Iran is anxiously awaiting Israel’s expected response to the attacks within its borders earlier this month, which were in retaliation for the killings of Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

The longer the Israeli response is delayed, the more Tehran grows uneasy about the scope and scale of Israel’s potential strikes.

The regime knows it must tread carefully to avoid significant damage, not just from Israel’s military response, but also from the shifting dynamics of the region. The setbacks suffered by its allies in Lebanon and Gaza have placed Tehran in an unprecedented predicament, facing simultaneous crises across multiple fronts.

Meanwhile, its allies in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq are also feeling the pressure of increased Israeli and US strikes. The strategy seems clear: Israel and the US are aiming to push Tehran into a corner, forcing the regime to either alter its regional policies or risk collapse.

Tehran did not expect the Hamas 7 October attacks on Israel to spark such a chain of events, nor did it foresee being drawn into a direct confrontation with Israel, which could pull the US into the conflict, something Iran has been desperate to avoid.

In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has launched a diplomatic campaign across the Middle East, urging countries to prevent the conflict from escalating into a wider regional war.

Araghchi has emphasised that the 11 countries he has visited so far have assured Tehran that they will not permit their airspace to be used for strikes against Iran, will not help or support the Israeli attack in any way, and will work to de-escalate and stop the war in Gaza and Lebanon.

But as tensions grow, many states are choosing neutrality. Worse, unresolved political and territorial disputes between Iran and its neighbours, like the UAE and Bahrain, are resurfacing, further complicating efforts to form a united regional front.

A statement by Jassim Al-Budaiwi, secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), on Monday condemned remarks made by Kamal Kharrazi, chairman of Iran’s Strategic Council for Foreign Relations.

Kharrazi had asserted Iranian sovereignty over the disputed Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa Islands, which are claimed by both Iran and the UAE. He also questioned Bahrain’s independence in 1970, referring to it as a “separation from its motherland, Iran,” and casting doubt on the legitimacy of the referendum that confirmed Bahrain’s Arab identity.

The GCC swiftly denounced these comments as “irresponsible” and emphasised the solidarity of its member states with the UAE and Bahrain, stressing that such remarks do nothing to strengthen relations between the Gulf and Iran.

Similarly, Lebanon’s caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, criticised Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf for “blatant interference” after he suggested Iran could negotiate with France over a UN resolution regarding Southern Lebanon.

This diplomatic tension underscores the challenges Iran faces in trying to unite the region behind a ceasefire plan for Gaza and Lebanon.

The timing, scope, and targets of Israel’s anticipated strikes on Iran remain unknown, but one thing is clear: these actions will signal to Tehran that the Middle East has changed dramatically since 7 October last year.

Gulf commentators suggest that while many regional countries may quietly support efforts to weaken Iran’s influence, they are not in favour of regime change. Toppling the Iranian government is seen as too risky, potentially leading to chaos that could spread across borders, particularly given Iran’s size and complexity.

While there is broad regional and international agreement that any Israeli response to Iran should be proportional and focused on military targets, this will offer little reassurance to Tehran in a geopolitical climate marked by dramatic shifts and uncertainty.

In a recent joint statement, the G7 group urged Iran to “refrain from providing support to Hamas, Hizbullah, the Houthis, and other non-governmental actors” to prevent further destabilisation and escalation in the region.

European diplomats have also sent clear messages to Tehran, linking progress in nuclear negotiations and the lifting of economic sanctions to changes in Iran’s regional behaviour.

One European diplomatic source told Al-Ahram Weekly that “we are eager to resume the nuclear deal, lift economic sanctions, and improve relations, but this depends on Tehran’s behaviour. Support for militias and non-state groups has had devastating effects on the region. If Tehran stops this support, we can test the chances of resolving the accumulated crises through a political process that includes negotiations for a two-state solution.”

He said that Europe and Washington have no intention of forcibly toppling the Iranian regime, recognising the disastrous consequences such an action could have for the region and potentially the world.

Attempting to destabilise the regime could drive Iran towards more radical measures, including the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and would likely provoke intervention from Russia and China. Additionally, many regional powers do not support regime change by force, as they recognise that such a scenario could threaten their own stability.

The prevailing sentiment is that if Tehran does not soon alter its support for the “Axis of Resistance,” it will face an organised campaign of increased sanctions, economic isolation, and internal destabilisation. This could exacerbate Iran’s domestic crises, fuel social unrest, and embolden ethnic and religious minorities.

At the same time, its allies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen may face intensified military strikes, further weakening Iran’s regional influence.

Israel’s anticipated response to Iran remains shrouded in uncertainty. Even the US claims to be unsure of the specifics, though some believe this might be a strategic distancing from the nature of the impending Israeli actions.

US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin struck an ambiguous note on Monday, stating that “it’s difficult to predict what an Israeli strike on Iran will look like, or how Tehran might respond. Ultimately, this is Israel’s decision.”

He also revealed that the US THAAD missile-defence system is now operational in Israel.

Leaked intelligence documents related to US assessments of Israeli plans for an Iran strike have surfaced, although they do not disclose specific targets. They do, however, indicate Israel’s preparation for significant strikes using advanced missile systems such as the long-range Rocks and the Blue Sparrow.

These weapons are designed to target underground facilities from outside Iran’s airspace, reducing the need for Israeli aircraft to fly over regional countries like Jordan. While there are no signs of Israel preparing to activate its nuclear deterrent, the scale and intensity of the planned strikes suggest that they will be substantial.

Against the backdrop of Israel’s military preparations, Tehran finds itself in a precarious position. In the US and Israel, hardline factions view this as an opportune moment to deal a heavy blow to Iran. Their goal is to weaken the regime from within, pressuring it into a fundamental shift in its policies or even to force a change in leadership.

Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has positioned itself as the leader of the resistance to US and Israeli hegemony in the region, but now it faces an existential decision: adapt to survive or risk collapse.

This is a pivotal moment for Iran, as the region teeters on the brink of its most dangerous transformation since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Within Iranian political circles, especially among reformists, there is increasing advocacy for pragmatic thinking and measured responses.

Some urge Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards to recognise that the stakes are not just political or military but also concern the future of a nation of nearly 100 million people, many of whom have grown weary of endless regional crises.

Many Iranians, especially young people, question Iran’s involvement in the conflicts in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, asking why Iranian resources are being funnelled into these wars instead of being used by the Iranian people.

Iran’s leaders are also aware that threatening regional countries if they help the US or allow their airspace to be used in an attack on Iran is not a viable strategy. Such a move would isolate Tehran, trigger direct US intervention, and give the Gulf states and Western powers further justification to target Iran.

The regime knows that its options are shrinking, and it faces immense pressure to adapt.

Some within Iran now hint that Hizbullah may soon be forced to make strategic adjustments to preserve its political and ideological existence. Similarly, they argue, Iran itself must reassess its position.

While no reformist openly advocates abandoning the Axis of Resistance, they argue that Iran must carefully navigate the regional storm, normalise relations with the West, resume the nuclear agreement, get the sanctions lifted, and improve its relationships in the region.

Even conservative factions in Iran are beginning to acknowledge that Tehran’s regional strategies, unchanged since the 1980s, need to evolve to reflect the dramatic shifts in the geopolitical landscape.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 October, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly