prioritise sustainable development, economic strength, and improved living conditions for the population.

Referring to the crippling sanctions on the country, which he described as “oppressive,” he said his government would consider normalising economic relations with the rest of the world.

He remained vague on his government’s foreign policy, though Iran remains challenged by an aggressive agenda that includes the ongoing war in Gaza and the standoff with the US over Tehran’s nuclear programme.

Among his promises, Pezeshkian expressed his commitment to safeguarding Iran’s dignity and interests on the international stage, with the backing of the Iranian people and the Supreme Leader, while trying to forge a consensus among all the political factions within the country.

He highlighted three key principles central to his foreign policy: dignity, wisdom, and expediency. He promised that “constructive engagement” with the world would be the cornerstone of his Government’s approach to foreign affairs.

To many Iranians, Pezeshkian’s remarks, much like his statements during his campaign, sounded hollow and even revealed confusions and contradictions that are likely to trouble his government over the next four years.

For those Iranians who wanted to see significant changes within the country’s government, the composition of Pezeshkian’s Cabinet will be concerning as it includes elements close to Khamenei and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who could be a cover for the conservative establishment.

Pezeshkian’s government has to grapple with major economic challenges, mostly caused by the sanctions, and address numerous longstanding issues in foreign affairs that have left Iran isolated.

One daunting task faced by his government is dealing with the embargo that has hit Iran’s vital oil exports, blocked transactions on international bank networks, and spurred inflation, which is now running at about 40 per cent.

The stringent sanctions imposed on Iran have punished the country and by extension its people. With depleting foreign reserves and a depreciating local currency, prices of imports in Iran have jumped dramatically causing widespread poverty.

The UK Financial Times newspaper reported last week that many patients and their families face ruinous costs for medical care and many people are struggling to access crucial medicines as the sanctions hit supplies, for example.

In this context, Pezeshkian’s talking points about the economy are little more than electioneering, since it is difficult to expect the sanctions to be lifted before Tehran changes its behaviour and complies with a wide range of international demands set by the US and its allies.

Pezeshkian’s win in the elections was presumed to lead to some domestic policy shifts and measures intended to alleviate the hardships of many Iranians’ lives. It had been hoped it would create some social and political space particularly for young people and women.

But this remains a daunting task, in view of the absence of concrete plans to lure ordinary Iranians to participate more in the system and in particular young people who feel let down, frustrated, and even traumatised by a system that offers little opportunity for participation.

Pezeshkian’s other pressing challenge is the foreign-policy arena, where his government need to open a new chapter in Iran’s strained regional and international relationships, now at their lowest ebb.

Both Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi have been sending mixed messages on the orientation of the new administration’s foreign policy, reflecting the opaque inner workings and decision-making processes of the Islamic republic.

In his most elaborate foreign-policy statement thus far, Araghchi told Iranian television on Saturday that “the overarching approach of the 14th administration’s foreign policy reflects a nuanced balance between continuity and transformation.”

The president himself suggested in another statement that “the world needs to seize this unparalleled opportunity for addressing regional and global issues through collaboration with a powerful, peace-seeking, and dignified Iran.”

By analysing this discourse through the lens of the Islamic republic’s ideology and foreign policies it is possible to gain a better understanding of the approach Pezeshkian’s government will take in shaping Iran’s foreign policy over the next four years.

The new president will perhaps not share his predecessor’s visceral animosity towards the West, nor his obsession with notoriously hardline regional policies. However, he will certainly adhere to the Supreme Leader’s guidance and stances.

Two main issues will face Pezeshkian’s foreign-policy planning, in which he should demonstrate positive engagement and not mere rhetoric: Iran’s strained relations with the West including over its nuclear activities, and Tehran’s regional agenda, especially its support for the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel.

However, the waters remain as muddy as they have for decades. A strategic shift will only come if the establishment led by Khamenei sees in Pezeshkian an opportunity for reorientation.

This will depend on the outcome of the war in Gaza and whether Western governments and regional powerhouses have the appetite to mend fences with Iran.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 29 August, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly