Israel’s Security Cabinet voted to approve a Lebanon ceasefire agreement on Tuesday. The deal is expected to come into effect on Wednesday.

It is one thing for international mediators — essentially the US and Europe — to propose a ceasefire for Israel’s war on Lebanon, and another thing for the ceasefire to hold.

This, in essence, is the assessment of diplomats and analysts who were closely following Washington’s and Paris’ push to secure a ceasefire which is endorsed both by the outgoing Biden administration and incoming US President Donald Trump.

The deal is “the result of the guarantees being offered by the US, including the Trump team, and key European capitals, especially Paris,” said an informed regional diplomatic source.

According to the source, a “separate guarantees” format is the only way to get around crucial questions, not least the persistent Israeli demand that any ceasefire deal not preclude the right of Israel to act upon its own intelligence information against Hizbullah targets that it might perceive as a threat.

Several sources agree. Much of the negotiations, they say, focused on finding ways to accommodate the Israeli demand for “freedom of action against all possible threats” without having to share intelligence information on the alleged threat with the government of Lebanon, UNIFIL, or whatever monitoring mechanism will be established to observe the commitment of “both sides” to the deal.

Clearly, they say, this is not something that the Lebanese government, no matter how reconciliatory, would agree to, and certainly not Hizbullah.

According to one of these sources, the line being discussed on Monday morning was of a possible ceasefire deal stipulating the right of both “Lebanon and Israel” to take necessary measures to defend their security.

It was not immediately clear whether this line had proved acceptable to Hizbullah, though sources say the reference to “Lebanon” rather than “the Lebanese government” might have made it more palatable, certainly more than a “both sides” formulation which would have directly referred to Israel and Hizbullah.

One European diplomatic source in Cairo said that Hizbullah’s ally Iran is encouraging leaders of the resistance group to not object to the line given that on paper it is the Lebanese army that will be deployed south of the Litani River.

The Israeli meeting took place on Tuesday, amid criticism of the deal from right-wing politicians and cabinet members, to give a final say on the draft negotiated separately with Lebanon and Israel.

There have been reports in the Israeli press that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had in principle agreed to the “essentials of the deal”, including the full withdrawal of Israeli troops from south Lebanon without the creation of a buffer zone, the deployment of the Lebanese army in the designated area, the establishment of a monitoring mechanism with troops on the ground in southern Lebanon, the withdrawal of Hizbullah operatives north of the Litani River, a full suspension of hostilities between the two sides, and the right of civilians from villages in southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut to return to their homes.

Sources explain that there will be no joint signing of the deal by Israeli and Lebanese government officials. Instead, the deal will be signed separately between the US and each of the governments. And while the text of the deal will be identical, the text of the letters of guarantees will not.

According to the regional diplomatic source, this is a deal Netanyahu can accept because he can claim victory. He will say that Hizbullah has been forced from its southern Lebanese stronghold, its leaders have been eliminated, and Israelis will be able to return to their homes in the north.

The source added that it is also important to remember that this is not a final agreement but a 60-day truce during which a final deal will be negotiated and “maybe agreed on”. Otherwise, he explained, work will focus on extending the truce.

Rabha Allam, an expert on Lebanese affairs at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, cautions that the situation remains hugely complex.

“The question is whether the ceasefire is sustainable,” she says.

Allam argues that the negotiated 60-day truce fails to close down the possibility of violations, warning that the language of truce does not prevent Israel from acting against what it might claim to be a possible attack on its troops during the timeframe stipulated for the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon.

Nor, she says, is it clear how the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the deployment of the Lebanese army will be synchronised so that unintentional clashes are avoided.

This week, UNIFIL said that it is “seriously concerned” by strikes against the Lebanese army inside Lebanese territory despite the declared position of the Lebanese army that is not involved in ongoing hostilities between Israel and Hizbullah.

Allam also notes that it is not clear what will happen should the Israeli army — during or after the withdrawal of its troops — decide to act, under the claim of self-defence —against Lebanese civilians that Israel says are Hizbullah operatives who have returned to their villages.

And what, she asks, will be the reaction of the Lebanese army should Hizbullah decide to use any of its underground installations which have not been destroyed by Israel.

There are multiple ways violations and counter violations of the text of the truce might occur, she warns.

In Rome, on Monday and Tuesday, the foreign ministers of the G7 were scheduled to discuss ways to promote a ceasefire. The foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia were scheduled to join their G7 counterparts for deliberations on Lebanon and Gaza.

According to an informed Egyptian source, while Cairo expects a deal on Lebanon to emerge before Biden leaves the White House, Gaza is a different story.

“Netanyahu may well end up signing a Lebanon deal, but it is an open question whether or not he abides by it. It all depends on his internal political calculations and the level of pressure Trump puts on him, even before his inauguration,” said the source.

“Gaza is a different story. It seems that Netanyahu has already convinced the Trump foreign policy team that Israel will not be leaving Gaza anytime soon. Judging by the military installations the Israelis are building in Gaza, it is clear they are planning to maintain a military presence for a year, maybe more.”

The source added that things might change if Trump decides to put more pressure on Netanyahu after he enters the White House. He argued that a possible factor that might influence Trump’s position is the recent arrest warrant issued by the ICC against Netanyahu and his sacked minister of defence Yoav Gallant.

 “We are trying to keep the parties engaged on Gaza and channels open,” he said. “But for now Lebanon is the priority that [Washington is] working on”.

The Israeli war on Gaza started on 7 October 2023 in response to a Hamas attack on Israel. On 8 October 2023, Hizbullah began firing rockets into northern Israel in solidarity with Hamas. Up until Monday morning, when American, French and UN officials were suggesting that a truce on the Lebanese front was in the offing, attacks and counterattacks between the Israeli army and Hizbullah were ongoing.

“We will see if this truce holds up. It is an open question for now,” said Allam.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 28 November, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly