Awaiting the strike

Manal Lotfy , Sunday 20 Oct 2024

Debates over Iran’s Nuclear Hedging Strategy complicate Israel’s next move.

Awaiting the strike

 

Anticipation is rife over how and when Israel will strike Iran in retaliation for the missile attack that hit Israel two weeks ago, intended to avenge the assassination of leading figures of Hizbullah and Hamas. Several narratives in the Israeli, Iranian, and American press have accounted for the “delay” that both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Minister of Defence Yoav Gallant said was definitely coming.

Most reports focused on differences between Tel Aviv and Washington over the potential list of Israeli targets in Iran and the calculations of a possible Iranian reaction. Even with two weeks gone since the strikes, and despite robust military backing from the US — including the recent deployment of the sophisticated THAAD missile defence system and 100 American troops to Israel — Netanyahu’s government is still deliberating its course of action.

The anticipated Israeli strike and its consequences will probably have a direct impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Israel’s far-right government aims to position these strikes within its broader strategy to permanently weaken Iran and its allies. Some of the most hardline figures in Israel view this moment as an opportunity to hit hard and are advocating direct attacks on Iran’s nuclear and oil infrastructure. This stance, however, has sparked tensions with the administration of US President Joe Biden.

Biden cautioned Netanyahu that targeting Iranian oil facilities would raise oil prices on the global market, negatively impacting the Democratic Party, especially with US elections on the horizon. Biden also opposed strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, warning that such actions could open a Pandora’s box across the region.

Washington’s concerns were amplified after consultations with regional allies, including those from the Gulf states, who opposed attacking Iranian oil or nuclear facilities, fearing it could ignite widespread conflict. Gulf officials expressed concerns that Iran might retaliate against American military assets in the Gulf or even target oil and economic interests in the region, particularly if Tehran suspects that Israeli or US aircraft used their airspace to strike Iranian facilities.

In this intricate web of alliances and hostilities, every decision carries profound consequences, influencing everything from the US’ standing in the region and global energy markets to the ongoing wars in Gaza and Lebanon and what Middle East will emerge after the guns fall silent.

The complex calculations surrounding the choice of targets within Iran and the political message of this response have forced Israel to take its time. A day after The Washington Post reported that Netanyahu had informed Biden in their first call in over seven weeks that Israel would strike Iranian military — not nuclear or oil — targets, Israeli officials on Tuesday (15 October) declined to confirm or deny this report.

They emphasised that the Israeli decision to strike would be made by Netanyahu and Gallant along with Israeli army Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi. The Israeli cabinet was only being briefed on the general plan.

Meanwhile, former deputy prime minister and leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu Party, Avigdor Lieberman, argued that the Israeli strike should be forceful and include attacks on Iran’s oil and nuclear facilities. He also advocated for the occupation of southern Lebanon, a stance supported by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

This raises concerns about an escalation, particularly given that, since the start of Israel’s genocidal war against the Palestinians last October, Netanyahu has consistently leaned towards the hardline options. American reports suggesting that any attack would be limited to Iranian military targets may therefore not fully reflect Netanyahu’s true intentions once he decides to respond to the Iranian missile strikes.

Yet, even if Israel’s strike is restricted to military sites within Iran, that doesn’t necessarily imply restraint regarding further escalation. Netanyahu has vowed to dismantle Hizbullah, Iran’s most significant ally in the Axis of Resistance. However, this is a far from simple task, as neutralising Hizbullah probably requires Israeli ground operations — a high-risk strategy given the formidable combat capabilities of Hizbullah fighters and the challenging terrain in which they are accustomed to operating.

Tehran, in turn, will not remain passive if Israel attempts to eliminate Hizbullah. In recent days, two senior Iranian officials — Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohamed-Bagher Ghalibaf — visited Lebanon to reaffirm Iran’s support for both the country and Hizbullah. Ghalibaf toured Beirut’s southern suburbs, inspecting the damage caused by Israeli strikes, and stated that Tehran will assist in rebuilding once the conflict ends.

Meanwhile, Hizbullah continues to provide relief to those affected by the conflict, distributing financial, food and medical aid through its social and relief networks, signalling that its structures remain intact despite the heavy blows it has endured in recent weeks.

