It seems that reaching a prisoner-exchange deal and a ceasefire in Gaza is closer to being accomplished this time round than at any other time.
However, the core terms of this deal do not differ much from those presented in previous attempts, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sabotaged by fabricating reasons to prevent their success, as noted by Israeli critics familiar with the negotiations. It appears that incoming US President Donald Trump’s threats to ensure a deal was finalised before he assumed office were the primary and direct reason for Netanyahu’s approval of it this time round.
The deal comes against the backdrop of significant events in Palestine, creating future implications that cannot be ignored. Its implementation will unfold under Trump’s presidency, during which he has plans and objectives for the region that may shed light on how the deal will progress in the coming days. Furthermore, these developments are part of broader regional changes that are likely to influence the outcomes of the deal.
Perhaps the most immediate achievement of the deal is the cessation of the bloodshed in Gaza that has persisted for over 15 months amid international silence, ignoring the racism and brutality of this crime. Without the deal, the suffering of more than two million Palestinians, whose lives, safety, and dreams have been continuously and brutally violated, would have remained unaddressed. The announced terms of the deal suggest that the Israeli Occupation has failed to achieve the objectives it set for the war it has waged on Gaza since 8 October 2023.
The declared goals of the war, frequently emphasised by Netanyahu and other Israeli officials, were to defeat Hamas, retrieve the captives in Gaza by force, and ensure Israel’s security control over Gaza after the war. However, the deal speaks of an exchange process, as Hamas has demanded since the beginning of the conflict. Although Hamas initially called for “emptying the prisons,” meaning releasing all Palestinians from Israeli detention, the current deal seems to fall short of this demand. It outlines a phased exchange of Israeli captives in Gaza in three stages in return for Palestinian prisoners, including individuals Netanyahu and other occupation leaders previously refused to release.
In the deal, Hamas has avoided loopholes from past agreements that enabled the re-arrest of released Palestinian prisoners, a practice known as the “revolving door.” However, a major shortcoming of the deal is that some released Palestinian prisoners will be denied the right to live in their homeland.
Meanwhile, the Israeli military has failed to eliminate Hamas’ military capabilities. Its fighters continue to launch rockets from Gaza, inflicting dozens of casualties among the occupiers daily. Israeli estimates are conflicted over the extent of the damage to Hamas’ military strength, and it is difficult to make definitive assessments, particularly given the Israeli Army’s admission of its inability to locate all the tunnels in Gaza, which have proven to be more complex than anticipated.
Hamas’ military operations against the Israeli forces in Gaza have persisted until the very last moment. The Israeli Occupation leaders believe that the resistance factions in Gaza are continuing to renew their forces and capabilities. According to the terms of the deal, the occupation authorities have also failed to maintain a security control approach to post-war Gaza.
Despite the Israeli military’s repeated claims of its intention to retain control of the Netzarim Corridor, which has been expanded and fortified, and the Salaheddin Strip (the “Philadelphi Corridor) separating Palestine from Egypt – an area Netanyahu refused to withdraw from in the previous deal – the current agreement emphasises a gradual withdrawal from both Netzarim and Philadelphi back to the borders of the Gaza Strip. It also permits displaced residents to return to their homes in northern Gaza.
Thus, the Israeli approach of maintaining control over parts of the Gaza Strip has been removed from the current deal. However, it must be noted that its maritime, aerial, and border controls still represent forms of occupation and dominance.
US PRESSURE: It is no secret that Trump pressured Netanyahu to finalise the current deal. Media reports in Israeli outlets have revealed that between Saturday last week and Monday this week Netanyahu faced intense pressure from Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff.
Although Trump seems to be aiding Netanyahu in extricating himself from the Gaza quagmire and thus saving face, his actions align with his own broader goals. Trump did not hide his desire to end the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine either before or after his election victory, consistent with his aims to reduce tensions, withdraw from global hotspots, and prioritise economic deals and financial gains, objectives he hopes might earn him a Nobel Peace Prize.
However, Trump’s steadfast support for the Israeli Occupation is also notable, based on his unprecedented policies during his last term in office in favour of Israel. Trump has broadly supported the Israeli war on Gaza, encouraging Netanyahu to expedite the accomplishment of his objectives. He has also stood firm against anti-war demonstrations in the US. A year or so after the war broke out, Netanyahu had been unable to achieve these aims, now looking distant in the face of the ongoing attrition.
