Israel’s decision to resume the war on the Gaza Strip was a surprise if not in substance then in timing. The resumption of the war had been widely anticipated, but its resumption at this time seemed improbable, even to Hamas, which had been procrastinating over Steve Witkoff’s latest proposal, operating under the assumption that as long as negotiations were ongoing and the US remained involved, Israel would refrain from returning to war.
The prevailing expectation, in addition, had been that the month of Ramadan would pass without Israeli military operations in Gaza. It is difficult to call this a war – which implies the presence of two active parties. Instead, it is better described as an Israeli assault, met with almost no response from the Qassam Brigades.
Such assaults raise a question about what Benjamin Netanyahu’s wants, not only from resuming the war on Gaza, but also reigniting military operations in Southern Lebanon, southern Syria, and in Yemen against the Houthis. The underlying rationale behind this multi-front approach appears to be a reconfiguration of regional security dynamics in the Middle East to align with Israeli interests.
Tel Aviv believes these arrangements can only be achieved by force, regardless of the toll, as evidenced by its ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide in Gaza, alongside exacerbating internal divisions within fragile societies, such as establishing relations with the Druze community in southern Syria.
Expanding hostilities in the region intensifies tensions and aligns with Israel’s ultimate objective of enforced displacement. However, on the Syrian front, the security ramifications of Israel’s response to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood did not unfold in its favour. After the devastating blow inflicted by the Israeli Army on Hizbullah and the disruption of its supply lines from Syria, the Syrian regime collapsed due to the absence of one of its most crucial allies, Hizbullah. This led to the emergence of a hybrid player as an alternative to Bashar Al-Assad. The new actor, initially a non-state player — namely, Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham, which was duly dissolved as a framework — evolved into the legitimate authority overseeing the transitional period.
Israel was able to neutralise the ideological threats emanating from neighbouring Syria by quickly destroying 80 per cent of the Syrian army’s capabilities, ensuring that neither the ruling group nor any other force could wield this power to threaten Israel. Reinforcing its power, Israel penetrated further into southern Syria, predominantly inhabited by the Druze — who constitute three per cent of Syria’s population — and established a security buffer zone supposedly to address its security concerns.
Internally, Israel is engulfed by chaos, with the multi-front military escalation representing only a fraction of its broader crisis. The most consequential feature is the attempt to undermine its democratic system, epitomised by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s efforts to get rid of key figures on the Israeli security and political stage, foremost among whom is Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar, which ignited a crisis. Netanyahu’s stance on the attorney-general, whom the government wanted to remove, is another issue; and so is Qatargate, which dented his credibility.
All these events have caused the picture to revert to pre-7 October 2023 and the attempt by Netanyahu to erode Israel’s democracy and dismantle its judicial independence. However, the return of Itamar Ben-Gvir to the ruling coalition grants Netanyahu leverage, ensuring the passage of the general budget and reinforcing the ruling bloc. Netanyahu’s multi-front manoeuvres aim to consolidate his domestic standing and showcase military triumphs, particularly in operations against Hamas, especially now that Israel has recovered several hostages.
The narrative being marketed now is that Israel wants to change the course from negotiating during peace to negotiating during war in order to exert maximum pressure on Hamas to compel further hostage releases, force its departure from the Gaza Strip, and secure the dismantling of its military capabilities. This, in addition to a set of goals to achieve by resuming its war on the Strip, including targeting Hamas’ tunnel infrastructure with bunker-busting munitions and assassinating the group’s senior leadership. This was executed immediately upon the resumption of war, mirroring the American “maximum pressure” approach, combining military offensives, withholding humanitarian aid, and cutting electricity supplies.
The New Middle East project, as envisioned by Israel — positioning itself as the dominant regional power — may appear conceptually larger than Israel as a state. However, the arrival of Trump at the White House serves as a catalyst for embedding these ideas within Israeli strategic thinking, accelerating efforts to end the Palestinian cause through unjust and unilateral measures, such as a modified version of the “Deal of the Century,” the implementation of a forced displacement strategy, and the annexation of the West Bank. Additionally, Washington’s approval has facilitated Israeli incursions into southern Syria, in an attempt to expand Israel’s geographical space. Israel has expressed reservations regarding the direct talks conducted by the American envoy for prisoner affairs with Hamas, which led to his resignation.
Assessing Israel’s recent internal and foreign moves, Tel Aviv’s military pressure against Hamas does not guarantee the latter’s return to negotiations with Israel’s conditions. On the new Middle East, Israel is shifting away from its historical role—where it remained within its defined borders — seeking influence aligned with regional actors advancing their own strategic interests. Backed by the US, Israel aims to secure its interests in a region that remains entrenched in complexities that defy US-Israeli blueprints. Past US projects in the region have often yielded instability rather than control, and the current strategy includes dismantling the Palestinian state project.
Ultimately, policies such as the creation of buffer zones, military presence in Syria and Lebanon, renewed conflict in Gaza, and the targeting of the Houthis in Yemen with US support bolster the influence of Israel’s far-right, reinforcing Netanyahu’s grip on power. However, undermining Israel’s democratic institutions, particularly the judiciary, may result in serious tensions in Tel Aviv’s political circles, especially after recent events have shown that Israeli policies are not dictated by public sentiment.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 27 March, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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