Turkey has recently reiterated its support for the Syrian opposition, stressing the need for its own inclusion in forthcoming arrangements. However, not everything may go according to plan, especially after the Syrian army handed over the areas of Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah and Qamishli in northeastern Syria to the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on 6 and 7 December. Ankara views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it designates a terrorist organisation.

Ankara had made little secret of its support for the Operation Deterrence of Aggression launched by Turkish-backed Syrian insurgent forces on 27 November. Turkish officials delayed issuing an official response for nearly two days as the forces swept into Aleppo and made rapid advances elsewhere. The first official statement, released on 29 November, did not explicitly condemn the offensive that had disrupted a relatively stable ceasefire in place in the northwestern Idlib province since 2020. Before this, Turkey sent in military reinforcements to the “Euphrates Shield” area in northern Aleppo governorate, which is occupied by Turkish forces and factions of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army.

More tellingly, on 26 November — the eve of the offensive — Turkey sent trucks full of heavy weapons along with tanks and armoured vehicles into the so-called Putin-Erdogan de-escalation zone, which had been established under the 2020 ceasefire agreement, deploying them close to the line of contact with the area controlled by the Syrian Army.

Diplomatically, Turkey appears to have broken with the approach adopted by its partners in the Astana process, Russia and Iran. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had decided to intensify pressure on his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Al-Assad, asserting, as the insurgents’ military operation was in motion, that the time had come for the Syrian regime to engage with the people to reach a comprehensive political solution.

Ankara has indicated that it is currently working to generate a climate conducive to dialogue involving that Syrian opposition described by Turkish officials as having enough influence in Syrian society to contribute to the success of a national reconciliation process.

Also in this vein, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) called for the formation of an interim Syrian government that would include representatives of the opposition. Ankara has long felt that Al-Assad’s backers, Moscow and Tehran, have attempted to use the Astana process to sideline or eliminate the opposition and regain control of “liberated” territories, instead of responding to the opposition’s legitimate demands.

Ankara believes it has much to gain from Al-Assad’s downfall. Undoubtedly it calculates that the rapid triumphs of Turkish-backed forces will change the balance on the ground in favour of the Turkish presence in Syria in the next phase, while reducing the influence of Tehran and Russia. The latter had recently attempted to build up pressure on Turkey in Syria in relation to the reconciliation process that had been underway for months between Ankara and Damascus. Erdogan felt that Moscow was not doing enough to persuade Al-Assad to meet with him on his terms, instead of insisting on the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria as a precondition. To make matters worse, the Russian envoy to Syria openly described the Turkish military presence in northern Syria as an occupation.

Turkey bided its time, aware of Moscow’s preoccupation with Ukraine as it watched for how Israeli strikes on Iran, its proxies in Syria and Hizbullah in Southern Lebanon would play out. Then, at last, when Israel had softened the Syrian field sufficiently, Ankara leaped at the opportunity to step in and manage the complex Syrian question in its own way and in accordance with its interests.

One of Turkey’s most pressing concerns at present is to pave the way for the repatriation of the millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The rebel forces’ success in seizing control of Idlib, Aleppo and Hama have boosted Erdogan’s hopes in this regard. The Syrian refugees and the resulting, extra strains on the economy have been a hot button electoral issue for several years, and the Turkish opposition laid it at the feet of the Erdogan government and its Syrian policies.

Turkey also expects that the new situation on the ground in Syria will change the military balances with respect to the SDF in northeastern Syria. Ankara therefore green-lighted a second offensive by the Turkish-backed forces on 30 November. Operation Dawn of Freedom, as it was called, aimed to eliminate SDF forces in the areas of Tel Rifaat and Manbij.

In backing the military offences that have led to Al-Assad’s fall, Turkey has strengthened its position as a key player in Syria. It will now try to leverage the gains that Turkish-backed forces have achieved on the ground to redraw the Syrian map in favour of those forces and against the Kurdish forces. It will then push for imposing de facto realities that work in favour of Turkish interests in Syria before the Trump administration takes office in Washington. Much of course depends on the extent to which Iranian and Russian influence have been reduced in Syria. Meanwhile, back in Turkey, Erdogan will be able to boast a victory in Syria and perhaps counter the major advances that Turkish opposition parties have been showing in recent public opinion polls.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 December, 2024 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly