Newly appointed Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has just formed his first government under President Joseph Aoun, defying predictions that he would either throw in the towel or become bogged down in endless haggling.
The non-partisan technocratic government, as it has been described, was formed in just under a month, in consultation with different parliamentary blocs. However, its members are not aligned with them, are not MPs, and are not allowed to run in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Salam, who had served as president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) until this year, has succeeded where others had failed. He has managed to strike a balance that has ensured that no faction has control of one-third of the seats in the government, giving it effective veto power, an advantage Hizbullah and its allies enjoyed in previous Lebanese governments.
At the same time, he has avoided antagonising Hizbullah, consulting with it as he did with other parties and factions, but ultimately imposing his own terms.
Salam’s nomination as prime minister gained the required support of at least two-thirds of Lebanon’s 128-member parliament. The opposition had initially planned to back another alternative to former prime minister Najib Mikati, whose term Hizbullah hoped would be renewed.
However, the pro-change bloc convinced the opposition to support the former ICJ judge instead, because of his international prestige and other factors that made him a stronger candidate. The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), a Hizbullah ally, cast the decisive votes in favour of Salam, hoping to secure a place in the new government, although that hope was not fulfilled.
While Hizbullah was stung by the defeat of its preferred candidate, Salam took pains to include it and Lebanon’s other large Shia Party, the Amal Movement, in his consultations to ensure that his government would have strong Shia support in parliament.
However, when negotiations stalled with the predominantly Maronite FPM, he turned to the Lebanese Forces (LF) instead, thereby strengthening the government’s support among Christian MPs. The LF is the largest Christian parliamentary bloc.
Salam stipulated a set of principles for forming a government when accepting the appointment as prime minister. He has insisted that ministerial candidates have extensive experience and expertise and upstanding reputations. In addition to preventing any bloc or faction from holding a “blocking” one-third of cabinet seats, he introduced a principle of portfolio so that no faction can monopolise key ministries.
He managed to bring Amal and Hizbullah around to his position during his talks with them. They insisted on retaining the Finance Ministry as part of the Shia quota of government posts, and Salam found it impossible to budge them even though finance ministers affiliated with the Amal-Hizbullah camp do not have great records of achievement.
Major government decisions in Lebanon require three signatures – from the Maronite Christian president, the Sunni Muslim prime minister, and the finance minister who approves the necessary spending.
The Amal and Hizbullah leaders argued that a Shia-affiliated head of the Finance Ministry would ensure effective Shia participation in the government and an equitable balance between Lebanon’s three main sects. Salam agreed to appoint the Amal-affiliated Yassin Jaber as finance minister.
The Salam government consists of 24 ministers, including five women. The president controls the ministries of defence, telecommunications, and information, and the prime minister controls nine portfolios: deputy prime minister and the ministries of tourism, culture, interior, education, economy, social affairs, and administrative development.
The heads of these ministries have been distributed across the main religious denominations. The same applies to the remaining 12 portfolios, whose heads were nominated by the parliamentary blocs.
The Lebanese forces, Hizbullah’s main rival, obtained the ministries of foreign affairs, industry, displaced persons, and energy and water, securing the broadest Christian representation in the government.
The right wing Kataeb (or Falangist) Party, also historically Christian, nominated the justice minister, while the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF or Tashnag) nominated the youth and sports minister. The Progressive Socialist Party obtained two posts: agriculture and public works, and transport.
In addition to the Finance Ministry, the Shia parties obtained the portfolios of health, labour, and the environment. To these they hoped to add a fifth: administrative development. However, Salam included this in his quota, although in consultation with Hizbullah and Amal, presumably with a view to pre-empting Shia threats to withdraw from the government in order to force concessions, a tactic that has been used in the past.
The composition of the new government was set to be announced on 6 February. However, at the last minute Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri rejected Salam’s appointment of the fifth Shia minister and left the Presidential Palace without issuing the decree forming the new government.
The following day, there was a visit to Lebanon by US Deputy Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus, the successor to Amos Hochstein. In remarks to the press after meeting with Aoun, she said that the US drew a “red line” at Hizbullah’s inclusion in Lebanon’s government.
In her meeting with Salam, she said she hoped his government would be formed soon and expressed US support for financial, administrative, and judicial reforms. Salam stressed the need to put pressure on Israel to complete its withdrawal from southern Lebanon before 18 February, the new deadline for the ceasefire extension.
On Saturday, Ortagus met privately with Berri. Immediately after the meeting, it was announced that the new government had been formed.
It appears that Berri was induced to accept a fifth Shia minister aligned with the prime minister’s bloc. In relinquishing Amal and Hizbullah’s prerogative to choose that minister, he relinquished a powerful card, but the concession signalled a realisation that Salam had refused to buckle to US pressure to exclude Hizbullah, which represents 10 to 15 per cent of the Lebanese population.
Perhaps Berri realised that if he dug in his heels, he would miss the chance to help form a new government, while mounting US pressure would result in even harsher obstacles to the Shia parties’ participation in the future.
The cooperation between Salam and Berri must still undergo the test of time. Salam is expected to omit the formula “Lebanon’s right – through its army, people, and resistance – to liberate its Occupied Territories” from the statement submitted to parliament to obtain a vote of confidence.
He will probably include wording about the role of the Lebanese Army in defending the country, international legitimacy as the key to liberating Southern Lebanon from the Israeli occupation, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 instead.
Major challenges include ensuring that the new government functions as efficiently as possible and rises above political divisions. Tense moments will come when it addresses administrative, financial, and judicial reforms. The budget will be a particularly contentious subject, given the many interests at stake.
Judicial independence could be sensitive, as it could mean reviving the stalled investigation into the Beirut Port explosion in 2020. Some speculate that renewed investigations might lead to charges against former officials close to Hizbullah and Amal, which would try to shield them by throwing spanners into the four ministries they control.
Administrative reforms could expose corruption cases involving key figures from other political parties, which would also attempt to protect their affiliates from prosecution.
The formation of a new government in record time for Lebanon is unquestionably a feat. But many tough tests lie ahead for Salam, and it will probably take a miracle for his government to meet all the commitments outlined in President Aoun’s oath-of-office speech.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 February, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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