Every day, Israel loses more soldiers and more captives in the Gaza Strip, in addition to its economic losses. The internal situation in Israel is also unravelling, characterised by deepening divides between political factions and rising street protests. With the crimes against Gaza continuing in the name of the occupation, the international reputation of the Israeli government diminishes day by day.
From Trump’s perspective, freeing the remaining captives in Gaza and ending Israel’s continuous human, economic, and international drain could be seen as serving Israel’s interests.
From a regional perspective, Trump may be relying on political pathways to secure victories for Israel following the military failures. This might become apparent after the current deal’s completion. Trump hinted at this approach after sharing a video of US academic Jeffrey Sachs warning against being dragged into fulfilling Netanyahu’s and Israel’s objectives of waging war with Iran.
Sachs also highlighted the broader issue of Israel’s grip on US foreign policy, as previously discussed in US academics Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer’s book The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. However, Trump was likely focusing on avoiding Netanyahu’s bloody tendencies to escalate wars in the region.
Trump recognises that the Middle East today is not the same as it was in 2020. The aftermath of the Gaza war has shaken the balance of power and deterrence in the region in favour of Israel, particularly with the fragmentation of Iran’s axis and its wavering positions following Hizbullah’s losses in Lebanon and the fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria.
Such dramatic developments in the region cannot be ignored. The ceasefire with Lebanon, which appears to be unilateral on Lebanon’s side, continues to see Israel violating Lebanese sovereignty. Similarly, Israel continues to encroach upon Syrian sovereignty, occupying more of its land without response amid significant internal turmoil.
These circumstances support US and Western security and political plans that favour Israel in the region. Developments in Lebanon may offer insights into these shifts. After the ceasefire with Hizbullah, Lebanon elected and appointed a new president and prime minister, both of whose visions clash with Hizbullah’s, particularly regarding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the withdrawal of Hizbullah forces to the north of the Litani River and the restriction of weapons to the official state framework.
Although Lebanon’s internal political landscape is still evolving after the war, the Western powers are banking on dismantling Hizbullah’s military strength, especially following the fall of the Al-Assad regime and Iran’s withdrawal from Syria. This could serve as a political model for what is being plotted for Gaza, evident in the insistence on excluding Hamas from governance post-war and drying up its resources in a similar way to the approach taken with Hizbullah.
The third phase of the Gaza deal, designated for reconstruction, might jeopardise Gaza’s future, with conditions tied to the governance system and its affiliations. Trump could link the developments in the Gaza deal to Israel’s diplomatic normalisation with Saudi Arabia. The latter has called for an end to the Gaza war and has linked normalisation to progress towards establishing a Palestinian state. Trump may leverage the Gaza deal and humanitarian relief efforts to achieve a normalisation agreement.
These efforts might also assist Trump in advancing his stance towards Iran, as he has already declared his intention to sign an agreement limiting Iran’s regional influence and military nuclear activity while avoiding war. Nevertheless, the will of other nations and their peoples remains the decisive factor in shaping policies and decisions. In Palestine, it is evident that unity and a shared national decision to confront the challenges and conspiracies against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank alike are the only viable paths forward.
In Lebanon, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has emphasised that an agreement with Hizbullah to establish a political course acceptable to all Lebanese is essential for managing the country’s affairs. While it is still too early to predict the outcome, Lebanon’s unity is particularly crucial now for overcoming its crises.
In Saudi Arabia, while interests with the US remain significant, they are not being pursued at any cost. The Saudis opted for reconciliation with Iran through Chinese mediation in 2023, and they are no longer interested in joining the US in pressuring Iran, especially given the pragmatism of their policies, the relative decline of US influence, and the erosion of collaboration with Israel to counter Iran.
The priority has shifted towards fostering cooperation and peace with all regional countries to achieve Saudi Arabia’s economic ambitions. Adopting justice for the Palestinian cause could serve as an additional tool for the country to solidify its leadership position in the region.
The writer is a professor of political science and international relations at the Arab-American University in Palestine.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 January, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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