In addition to his recent visits to Doha, Baghdad, Riyadh and Beirut, the Iranian foreign minister is expected to travel to Cairo soon to coordinate a regional initiative aimed at curbing violence in Gaza and Lebanon and preventing the situation from spiralling out of control.

Iranian officials believe that regional coordination is now more crucial than ever, given Israel’s declared plan to assert dominance in the Middle East and revive the Greater Israel project. This vision, they argue, entails dissolving the Palestinian issue, the annexation of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, and displacing millions of Palestinians to neighbouring countries and beyond.

Iranian sources also stated they have secured guarantees from the Gulf states that their airspace will not be used for any future Israeli strikes on Iran. However, Tehran recognises that the region is facing unprecedented challenges and could be on the verge of significant change, prompting a reassessment of its national security strategy.

Iran’s national security strategy focuses on several key elements shaped by both domestic and regional considerations. Since the 1979 Revolution, a consistent pillar of this strategy has been the doctrine of asymmetric warfare to counter its military disadvantages relative to the US, Israel, and regional powers. This approach includes reliance on missile technology, drones and regional allies such as Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and other groups in Iraq and Syria to influence events across the Middle East while avoiding direct confrontation. Iran’s cyber capabilities and focus on grey-zone tactics have also gained importance. However, perhaps the most crucial element in Iran’s national security arsenal is nuclear hedging.

Nuclear hedging is a strategy employed by some nations to keep the option of developing nuclear weapons open without fully committing to a nuclear weapons programme. This allows countries to be prepared for potential future threats while avoiding the immediate political, economic and security consequences of becoming a state with nuclear weapons. While Tehran has not openly pursued nuclear weapons, it continues to advance its nuclear program in a way that preserves the option to do so. This creates a deterrent without fully violating international agreements, enabling Tehran to manage international sanctions and avoid provoking military strikes while maintaining strategic flexibility.

Despite this, the debate over nuclear weapons has recently become more public in Iran as existential threats loom larger. A divide has emerged between moderates and hardliners on the wisdom of developing them. The core of this debate is the balance between the advantages of nuclear deterrence and the risks of increased isolation, deeper economic sanctions, and potential military confrontations with powerful adversaries like the US and Israel.

Moderate politicians argue that nuclear hedging remains the best approach to safeguard Iran’s comprehensive national security. Figures such as Iran’s Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, former president Hassan Rouhani, and strategic advisor to the Iranian president Mohammad Javad Zarif maintain that the current regional and international environment is not conducive to acquiring nuclear weapons.

They fear it could lead to pre-emptive military strikes, greater economic sanctions, and deeper isolation, while also undermining Iran’s improving relations with Gulf states and potentially triggering a regional nuclear arms race. These moderates advocate for keeping Iran’s nuclear programme peaceful.

Even among Iranian hardliners, there are those, such as former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, who support the nuclear hedging strategy. They argue that Iran should maintain the capability to develop nuclear weapons without actually doing so, thus preserving a deterrent without provoking international retaliation.

However, other hardliners and Revolutionary Guard members push for the outright development of nuclear weapons, citing existential threats from the US and Israel. Figures like Hossein Salami, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, have spoken of the need for stronger deterrents, especially after the assassination of IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Some clerics in Qom also support this view, seeing nuclear weapons as a legitimate means to defend Iran against Western dominance.

The debate has reached the Iranian parliament, where hardline politicians like MP Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani have suggested that Iran may already possess nuclear weapons or is on the verge of acquiring them. They argue that nuclear deterrence is essential for Iran to counter its adversaries and ensure the regime’s survival.

Although Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa in the early 2000s casting religious objection to developing nuclear weapons, Iran continues to develop its nuclear capabilities under his leadership. Khamenei supports nuclear hedging, keeping the option of weaponisation open without necessarily crossing that threshold, which allows Iran to benefit from deterrence and avoid direct conflict.

The US has used Iran’s nuclear hedging to pressure Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, as such an attack would give Tehran both the justification and incentive to pursue nuclear weapons openly. Iranian officials have warned that if Israel targets any of its nuclear sites, Iran will likely cross the nuclear threshold.

They further argue that Israel, even with US support, cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear programme, as it is deeply protected underground and spread across dozens, if not hundreds, of sites throughout Iran’s vast and difficult terrain.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 17 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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