The Syrian National Dialogue Conference (SNDC) Preparatory Committee has been reaching out to most parties to ensure as inclusive a dialogue as possible. The conference, a crucial step towards producing a constitutional declaration to govern the interim phase, is expected to include more than 1,000 delegates from across the country.
On 21 February, the committee met with community representatives in Damascus and its environs, as well as in Raqqa and Hassakeh in the northeast. However, the Syrian administration has deferred the inclusion of a significant Kurdish component in the dialogue due to unresolved issues between the two sides.
On 15 February, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) released a statement criticising the SNDC Preparatory Committee formed by the current caretaker government. “The committee does not reflect the various components of Syrian society, nor does it meet their expectations. No meaningful dialogue can occur under such exclusionary and marginalising practices,” AANES said.
The statement was a response to the committee’s first press conference two days earlier, in which it announced that the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) would not be invited.
Nevertheless, talks have continued between representatives of both sides. Observers also anticipate a breakthrough in light of the announcement by the Syrian Ministry of Oil on 22 February that the Kurdish authorities in northeastern Syria have started transferring oil from the fields they operate to the government in Damascus.
Tensions have risen between the caretaker government under President Ahmed Al-Sharaa and AANES authorities over the SDF’s refusal to turn in its arms and dissolve itself as a precondition for integrating into the Syrian national army. The SDF insists on remaining intact and joining the army as a corps, which the Sharaa administration adamantly opposes.
Sharaa also rejects the Kurds’ proposal of a “flexible federalism,” a concept inspired by Syria’s first democratic constitution of 1920 and that “offers solutions to all Syrian regions,” according to Ilham Ahmed from the AANES Foreign Relations Department.
AANES had described Al-Sharaa’s appointment as interim president as illegal. In turn, critics of the SDF, AANES’ military wing, accuse it of hiding behind the US and developing relations with Israel, which has begun to use the minority issue to justify its recent incursion into Syria and occupation of Syrian territory.
The interim government’s exclusion of the Kurds is also connected with Turkey’s considerable influence on the new administration. Turkish forces and Turkish-backed Syrian militias had fought frequent battles against Kurdish forces in northern and northeastern Syria. Ankara is now determined to ensure that the current government in Damascus aligns with its hardline approach to AANES/SDF with the ultimate aim of dismantling the Kurdish project in northeastern Syria.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan encapsulated this approach during the Syrian president’s visit to Turkey on 4 February, when he praised “my brother Ahmed Al-Sharaa” for his “strong commitment” to combatting all forms of terrorism. Erdogan regards the SDF and other Syrian-Kurdish political entities as extensions of the Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey has designated a terrorist entity.
Declining US support for the SDF may also have encouraged the Al-Sharaa government to exclude Kurdish political entities from the national dialogue. The Trump administration has indicated that it is considering withdrawing US forces from northeastern Syria. If so, the Kurds will find themselves trapped between Turkey to the north and Turkish-backed forces in Idlib and other provinces.
Al-Sharaa government is simultaneously bolstered by its developing relations with the West, as epitomised by Paris hosting the international conference in support of the Syrian transition in mid-February and the EU’s call to lift sanctions on Syria. Western powers are keen to support the new government and minimise all potentially destabilising factors. This may explain these powers’ reluctance to criticise the Al-Sharaa government for excluding Kurds from the national dialogue. They fear that amplifying the question of the Kurdish ethnic minority at this juncture would sour their relations with Damascus and obstruct talks pertaining to the political process.
On the other hand, excluding the SDF and other Kurdish political components during this early and delicate phase could have adverse effects. Finding their exclusion provocative, the Kurds could respond with potentially provocative steps. At the very least, they might try to tarnish the image of the national dialogue conference and question its objectives. Already in its aforementioned 15 February statement, AANES lashed out against the “restrictive and narrow-minded approach” that “marks the beginning of a marginalisation policy that Syrians will never accept.” The preparatory committee’s inflexible and exclusionist attitude was misguided, the statement said. It reflects a complete misreading of Syrian reality and risks a reversion to the old, centralised government system.
Deferring inclusion of the Kurds in the SNDC could lead the Kurdish political forces to overcome frictions between them and close ranks to counter pressures from Damascus. On a stronger and more unified footing, they would probably open a channel for dialogue, while retaining a hard power option. The Kurdish forces realise they might not be able to hold out indefinitely against military operations carried out by Turkey directly and indirectly by the Turkish-backed Syrian factions and the current administration.
While the situation between the Kurds and the Al-Sharaa government might be tense, few analysts believe relationship will reach a point of rupture. For one factor, the AANES statement reiterated the Kurdish political forces’ commitment to the preservation of Syrian territorial and social unity as a core goal. Secondly, both sides are working to sooth tensions. Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani from Iraqi Kurdistan has stepped in to mediate between the SDF and Damascus while Al-Sharaa government has not given up trying to persuade the SDF to disarm and integrate with the army.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 27 February, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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